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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
How I came to focus on these questions has much to do with my past experiences in 
the Australian Public Service in defence related departments; as a volunteer in the 
Highlands of Papua New Guinea and later in the United Nations Development 
Programme office in Laos; and as a research officer with the former Australian 
Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA).1  Entering the Australian public service in the 
nineteen sixties with the Vietnam war and conscription high on the agenda, I was 
soon aware of an uneasy personal political tension between a war effort and the 
humanitarian consequences.  It seemed that there was a close link between the 
achievement of security for some states and the vulnerability of people in the Third 
World, or the underdeveloped countries or developing countries depending on the 
decade and the perspective of the commentator.  Security was even then not just 
about military confrontation and balance of power relations between states, but also 
about human rights and development which were promoted by the economic and 
social machinery of the United Nations as its contribution to the United Nations 
security function.   
After four successive United Nations ‘development decades’ from the 1960s, 
macroeconomic indicators show that economic growth has been achieved by many 
developing countries and that many people are better off in absolute terms with 
national per capita figures suggesting improvements in income, health, education 
and other indicators.  A study of more local details, however, discloses a different 
story of poverty, disease, illiteracy and violence, afflicting more people now than 
ever before.  Rather than wars between states, we find, too, that people may be at 
greater risk of violence from their own governments or rebel groups, and that the 
incidence of civil war is widespread.  The incidence of failed or failing states has 
also increased and, in a climate of fear of international terrorism, these are seen as a 
threat to the security and economic wellbeing of wealthy nations.2    
                                                 
1  ACFOA was then a coordinating body of about 30 NGOs engaged in overseas aid and 
development.  It is now the Australian Council for International Development (ACFID), 
performs the same coordination function and has about 80 members. 
2  A failed state is basically one whose government ceases to exert effective control over its 
own population and territory.  Since 2005 the organisation Fund for Peace and the magazine 
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It was Barry Buzan’s People, States and Fear, which I discovered while completing 
a Masters degree in defence studies at the Australian Defence Force Academy, that 
motivated an academic interest in the issues of security and the place of the 
individual.3  I also discovered Ken Booth’s 1991 paper “Security and Emancipation” 
which inspired me to further pursue the idea that security is about individuals and 
groups and not only about states and an international balance of power.4  It opened 
the way for a view that in addition to the state, civil society organizations and social 
movements could also be key actors in creating security.  In this context, the 
political, social and economic advancement of people according to their own 
aspirations – what might be called indigenous development – appeared to be crucial.  
How the international community engaged in that development process would, it 
seemed, also be relevant to the basic human security of individuals and groups.   
What I found to be unsatisfactory about the debate on human security that followed 
release of the UNDP Report in 1994, however, was that it was being undertaken at a 
theoretical level and largely in the context of established state-based theory.  This 
meant that the debate had more to do with definitions and whether human security 
could be squeezed into existing theory and practice, rather than what human security 
might mean for individuals and groups themselves.  It also meant that human 
security was envisioned mainly in terms of conflict and violence rather than in a 
broader sense embracing livelihood, welfare and human dignity.  This thesis is, 
therefore, an exploration of the broad approach to human security and how it might 
contribute to changing the way states interact in the pursuit of their own and global 
security.  It examines the case of Cambodia whose people have suffered many forms 
of insecurity through war and violence in the 1970s and into the 1990s and who 
continue to suffer from poverty and deprivation.  My approach has been to try to 
focus security attention on the actual conditions experienced by individuals and 
groups, using Cambodia as a case study, to identify the causes and to propose 
solutions.  The research was initiated with a very open mind as to where it might 
                                                                                                                                          
Foreign Policy have together produced an Failed State Index. The Fund for Peace and 
Foreign Policy Magazine, "The Failed States Index 2007," Foreign Policy 161, July/August 
(2007).  See also Susan E Rice and Stewart Patrick, "Index of State Weakness in the 
Developing World,"  (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2008). 
3  Barry Buzan, People States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the 
Post-Cold War Era, Second Edition ed. (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991). 
4  Ken Booth, "Security and Emancipation," Review of International Studies 17, no. 4 (1991): 
313-26. 
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lead, though there were two fundamental assumptions, first, that human security 
must embrace both individual safety and livelihood, and secondly, that human 
security is an essential element in international security.     
First and foremost I thank Rapin Quinn for encouraging me to take up the PhD 
challenge and for bearing with me over the years and in the difficult final stages.  My 
thanks go also to Associate Professor Aat Vervoorn who took on the task of chair of 
my supervisory panel.  His calm but firm and responsive presence has been 
reassuring throughout.  Advisers Dr Craig Reynolds and Dr Hazel Lang offered 
valuable insights in the early stage of the thesis programme.  Dr Bina D’Costa 
accepted an advisory role in mid-2006 when Hazel moved to Sydney.  Bina provided 
great encouragement and critical comment as my work progressed. 
But in a work of this nature, the best advice and guidance can flounder on a 
seemingly unreceptive subject.  As much as I welcomed and appreciate comment 
and critique, and despite my best efforts, my ability to act on it has not, it seems, 
always been evident.  My tendency to persevere, rather than stubbornness, means 
that in the end the thesis is definitely all mine.  
There are many others who deserve my thanks.  In Cambodia I was welcomed by 
villagers wherever I went and I owe them all a debt of gratitude.  Theirs is not 
always a secure and easy life, in part because they are not well served by their 
government.  They are the reason for this thesis.  I would have been lost, too, 
without the excellent interpreting services of Chan who was by my side through all 
the village visits and interviews.   
My thanks go also to the staff of the local Cambodian NGOs in Battambang – Krom 
Akphiwat Phum, Village Support Group and Aphiwat [sic.] Srey in particular – who 
assisted with access to villages and who provided many insights into rural 
conditions.  In Phnom Penh, the staff of the Cambodian Development Resources 
Institute (CDRI) were particularly helpful and I benefited from access to the CDRI 
library and resources.  Thanks also to Tim Conway of the World Bank in Phnom 
Penh who provided access to much useful material. 
Finally, thanks are also due to Faculty of Asian Studies which accepted me into the 
programme and provided an Australian National University PhD Scholarship and 
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excellent facilities.  The faculty staff, especially Harriette Wilson and Karina Pelling, 
have attended to every need graciously and efficiently.  
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ABSTRACT 
Human security was promoted in 1994 by the UNDP as a concept embracing not 
only freedom from war and violence (or personal security), but also embracing 
individual’s basic needs for (and rights to) economic security, food security, health 
security, environmental security, community security and political security.1  
Following this formulation, the concept has been subject to considerable scrutiny 
particularly in the context of state centric security studies.  Extending the concept of 
security beyond the state to the individual appeared problematic, especially as the 
mechanisms designed to maintain and restore world peace are state based.  However, 
the post-cold war environment has required a renewed interest in conflict resolution 
and in this context, human security as personal security has achieved political and 
analytical acceptance, particularly in the UN sponsored Human Security Report.  
What then of the second dimension of human security as freedom from want 
expressed by the UNDP in terms of basic needs and rights? 
Debate on this aspect of the UNDP definition foundered on several fronts.  As well 
as being outside the traditional security framework, many argued that it was too 
broad to be analytically useful; others that it added nothing to human rights and 
human development which appeared to address precisely the same issues.  Thus, 
while the concept of human security has found acceptance by those advocating with 
humanitarian approaches to conflict resolution and prevention, few have addressed 
the actual relationship, if any, between human security and development at the local 
level where people are most vulnerable to insecurity and where human security or its 
absence is most felt. 
This thesis addresses this gap through a study of human security in Cambodia, where 
people have experienced, at different times, the full range of human insecurities 
detailed by the UNDP.  It shows that the human insecurity of Cambodians has been 
in large part a consequence of the security policies and military engagements of 
external powers.  Human security and international relations are inextricably linked.  
Cambodia’s post-conflict reconstruction, rehabilitation and development strategies 
                                                 
1  UNDP, Human Development Report 1994 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
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have also been strongly influenced by international forces through development 
assistance programmes.  Despite this aid, Cambodia’s performance in health, 
education, justice, employment and poverty alleviation has been poor and leaves 
many rural people with uncertain futures and their human security threatened.   
Various authors have suggested that human security might be guaranteed by the 
state, the rule of law, democratisation, governance, human rights or human 
development.  Based on qualitative fieldwork, the thesis argues that governance – 
especially the way in which state institutions deliver services to the people at the 
local or ‘grass roots’ level  – is key to assuring human security.  It further argues that 
through development assistance policies and practices, global governance 
institutions have a significant influence on national and local governance processes.   
The thesis concludes that, if accepted by the UN Security Council, global 
governance and international development assistance agencies, human security can 
be a bridge uniting them all in the common pursuit of individual security and 
wellbeing with benefit for state, regional and global security.   
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23 February 1979; A/RES/34/22 of 14 Nov 1979) but not included in the 
Bibliography.  UN Resolutions may be accessed at www.un.org/documents. 
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 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION – AIMS AND ARGUMENTS 
By the early 1990s in the immediate post-Cold War period, there was great optimism 
that a new world order of cooperation between the great powers would bring peace 
and prosperity to the world.  A major symbol of the new order was the reunification 
of Germany.  The UN Security Council, freed of the Cold War confrontation, had 
approved military intervention against Iraq to repel aggression and Operation 
Restore Hope to create a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid in 
Somalia.  The Security Council had also given its blessing to a peace settlement in 
Cambodia which included a new democratic constitution, free market economy and a 
promise of international cooperation for reconstruction and development.  However, 
the early hope for a new order faded as the US led intervention in Somalia soured 
and ended in withdrawal, and as the UN failed to respond early to state-sponsored 
violence in Rwanda and the crisis in Bosnia. 
A decade later, such intra-state conflict and violence had increased, particularly in 
Africa, where many people have been victims of their own states rather than being 
protected by them.  Much of this violence against citizens occurred in a context of 
poverty and ethnic division, and in the absence of basic political and human rights.  
Recognising these as both security and humanitarian concerns, the international 
community has been increasingly engaged in conflict resolution initiatives, 
peacebuilding and post-conflict development activities in many countries.  The post-
Cold War security environment has thus seen a close and deepening association of 
individual and state security and an intertwining of international and state 
responsibilities for human security.   
In 1994, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its annual Human 
Development Report drew attention to the widespread conflict and violence and 
identified the underlying poverty and underdevelopment as a root cause of human 
insecurity.  The Report questioned the traditional state-centric concept of security 
and argued that there was a need for a new approach based on a comprehensive 
concept of human security embracing economic and social rights (freedom from 
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poverty, hunger, disease, violence and environmental degradation) and political and 
cultural rights (freedom to exercise basis human rights and freedoms and cultural 
identity).  Human security, it argued, corresponded to the right of individual to 
“freedom from want and freedom from fear.”1   
This thesis is about human security.  The concept developed by the UNDP seemed to 
me to be straightforward enough in that individuals and groups ought to have some 
measure of expectation that they can in the present and continue in the future to live 
in peace and safety, have a reasonable standard of living and opportunity for 
themselves and their children, and receive protection within their given societies.  
Further investigation of human security, however, soon revealed that not all share 
my conviction.  Human security has, instead, proved to be far from straightforward.   
Human Security 
The UNDP approach to defining human security immediately suggested a 
bifurcation of the concept into freedom from fear which could be interpreted as 
freedom from war, conflict and violence; and freedom from want which embraced a 
wide range of livelihood issues.  Indeed, as we shall see in the next chapter, 
Canadian and Japanese governments soon supported separate approaches which 
prioritised freedom from fear and freedom from want aspects respectively.  The 
Canadian approach has been consolidated in its support for an annual Human 
Security Report which adopts a narrow definition of human security as freedom from 
war and other forms of violence.  On the other hand, the Japanese supported 
Commission on Human Security followed the UNDP lead by proposing a broad 
definition of human security.  It also prioritised the development aspects of human 
security. 
The first major issue to confront in a study of human security is how it is to be 
defined—is it, for example, only about exposure to war, conflict and violence, or, as 
I will argue in the next chapter, does it embrace other humanitarian and welfare 
concerns as well?  Broad definitions of human security such as that of the UNDP, 
have been challenged by a number of authors who support only those limited to 
                                                 
1  United Nations, "Universal declaration of Human Rights,"  (New York: United Nations, 
1948). 
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conflict and violence.  Some limit the definition for ‘pragmatic’ reasons based on an 
argument that the nature of development indicators, which might be used to measure 
aspects of freedom from want, cannot be defined or quantified in terms of 
vulnerability, level of threat, severity or other security based criteria.2  A narrow, 
freedom from fear approach is, in this view, considered to be more practical.  
Proponents depend largely on econometric studies of the incidence and causes of 
conflict and violence to argue their case.  The main problem with their method, 
however, is not only that the issue of quantification can be disputed, but that it also 
demands a more rigid definition of the concept of security in the human security 
context than is applied in security studies generally.  Other arguments are also made 
against the broad definition on the grounds that it risks being so wide as to include 
anything as a human security issue and is thus unworkable.  It is argued, too, that 
freedom from want is adequately dealt with by existing human rights and human 
development strategies making a broad concept of human security unnecessary.   
It is true that many of the issues embraced by the broad definition of human security 
are similar to those addressed within the human rights and human development 
frameworks.  However, while all three approaches focus attention on the welfare of 
the individual, human rights and human development are essentially methods which 
can be applied to achieving human security and, thus, also contributing to state and 
global security.  Human rights have become a major advocacy and diplomatic tool 
used by states and civil society organizations to pressure other states to protect their 
citizens.  Human development includes a range of processes promoted by 
international development agencies and donors to improve the capacity and welfare 
of individuals in a way that they believe will contribute to national development and 
security.  To date, these methods have not achieved their desired outcomes despite 
massive aid and development efforts worldwide.  In other words, they have failed to 
provide human security and a new approach is required to help understand the causes 
of persistent human insecurity and what can be done about it.   
                                                 
2  See for example Andrew Mack, "Report on the Feasibility of Creating an Annual Human 
Security Report,"  (Cambridge: Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, 
Harvard University, 2002), 2; Human Security Centre, Human Security Report: War and 
Peace in the 21st Century (New York: Oxford University Press for the Human Security 
Centre, University of British Colombia, Canada, 2005), viii. 
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Objective of the thesis and research question 
This thesis explores the possibility of using a human security approach to identify 
human insecurities in a particular situation, to uncover their causes and to propose 
new policies and strategies for their alleviation.  My main concern is to make a 
contribution to improving the human security of people subject to conflict, violence, 
poverty and other deprivations.   
With Cambodia as a case study, the objective of the thesis is to demonstrate that it is 
important to retain the broad definition of human security and that a human security 
approach to the study of local conditions can provide a valuable contribution to 
improving international security and development policies and practices.  Further, 
the thesis aims to show that human security is a function of society and culture as 
well as of government and the institutions of state which impact on people’s daily 
lives.  It thus reflects a dynamic condition which is also affected by such wider 
influences as globalisation and international governance processes which impact 
either directly, or through the state, on local human security conditions.3  The 
purpose is to explore the practical aspects of human insecurity and its causes, with a 
view to proposing new approaches to security and development problems.  I will 
leave to others the task of reformulating or rearranging state based international 
relations and security theories to accommodate human security. 
The research question for the thesis, therefore, is how a human security approach can 
contribute to human welfare through a reassessment of the impact of international 
security and international development practices at the grass-roots level.  To answer 
this question, several supplementary questions need to be answered before exploring 
the application of the concept of human security to the situation in Cambodia from 
the 1970s to the present.  First, is a broad definition of human security practicable?  
Secondly, how have international security and development processes impacted on 
human security?  Finally, what can the findings from Cambodia contribute to giving 
a human security focus to what I call international security practice, which includes 
the way that states use balance of power strategies (economic and military); 
                                                 
3  I use the word governance here and in subsequent chapters in its very general sense as a 
process of management or governing.  However, in chapter 5 the concept is discussed in 
detail for analytical purposes.  Also, in this thesis I do not consider  human insecurity arising 
from natural or other disasters . 
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collective security institutions such as the UN Security Council; UN humanitarian 
organizations and international development assistance, to pursue their national and 
global security interests? 
Research methodology 
Human security research has been largely concerned with its place in international 
relations and security theory, definitional issues and conflict situations.  As we shall 
see in the next chapter, authors have made various assertions that human security 
might be guaranteed by the state, civil society, governance or development.  For 
others, it is the rule of law or democratisation which is the key.  These claims have a 
strong ideological content and are based on top-down analyses from a broad 
international perspective in which human rights, democracy, the rule of law, the role 
of civil society and free markets are all seized upon as universal ideals which will 
guarantee human security.  Such ideals also underpin conflict resolution and 
peacebuilding activities.  It is assumed more broadly, too, that globalisation of these 
“universal” ideals and practices will bring human security in a new form of “trickle 
down” as states reform their institutions and adopt public policies in accordance with 
the universal best practice forms promoted by development institutions.  What is 
lacking, however, is research which investigates the actual relationship, if any, 
between human security and international security practice, development, civil 
society, rule of law and governance at the local level where people are most 
vulnerable to insecurity and where human security or its absence is most felt. 
The research approach is therefore focused at the local level where individuals and 
groups live in accordance with the opportunities offered to them by their physical, 
social, cultural and political environment.  This means that while national and 
regional statistical analyses might provide a broad guide to certain generalised 
human security issues, such as poor health, income and education, there are also 
other unquantifiable issues which need to be identified through qualitative field 
research methods.  These relate to politics and power structures at the local level and 
state administrative arrangements which influence local conditions.  Since the vast 
majority of Cambodians live in the countryside, I have limited my contemporary 
field research to the rural context.  I also assume that the concept, although 
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formulated in the early 1990s, can be used to reassess the conditions in which people 
found themselves in earlier periods in Cambodia.   
Thus, the research methodology is multi-disciplinary.  The main body of critical 
literature on human security has been produced by international relations and 
political science scholars and is primarily concerned with the question of definition 
(as discussed above) and with how human security, which prioritises the individual, 
can be reconciled with state centric theories of security.  They have also presented 
arguments as to how human security might be achieved by democratisation, 
development, civil society, the rule of law and other means.  While it is not my 
intention to argue that state security is dependent on human security or vice versa, 
the next chapter examines issues raised in the literature to illustrate that, although 
such studies are often highly sceptical of human security, nevertheless it is a concept 
already established and slowly finding a place in international relations theory.4   
The arguments for the achievement of human security by democratisation, 
development, civil society, the rule of law and other means are not well supported by 
econometric analyses of civil conflicts.  The econometric studies set out to determine 
the factors which contribute to outbreaks of conflict and violence and their results 
have been used in particular by proponents of the narrow freedom-from-fear 
approach.5  However, these statistical analyses provide no firm conclusions as to the 
causes of outbreaks of civil war and violence.  They also tell us nothing of the actual 
condition of individuals and groups who choose a path of violence.  Nor do they 
positively conclude that increasing democracy, human rights, rule of law, 
governance, level of development or other factors are in themselves sufficient to 
prevent such outbreaks.  Nevertheless, they do conclude that low-income levels, low 
growth and dependence on natural resources place a country at risk of falling into 
civil war.6  In other words, these factors create the situation of insecurity which 
                                                 
4  Pauline Kerr, "The Evolving Dialectic Between State-Centric and Human-Centric Security,"  
(Department of International Relations, Australian National University: 2003). 
5  The Human Security Report edited by Andrew Mack is a key example of this approach.  See 
Mack, "Report on the Feasibility of Creating an Annual Human Security Report," 2. 
6  See for example Paul Collier, "Development and Conflict," (Centre for the Study of African 
Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University: 2004); Paul Collier et al., 
Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (A Co-publication of the 
World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003).  Cambodia is identified as a country at risk 
in Monty G. Marshall and Ted Robert Gurr, "Peace and Conflict 2005: A Global Survey of 
Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy," (College Park: Center 
for International Development & Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 2005). 
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precedes an actual descent into conflict.  Hence, the econometric studies do not 
exclude the broad concept of human security but rather give it substance. 
Very few studies have attempted to look at human security at the local level.  It has 
been mainly used in political advocacy in relation to refugees and issues such as the 
elimination of landmines and the use of child soldiers, and the treatment of civilians 
in conflict, and there are networks of human security advocates.  Apart from several 
investigations of development projects in Africa which draw attention to 
international governance and human security, there are a number of anthropological 
studies which addressed human security mainly in terms of personal identity and 
social and cultural association, and their relation to aspects of local governance.7   
Overall, the main contribution from these sources has been to support a view that 
human security can be part of security theory and that the broad concept can be used 
to analyse local situations.  Thus, the methodology used in this thesis does not 
develop from a single body of theory and analysis.  Instead it takes an empirical 
approach to the study of the situation of people in several communes in Battambang 
province where fieldwork was undertaken in November—December 2004 and 
March—May 2005.  The findings from the fieldwork have been confirmed and 
generalised using a range of NGO, consultant and official organization development 
studies on Cambodia.    
Secondary documentary sources have been used for my analysis of Cambodia’s past 
state formation, the war-time experience of its people, the country’s administrative 
restructuring following Vietnam’s intervention and, later, international development 
programmes.  The research has drawn extensively on historical and political 
economy studies, as well as the few anthropological works on Cambodia, to provide 
an understanding of Cambodian history, society and culture and the various 
administrative arrangements which have been applied in Cambodia at various times.  
This is essential to our understanding of its contemporary governance.  Since the 
fieldwork focused my research attention on governance and society, social science 
literature has been used to provide a framework for the analysis of these aspects in 
rural Cambodia.  It has also provided the basis for my argument that not only do 
                                                 
7  See Caroline Thomas and Peter Wilkin, eds., Globalization, Human Security, and the 
African Experience, Critical Security Studies (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999).  
Anthropological studies are discussed in the next chapter. 
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states and individuals have responsibilities for human security, but that this extends 
also to international governance institutions (such as the World Bank and WTO) as 
part of a broader international security objective.       
Field methodology 
To hear the first hand views of the rural people on what constitute threats to human 
security or what conditions represent a situation of human insecurity, I organised 
with a Cambodian NGO working in Battambang to visit the province where I could 
take up this research with individuals and groups in rural communes.  Many issues 
emerge in the formulation of a research programme and approach.  Before I left 
Australia there was the question of an ethics clearance which was granted by the 
ANU ethics committee on 20 January 2005.  As part of the process, it was 
established that an informal interview method would be used rather than a formal 
questionnaire.  This was considered to be important so that the views of literate and 
non-literate villagers could be heard.  It also provided an opportunity to clarify views 
which appeared to reflect attitudes acquired from the NGOs, consultants and officials 
who had been regular visitors to many of the communes and villages in the region 
over the past decade.  They had used techniques such as rapid rural appraisal 
approaches, questionnaires and interviews which suggested that many people would 
be “questionnaire-aware.”8 I went to Cambodia with an expectation that human 
security would be primarily concerned with social movement and civil society 
organisations.  What I found was that these were extremely undeveloped and that at 
the local level the emerging operation of elected Commune Councils and their 
interaction with villagers were central to the study of human security.  These 
Councils had responsibilities relating to local development initiatives and for 
people’s general safety and welfare.  The field research also pointed to the poor 
performance of central government departments in service delivery to rural 
Cambodians.  Therefore, in the field my focus shifted to governance to understand 
how individuals and groups balance their economic, social and political relations 
with the communes councils and with the central government departments providing 
health, education, agricultural, judicial and other services.  Informed by my previous 
public sector experience, my fieldwork raised many questions relating to local 
                                                 
8  John Holloway, Chom Sok, et. al., "Process Audit of Commune/Sangkat Fund Projects 
(CMB/01/272/RILG),"  (Phnom Penh: For the Cambodian Seila Task Force, 2005), 4. 
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governance and in particular the “good governance” reforms promoted by the 
international development institutions.9  It also linked human security at the local 
level back to functions of international development assistance institutions. 
Working in rural Cambodia presented me with several important limitations.  First, I 
am not a fluent Khmer speaker and therefore was dependent on a translator for all 
work with villagers.  Secondly, the language of democracy, electoral politics and 
development has introduced many foreign concepts into Cambodian society and the 
need to manufacture Khmer terminology to express their meanings.  It is not 
necessarily the case that the new terminology conveys a universal understanding of 
the concepts, especially if used in a written questionnaire.  Unstructured interviews 
therefore represented a better approach on the one hand, but on the other depended 
on the ability and willingness of the translator to represent exactly what was being 
said by an interviewee.  My translator was very experienced.  He was an English 
teacher who had worked for UNTAC personnel and for a number of research groups 
since then, and was well qualified to assist me.  To confirm my interpretations, I 
cross-referenced the information and ideas presented by villagers, village and 
commune leaders and NGO representatives, with written material as well as 
discussions in English with local officials and NGO workers.   
The first major rethink of my approach was when it became clear that just as with 
concepts like human rights and food security in the past, there was no equivalent in 
Khmer to that of human security.  There was a mix of terms with related meanings: 
an informant explained that santesok referred to peace and being happy and would 
be used at the local level; santepeap on the other hand referred to a higher national 
level and meant there was no more fighting, one could travel without fear of bullets.  
Safety was another concept, sawatapeap, which was about safety from harm caused 
by such things as flood and fire and “by our own carelessness.”  Security in terms of 
concern about tomorrow’s food, a poor harvest, employment and income or, at the 
higher level, development and the future of the nation, was more akin to worry, 
bprooay.  Other terms mentioned were to be frightened or scared of the future, which 
                                                 
9  In this thesis, a reference to “good governance” is a reference to the specific programme of 
standard governance principles and reforms proposed by the World Bank and other 
development institutions.  In this context it is a packaged approach to economic regulation 
and management, supported by processes that are accountable, transparent, participatory, 
consensus oriented, effective, equitable and follows the rule of law.  
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NGOs might refer to as “vulnerable.”10  Therefore, the approach taken was to seek 
people’s general comments about issues that concerned them in any of these 
categories.  This could be justified by the fact that whether referred to as a worry, a 
safety concern or a breach of peace, an issue could potentially fall within the 
framework of the broad human security definition.  In a sense I was conceding that 
human security could be a catch bag of everything, as had been claimed by some 
critics.  In fact, Thakur takes a very similar view of human security as discussed in 
the next chapter.11  The main problem then was to establish the significance of an 
issue, whether it was being managed locally or whether it might become a more 
significant human security matter for the people concerned.   
The basic question for my field work was what sort of economic, social and political 
issues confronted villagers on a day-to-day basis and how the elected commune 
councils contributed to meeting the local development needs of villagers in 
accordance with national objectives, and to ensuring a safe and secure future for all.  
Findings from the fieldwork were, as far as possible, validated by reference to the 
many local and national development studies available in Cambodia, particularly 
those concerning the region visited.12 
Why Cambodia as the case study? 
Cambodia presents an important case study for human security for four main 
reasons.  First, it was subject to war and violence for thirty years from the 1960s.  
During this time there was internal political factionalism and armed revolt; 
clandestine US bombing as a “sideshow” to the Vietnam war before becoming 
openly engaged in that war; a period of revolutionary abuse under the leadership of 
Pol Pot; and, finally, a period of internationally sustained civil war prior to an 
internationally brokered peace settlement.  Throughout this time, human security for 
                                                 
10  Discussions with my interpreter and staff of Krom Akphiwat Phum (KAWP), a local 
Cambodian NGO.   
11  Ramesh Thakur, "From National to Human Security," in Asia-Pacific Security: The 
Economics-Politics Nexus, ed. Stuart Harris and Andrew Mack (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 
1997). 
12  Although Battambang Province has experienced periods of Thai rule and its involvement in 
the civil war, refugee camps and refugee repatriation has meant that it has possibly received 
more international assistance than other areas, the issues identified are widespread in 
Cambodia.  On different administration in Battambang see Chheat Sreang, "The Cambodian 
Khum from 1897-1919 and its Contemporary Relevance" (M.A., Royal University of Phnom 
Penh, 2004), 19-22. 
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most Cambodians was compromised in different ways depending on their particular 
circumstances.  Cambodia thus provides a rich and well-rounded example of the 
different factors, at the local, national and international level, which impinged on 
human security at different times and in a variety of circumstances.  The experience 
of Cambodia demonstrates that human security is closely related to international 
security practice in the way in which the permanent members of the Security Council 
in particular used the mechanisms of power and diplomacy to sideline the Security 
Council and, to some extent also, UN humanitarian organizations, to pursue their 
national security interests in Cambodia. 
Secondly, Cambodia was the subject, eventually, of a peace deal which saw the 
United Nations assume effective sovereignty while elections were held and a 
constitution agreed by the newly formed Cambodian government.  This process was 
made possible by the end of the Cold War which meant that the ideological posturing 
and confrontation between the great powers, that had sustained the Cambodian 
conflict as a proxy war, was no longer necessary.  The change also made it possible 
for the focus of international security practice to shift from war to peace and finally 
to the future stability of Cambodia and the welfare of Cambodians.  As well as 
imposing a democratic constitution and free market economy, the international peace 
agreement included provisions for a ceasefire, repatriation of refugees, rehabilitation 
and reconstruction of the country, and for ensuring Cambodia’s ongoing 
development.  Thus, global, regional, national and human security objectives were 
all part of the peace agreement.   
Thirdly, despite the agreement, sporadic civil war and political instability continued 
for a number of years and, while conditions for the people generally improved, the 
promise of human rights, human development and political freedom have 
languished.  It appears that human security was not guaranteed by the peace 
settlement, elections and a democratic form of government. 
Finally, Cambodian governments since 1993 have accepted and incorporated in their 
development policies the internationally promoted norms of human rights, human 
development and poverty reduction strategies.  Cambodia has also embraced “good 
governance” as a centrepiece of its development strategy.13  Hence, Cambodia 
                                                 
13  See Royal Government of Cambodia, "Address by Samdech Hun Sen, Prime Minister of the 
Royal Government of Cambodia on "Rectangular Strategy for Growth, Employment, Equity 
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provides a unique case for analysing the outcome of development in rural areas in 
terms of the broad definition of human security and to demonstrate the contribution a 
human security approach can make to development policies and practices.   
Cambodia – Today 
Cambodia’s population in 2006 was around 14 million, some 85 per cent of whom 
live in rural areas.  It is estimated that between 1.5 to 2 million Cambodians died 
between 1975 and 1978 during the Pol Pot period due to purges, disease and 
starvation.  A post war “baby boom” since 1979, when the population was estimated 
at about 6.5 million, has also produced a generation which requires a rapid expansion 
of education and health services and employment opportunities.14   
Despite a massive influx of aid since 1993 and an average annual growth rate of 7 
per cent, Cambodia ranked 129th on the UN Human Development Index in 2006.  
Illiteracy is above 25 per cent and 33 per cent of the population is undernourished.  
Life expectancy is just 56 years compared to 70 years in neighbouring Vietnam and 
Thailand.  Only 30 per cent of births have a skilled professional present.  Infant 
mortality is high and some 45 per cent of children under 5 years of age are 
underweight and under height (compared to Vietnam and Thailand at 28 per cent and 
19 per cent respectively).  Fifty nine percent of Cambodians do not have available 
clean water sources and a mere seventeen per cent have access to improved 
sanitation.  Education achievements are also poor in terms of retention and quality of 
services. 
National economic growth has not performed well in terms of improved standards of 
living and a reduction in poverty.  Growing inequality is a significant factor in 
                                                                                                                                          
and Efficiency"  delivered at the First Cabinet Meeting of the Third Legislature of the 
National Assembly at the Office of Council of Ministers," (Phnom Penh: Royal Government 
of Cambodia, 2004). 
14  Over 50 per cent of the population in 2004 was 19 years or younger.  See Royal Government 
of Cambodia, "Population Pyramid, Cambodia 2004," National Institute of Statistics, 
Ministry of Planning, http://www.statnis/SURVEYS/cips2004/p_pyramid.htm, accessed on 7 
July 2007. 
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explaining the weak poverty reduction achievement in Cambodia.15  Poverty is 
consistently high with 35 per cent of the population below the poverty line.16 
The majority of the population is engaged in agriculture on household plots.  Rice is 
the staple for most Cambodians and the country claims domestic food security at a 
national level.  Cambodia is not naturally suited to rice production and has a 
basically subsistence agriculture based on poor soils, traditional methods and 
equipment, variable climate and flooding patterns, and low yields.17  There is only 
limited agricultural infrastructure development.18   Industry has also been neglected 
and it is estimated more than 0.5 million young people will migrate, over four years, 
to the cities where there are no formal jobs for them.  Cambodia could then have up 
to one million unemployed or underemployed.19   
Hun Sen and the CPP have dominated government since 1993.  The government has 
demonstrated poor policy formulation and implementation.  There is little public 
debate and civil society contribution is limited.  Human rights, freedom of speech 
and of the press have been seriously curtailed during the CPP reign, and corruption 
in government and the public sector is rife with public institutions being hotbeds of 
                                                 
15  See World Bank, "World Development Report: Equity and Development,"  (Washington: 
World Bank, 2006) and World Bank, "Sharing Growth: Equity and Development in 
Cambodia,"  (East Asia and the Pacific Region, World Bank, 2007). 
16  ADB, "Participatory Poverty Assessment in Cambodia," (ADB, 2001).  The poverty line 
equivalent is calculated at less than US$0.45 a day—80 per cent of which is to meet food 
needs (2,100 calories per day) and 20 per cent to meet other essential needs such as clothing, 
health and shelter.  The ADB Assessment discusses a number of other poverty studies and 
the various poverty measures in use.  For an explanation of the US$1 per day poverty 
measure see also World Bank, “Frequently Asked Questions About Poverty in Cambodia” at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/
CAMBODIAEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20720197~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:2
93856,00.html, accessed on 19 September 2007.  
17  Jean Delvert, Le Paysan Cambodgien (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1961; reprint, 1994).  This is a 
comprehensive study of Cambodian agriculture.  See also Don Puckridge, The Burning of the 
Rice: A Cambodian Success Story (Hartwell: Sid Harta Publishers, 2004) which tells the 
story of an Australia–IRRI aid project  in Cambodia which was initiated in 1985. 
18  The main schemes were developed during the French colonial period.  The Mekong River 
Development Scheme sponsored by the then Economic Commission for Asia and the Far 
East (ECAFE) in the 1960s was abandoned due to the war with only one stage completed, 
irrigating 5,000 ha.  The Pol Pot regime instigated irrigation schemes across the country with 
generally poor results.  See Chann Sinath, "Investment in Land and Water in Cambodia," in 
Investment in Land and Water, Proceedings of the Regional Consultations, Bangkok, 3-5 
October 2001 (Bangkok: FAO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, RAR Publication 
2002/9, 2002), 165, 71.   
 SIDA noted the poor status of irrigation and compared Cambodia’s 7 per cent of irrigated 
land to Vietnam’s and Thailand’s 45 per cent and 31 per cent respectively.  See Susanna 
Lundström and Per Ronnås, "Employment and Growth in Cambodia: An Integrated 
Economic Analysis,"  (Stockholm: SIDA, 2006), 29.   
19 Economic Institute of Cambodia, Cambodia: Economic Watch, April 2005 (Phnom Penh: 
Economic Institute of Cambodia, 2005), xi. 
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political patronage and rent seeking.  In this authoritarian environment, influential 
and powerful persons are able to undertake illegal activities such as land seizures 
with impunity.  The rule of law is severely compromised.   
Overall, therefore, Cambodia provides a context for studying human security at the 
local level through periods of conflict, conflict resolution, peace building and 
development.  The experience of Cambodia suggests that human security as freedom 
from fear and as freedom from want are basically inseparable, though one may 
predominate at any time and place.  It demonstrates that long after the elections in 
1993 and the departure of UN troops, human insecurity is a daily issue for many 
Cambodians.  There remains a threat not only of livelihood insecurities, but also of a 
return to political violence.  As Thailand has shown, military engagement in politics 
in the region is not a thing of the past.  Also, conflict resolution and post-conflict 
development are major contemporary international security issues.  Iraq, Afghanistan 
and East Timor, as well as Somalia, Sudan, Liberia, Rwanda and many other 
counties, face the difficult transition from conflict resolution to development.  
Studying the Cambodian experience from a human security perspective may provide 
useful lessons for policy makers to apply in other similar situations.      
Outline of the thesis argument 
There are four main arguments to the thesis.  First, that human security is directly 
related to international security and development policies and practices; secondly, 
that a broad definition of human security is essential to understanding the security 
situation of people in times of war and peace; thirdly, that human security is best 
understood in the local context; and finally, that a broad definition of human security 
provides a sound basis for applying a human security approach to reassessing 
international security and development policies and practices of states and 
international institutions.  These are expanded below.   
The direct relationship between human security and international security and 
development policies and practices is amply illustrated in the case of Cambodia.  It 
will be demonstrated that, in addition to domestic factors, human security in 
Cambodia was directly affected by the conduct of the Cold War and, in particular, by 
the Vietnam war in which Cambodia was a “sideshow” before being fully enveloped 
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in the conflict from 1970 to 1975.20  The human security of Cambodians was further 
affected by great power and regional support for various Cambodian political 
factions to maintain a civil war in Cambodia following the Vietnamese intervention 
in 1978 until the signing of the peace agreement in 1991.  At the same time, states 
also placed their security interests above the welfare of people by actively 
obstructing the efforts of UN and other humanitarian agencies to assist refugees and 
other victims of war.  In this context the human security of Cambodians could not be 
separated from international security practice.  International security considerations 
will also be shown to underpin the massive programme of international development 
assistance which followed the peace settlement.  The first argument arising from the 
post-UNTAC development processes in Cambodia is that from a broad human 
security perspective, rural people face many insecurities which are not adequately 
addressed by government or international development policies and practices.   
Secondly, that a broad definition of human security is necessary to understand the 
individual situations in times of war and peace is confirmed by the experience of 
Cambodians in refugee camps and inside Cambodia during the conflict, as well as by 
the post-conflict experience.  What is demonstrated by the experience of Cambodia 
is that human security issues such as food security, health, environmental, social and 
political security exist in both war and post-war situations.  Accordingly, there is a 
continuum of human insecurity issues ranging from the ongoing, if diminishing, 
conflict and violence as well as basic economic and political insecurities. 
Thirdly, since human security concerns the actual living conditions of individuals 
and groups, it is best understood in the local context.  It is in the village and 
commune (or refugee camp) where people are bound by custom and society, come 
into direct contact with government institutions and political parties, and where they 
derive income for themselves and their families.  What the research shows is that 
human security conditions at the local rural level in Cambodia are influenced by a 
multiplicity of factors including, in particular, institutions of governance.  It will be 
shown that Cambodian society has long tended towards an authoritarian systems of 
governance under various regimes (predatory states) and that the current system of 
commune councils does not function democratically as intended by the international 
                                                 
20 William Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia (New 
York: Pocket Books, 1979). 
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donor community.  Instead it reflects much of the social structures of power from 
earlier times—especially the tendency to hierarchy and authoritarianism.  
Consequently, the human security of villagers has a great deal to do with how 
institutions work at the local level and the power relations inherent in them.  It is also 
influenced by power relations in the society at large which has its own system of 
relationships.  These are not necessarily ones of individual freedom, adherence to a 
rule of law and an acceptance of majority representative government.   
It will be shown that there are many social practices, including patron client 
relations, which may function to provide support and security to villagers.  These 
relationships are not eliminated by new democratic institutions but may be used by 
the powerful to extend their patronage networks into the commune councils and 
government organisations.  For the population at large this creates the dilemma of 
how to relate to the institutions and to those who manage them.  Are the institutions 
legitimate?  Can the officials be trusted?  What benefits do they provide?  At the 
same time international donors tend to classify patronage as corrupt and, ignoring the 
potential benefits, withhold support for government institutions thereby neglecting to 
address the more significant issues of how to achieve legitimacy, trust and effective 
service delivery.   
Researching human security at the local level also draws attention to the role of 
government ministries and departments.  These are responsible for delivering 
services, such as health care, justice, education, agricultural support and irrigation 
infrastructure, which make it possible for people to achieve human security as well 
as contributing to the growth of the national economy and national social wellbeing.  
In fact, it will be discovered that they are largely ineffective and that human security 
is thereby compromised as people’s opportunities and prospects are diminished. 
Governance in Cambodia is, therefore, a key factor in local human security.  
However, an analysis of Cambodian and international governance structures and 
processes illustrates that there is a tension between the institutions of existing society 
and the promotion of “universal” development norms and practices by international 
agencies.  Since social change is concerned with changing values and beliefs, it 
requires political and social leadership that not only promotes the new ideas as 
matters of policy but also contributes to legitimising them through open political 
debate and public acceptance.  Yet, in Cambodia, the political leadership has failed 
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dismally to show such leadership.  At the same time the international community has 
been unable to influence the commitment of the political leadership despite its 
fundamental importance to human rights and human development and, ultimately, to 
human security.  The attempt to influence change through a technical approach to  
“good governance” has failed because it does not facilitate social interaction and 
social change. 
Finally, the operation of the UN Security Council and of international development 
institutions is considered from the perspective of human security.  These institutions 
are essentially state-centric in their approach to global security.  Although 
development has been variously promoted in terms of basic needs, human rights and 
human development, “good governance” and structural adjustment, participation and 
empowerment, it has also been closely aligned with donor states’ concerns for their 
own security.  Aid has been used by donors to promote the stability of neighbouring 
countries and other areas of strategic interest.  Despite there being an assumption that 
security is linked to people’s welfare, the concept of human security which makes a 
direct link has not been widely adopted.  The thesis concludes that a human security 
approach, by emphasising a total security framework from human security through 
state security to global security, can effectively unite the UN Security Council and 
international development assistance institutions in a common objective.    
We have heard repeatedly over the years that it is not in Australia’s national interest 
to have instability and the threat of failed states in its region.  Human rights and 
human development, democratisation and “good governance” are tools in the overall 
security agenda of not only the developed countries but, since the end of the Cold 
War, the UN and so called international community generally.    
Thesis structure  
Chapter 2 discusses the concept of human security.  It begins with the 1994 UNDP 
Human Development Report presentation of human security, the political reaction 
and the response of the academic security community.  Largely, it centres around the 
debate over the comparative viability of narrow and broad definitions of the concept.  
It also considers econometric analyses of the incidence and causes of civil war and 
violence and post-conflict development policies.  These point to a range of factors 
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which may, to various extents, be associated with human security (e.g. as the 
absence of war and violence).  They include democracy, development, governance, 
globalisation, rule of law and economic growth, all of which are also part of 
international poverty reduction and human development strategies.  Therefore the 
chosen approach to human security is one that embraces governance and the scope 
for the political involvement of individuals.  The chapter concludes that the broader, 
if less manageable, concept has been largely ignored in explorations of human 
security.  As well as identifying this significant gap in the research in regard to the 
local conditions which impact on people’s human security at the grass-roots level, 
the chapter sets the context for the thesis case study.   
Chapter 3 serves a dual purpose.  First, by way of Appendix A, it provides a brief 
background to Cambodia’s political and administrative history to inform the reader 
of the societal context in which the more recent changes have been introduced.  
Secondly, it details the impact on the human security of rural Cambodians caused by 
both domestic politics and international security practice arising from the Vietnam 
war, the period of Khmer Rouge rule and the following period of internationally 
sponsored civil war in Cambodia.  It also outlines the state re-building following 
Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia in 1978, the role of UN Humanitarian agencies 
in assisting Cambodian refugees at the Thai border and, following a peace 
settlement, the role of international development institutions in promoting a 
decentralised development strategy for Cambodia.   
Chapter 4 looks more closely at the human security situation in the countryside in the 
light of the development priorities and promises.  It demonstrates that human 
security is threatened by a number of factors including failures of law and order, 
unemployment and poor public service delivery.  These issues are taken into chapter 
5 and discussed in relation to theories and practice of “good governance” in 
development.  It argues that governance, interpreted as a blend of new public 
management and corporate governance, needs to both engage individuals and civil 
society at the local level and pay close attention to institutional cultures which 
determine the role of leadership and the commitment of officers to designated 
outcomes.  The chapter will show that there needs to be greater attention given to 
politics and its role in creating social change.   
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The final chapter concludes that the broad definition of human security is both 
practical and desirable.  Using such an approach has also provided a sound basis for 
including human security within the international security framework both in terms 
of specific security bodies, such as the UN Security Council, as well as the extensive 
international development assistance programmes which are also security-related in 
their operation and purpose.   
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CHAPTER 2 
HUMAN SECURITY – CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which 
have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human 
beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been 
proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people.1 
People who are trying to survive … do not choose between addressing ‘violent threats’ or 
‘poverty threats’.  They address both.  Human security should do likewise.2 
 
This chapter outlines the projection of the idea of human security onto the 
international stage by the UNDP in 1994, and the debates that it engendered.  First in 
terms of definitional problems and, secondly, in terms of human security’s challenge 
to the mainstream academic disciplines which traditionally claim international 
relations and security as their specialist domains and the state as the basic unit in 
their theoretical formulations.  The main thrust of the chapter is that it is important to 
adopt a broad definition of human security and that the primary concern is for the 
condition of people in terms of their local social and political realities.  
The risk, otherwise, is that human security becomes little more than what Duffield 
calls an aid-related technique of global security, or Mary Kaldor represents as a 
particular form of military-civilian intervention in situations of civil conflict or 
natural disaster.3  These sorts of approach are about how human security is “done” 
by international aid and by international military intervention.  They do not 
challenge the state-based security theories but rather work within them to analyse 
how dominant states are pursuing their own security by co-opting humanitarian 
concerns and development processes.  This thesis therefore turns attention to the 
problem of how to refocus human security on the individual. 
                                                 
1  Preamble to United Nations, "Universal declaration of Human Rights."  Available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/index.htm. 
2  Sabina Alkire, "Conceptual Framework for Human Security (Working Definition and 
Executive Summary)," (Working Paper prepared for the Commission on Human Security: 
2002), 5.  
3  See Mark Duffield, "Human Security: Linking Development and Security in an Age of 
Terror," in New Interfaces between Security and Development: Changing Concepts and 
Approaches, ed. Stephan Klingebiel (Bonn: German Development Institute, 2006); and Mary 
Kaldor, Mary Martin, and Sabine Selchow, "Human Security: A New Strategic Narrative for 
Europe," International Affairs 83, no. 2 (2007).  
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Although econometric analyses of the occurrence and causes of civil war and 
violence have formed the basis for a narrow, conflict related approach to human 
security (defined as the absence of civil war and other forms of physical violence) 
they have also emphasised the role of development in conflict resolution and 
prevention.4  In fact, the econometric analyses support the extension of the human 
security concept beyond conflict and physical violence to embrace security in terms 
of everyday existence – food, shelter, justice, income, social and political freedom 
and liberty – which are the aims, if not the achievements, of development.  Further 
support for this position comes from a range of new studies on human security which 
extend the use of the concept into a wider context of anthropological research.5 
Inevitably, a discussion of human security brings into play questions of its 
relationship with human rights and human development.  The relationship is, in fact, 
treated in a variety of ways in the literature.  On the one hand, it is said that you can 
not have one without the other, while on the contrary there is a view that human 
rights are what counts, and that these embrace human development.  In this view, 
human security is largely irrelevant as it is considered to add little if anything to the 
comprehensive range of rights existing in international law and UN covenants.6  The 
position here is that a concept of human security provides a unique space in which 
human rights and human development may be brought together in practice to 
achieve their common goals of protecting individuals from their own states and from 
the deprivation of basic needs.  Hence human security is an overarching concept that 
combines people’s own search for security within their own cultures and societies 
with a process of adjustment and change to the external influences of rights and 
development processes.  Human security concerns everyday life and politics and the 
outcomes of the external impositions discussed by Duffield and Kaldor referred to 
above may not be as intended. 
                                                 
4  See Andrew Mack, "Report on the Feasibility of Creating an Annual Human Security 
Report." and Human Security Centre, Human Security Report: War and Peace in the 21st 
Century.  Aid and development policy is also an important  aspect of their work.  See in 
particular Paul Collier, "Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Countries,"  (Conflict 
Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, World Bank, 2002); Collier, "Development and 
Conflict."; and Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap.  
5  See Alexandra Kent, "Reconfiguring Security: Buddhism and Moral Legitimacy in 
Cambodia," Security Dialogue 37, no. 3 (2006). 
6  See the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights for the full 
framework of human rights instruments at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/. 
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The chapter will consider a range of factors, such as democratisation, 
decentralisation, effective security sector, civil society and social movement, which 
various authors have suggested are necessary for creating and maintaining human 
security.   
Human security – the concept 
During the 1970s and 1980s there was considerable public debate across the Western 
world around the issues of international security and development as concerns 
mounted over the failure of economic growth and the promised ‘trickle down’ to 
benefit the poor and to relieve the fragile security situation in most regions of the 
Third World.  In this climate, a number of independent commissions were set up to 
report and make recommendations on development and security.7  The linkage 
between security and development is particularly clear in Common Security: A 
Blueprint For Survival which recognised that threats to security are wider than 
“political rivalry and armaments …[and]… stem from failures in development, 
environmental degradation, excessive population growth and movement, and lack of 
progress towards democracy” and in Common Responsibilities in the 1990s which 
addressed attention to the “security of people and the security of the planet.”8   
The emphasis on the individual in these reports was not new in Western concepts of 
the state.  MacFarlane traces the long “prehistory of human security” and identifies 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as the period in which the “welfare 
of individual human beings, the mitigation of poverty, and the protection of the 
economic rights of the less privileged were growing preoccupations.”9  These 
preoccupations were also framed as international or universal norms and 
subsequently were incorporated in the UN Charter which, reflecting on the 
                                                 
7  For example the Club of Rome publicatin by Donella H Meadows, Dennis L Meadows, et 
al., Limits to Growth (New York: Universe Books, 1972); the Independent Commission on 
International Development Issues, North South, a Programme for Survival: Report of the 
Independent Commission on International Development Issues (London: Pan Books, 1980) 
known as the Brandt Report; and the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security 
Issues, Common Security: a Blueprint for Survival (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982).  
See also Kanti Bajpai, "Human Security: Concept and Measurement," (Kroc Institute: 2000), 
5-7; and Richard Falk, "Pursuing the Quest for Human Security," in Worlds Apart: Human 
Security and Global Governance, ed. Majid Tehranian (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), 8.  
8  Bajpai, "Human Security: Concept and Measurement," 7. 
9  S Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong, Human Security and the UN: A Critical History 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 59. 
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experience of the inter-war years, recognised that economic and social welfare were 
critical for international peace and security.10 
The concern for individual welfare and security is implicit in human security.  
Mahbub ul Haq, one of the founders of human development theory and the creator of 
the Human Development Index, was also influential in the development of the 
concept of human security in the 1994 UNDP Development Report.11  He spelled out 
his views in a widely distributed paper commissioned by the UNDP.12  In it he 
nominated as the five “pillars” of human security: sustainable human development; 
using a peace dividend to move from arms to human security; partnerships between 
North and South based on justice, not charity; new forms of global governance such 
as an economic security council of the UN; and a global civil society to hold leaders 
accountable.13 
 The UNDP Report argued that there were two main aspects of human security – 
“safety from such chronic threats [such] as hunger, disease and repression … and 
protection from sudden and hurtful disruption in the pattern of daily life.”14  The 
components spelled out were economic security (discussed mainly in terms of secure 
and adequate income); food security (physical and economic access); health security 
(prevention of disease and mortality - access to services, nutrition and lifestyle); 
environmental security (environmental degradation, pollution of air, water and land, 
sanitation); personal security (physical violence and threats, accidents, trafficking); 
community security (cultural identity, religious freedom, indigenous rights); and 
                                                 
10  Ibid., 65.  MacFarlane notes, too, that Roosevelt’s New Deal in the US was a mechanism to 
avert the risk that economic and social insecurity might carry over into political unrest. 
11  UNDP, Human Development Report 1994 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).  It 
was said that the UNDP agenda was to use human security as the organising principle for the 
1995 Copenhagen UN Conference on Social Development.  See Gary King and Christopher 
J L Murray, "Rethinking Human Security," Political Science Quarterly 116, no. 4 (2002), 
589.  
12  Mahbub ul Haq, "New Imperatives of Human Security," (A Policy Paper Commissioned by 
UNDP for the World Summit for Social Development, UNDP: 1994).  This Paper was 
widely reproduced including by the Society for International Development (SID) and the 
Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies (RGICS), Papers, and in U Kirdar and L 
Silk, eds., From Impoverishment to Empowerment (New York: New York University Press, 
1995); and Bibek Debroy, ed., Challenges of Globalisation (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 
1998).  Ul Haq considered human security should be “universal, global and indivisible.”  See 
Mahbub ul Haq, "Global Governance for Human Security," in Worlds Apart: Human 
Security and Global Governance, ed. Majid Tehranian (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 
1999), 79-94. 
13  Mahbub ul Haq, "New Imperatives of Human Security," in From Impoverishment to 
Empowerment, 22. 
14  UNDP, Human Development Report, 23. 
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political security (basic human rights and freedoms).  It argued that these were 
universal concerns for rich and poor countries and that its components were 
interdependent as well as being people-centred.15  It noted that a breakdown in 
human security in any one place may have local, regional or global impacts, and that 
human security is best ensured through prevention rather than by later restoration.  
Thus, “when human security is at threat anywhere, it can affect people everywhere.  
Famines, ethnic conflicts, social disintegration, terrorism, pollution and drug 
trafficking can no longer be confined within national borders,” and therefore the 
need for the new human security approach.16    
The Report barely addressed the relationship of human security with human rights 
and human development, noting only that human rights violations represent a threat 
to human security everywhere and that human development was a broader concept 
relating to people’s choice, while human security “means that people can exercise 
these choices safely and freely.”17  The relationship of human security with human 
rights and human development was not well developed although it is an important 
issue and is discussed later in this chapter.18 
The essence of the concept being promoted was radical as it challenged the adequacy 
of the contemporary approaches to development and security.  It sought to locate 
developing countries in a more global and more urgent security framework 
addressing the needs of people rather than serving the purpose of protecting and 
securing the rich and powerful states and the capitalist free market global economy.  
Its broad scope, however, contained the seeds of controversy as to the usefulness of 
the concept for analytical, practical or policy purposes.  
                                                 
15  Despite this, much of the ensuing debate has been based on either implicit or explicit 
assumptions that the issue of human security is about underdeveloped countries.  For 
example Suhkre says that human security is about the South and can be addressed by the 
universalisation of rights and development.  Astri Suhrke, "Human Security and the Interests 
of States," Security Dialogue 30, no. 3 (1999): 273-4.  
16  UNDP, Human Development Report, 34. 
17  Ibid., 22-23.   
18  The Report found it difficult to locate human security and added somewhat unhelpfully that 
“human security is an ingredient of participatory development.”  See ibid., 24. 
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“East – West” approaches to human security19 
Following the 1994 Report, the Japanese and Canadian governments both supported 
human security initiatives but with different emphases.  The Japanese government 
sought to develop the UNDP perspective mainly through freedom from want 
(development approach) while Canada sought to focus human security more on 
freedom from fear (conflict resolution and intervention).20  Japan’s interest in human 
security was immediate and in 1995 Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi advocated 
human security in an address to the United Nations General Assembly.21  This was 
endorsed by both of his successors, Hashimoto Ryutaro and Obuchi Keizo.  Obuchi, 
in particular, was committed to the concept mainly in the context of economic 
development in the region (which was in the grips of the 1997 economic crisis) and 
incorporated it into Japan’s foreign policy, leading to Japan’s sponsorship of the 
Commission on Human Security in 2000 and publication of its report which is 
discussed below.22   
Canada, on the other hand, put its emphasis on protection from violence in its 
statement to the UN General Assembly in 1996 and during its presidency of the 
Security Council in 2000.  Although the Canadian approach recognises the full scope 
of the UNDP Report, it was more concerned with a breakdown of government and 
society into violence than the need to protect individuals per se.23  This is reflected 
in Canada’s foreign policy statement as well as its support for the Liu institute and 
                                                 
19  While these are contested concepts, they are used here as convenient labels for different 
approaches.  See Amitav Acharya, "Human Security: East Versus West?," Working Paper 
no. 17 (Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore: 2001). 
20  In addition to the Japanese and Canadian government contributions, a number of institutions 
established units to addressed human security issues.  These included the Harvard Program 
on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (PHPCR) which produces a Human Security 
Network Bulletin; the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO); OECD Network on Conflict, 
Peace and Development Co-operation; the Conflict, Security and Development Group with 
the Centre for Development Studies at Kings College London set up with the UK 
Department for International Development, and the Institute for Human Security in the 
Fletcher School, Tufts University.  UN agencies also ran special human security projects and 
regional activities. 
21  Bert Edstrom, "Japan’s foreign policy and human security," Japan Forum 15, no. 2 (2003): 
209-25.  Japan’s ongoing commitment to human security is discussed in Julie Gilson and 
Phillida Purvis, "Japan’s pursuit of human security: humanitarian agenda or political 
pragmatism?," Japan Forum 15, no. 2 (2003): 193-207.  
22  The Commission on Human Security was co-chaired by Sadako Ogata, (former United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) and Amartya Sen (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 
1998).  The idea for a commission on human security arose from the United Nations 
Millennium Summit in 2000.  
23  Bajpai, "Human Security: Concept and Measurement," 33.   
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the publication of the Human Security Report which also adopts a narrow approach 
to human security based on freedom from fear.24   
Hence, the focus of human security on individual welfare was blurred by the 
concerns of two middle powers to pursue their particular interests and to influence 
the international scope and recognition of the concept.  Canada, which had a long 
history of military commitment to UN peacekeeping, pursued its policy of protection 
targeting specific issues such as landmines, child soldiers and small arms availability 
in conflict areas.25  On the other hand, Japan took a view that development 
diminished the threat of violence and contributed directly to human security.26  Its 
approach also appeared to be more acceptable in the Asian region where human 
rights had long been an issue of contention because of their perceived prioritisation 
of individual over group rights.27  In the wake of the 1997 economic crisis it was also 
clear that the ASEAN approach to human security was closely linked to safety nets 
and welfare for those affected by the economic downturn.28  
Over time, however, the concept of human security has become an international 
relations policy tool for military intervention as well as aid, much as argued by 
Kaldor and Duffield above.29  It has become largely incorporated into traditional 
                                                 
24  Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Freedom from Fear: 
Canada's Foreign Policy for Human Security," (Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade, 2000); and Andrew Mack and Oliver Rohlfs, "The Great Canadian 
Divide," The Globe and Mail, 23 March 2003.  The Canadian government also established 
the Canadian Consortium on Human Security (CCHS) to research human security.  The 
Consortium produces a quarterly online Human Security Bulletin. 
25  Mely Caballero-Anthony, "Human Security in the Asia-Pacific: Current Trends and 
Prospects," in The Human Face of Security: Asia-Pacific Perspectives, ed. David Dickens 
(Canberra: Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence no. 144, Strategic and Defence Studies 
Centre, The Australian National University, 2002), 23-24.   
26  MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong, Human Security and the UN: A Critical History, 143. 
27  Edstrom, "Japan’s foreign policy and human security," 220.  Edstrom also argues that, by 
embracing development, human rights, humanitarian and refugee law under the framework 
of human security, the adoption of human security in domestic as well as international policy 
enabled Japan to satisfy the US, while at the same time as appearing to Asian countries not to 
promote human rights.  See also Meiki Fujioka, "Japan’s Human Rights Policy at Domestic 
and International Levels: Disconnecting Human Rights from Human Security?," Japan 
Forum 15, no. 2 (2003): 301. 
28  Caballero-Anthony, "Human Security in the Asia-Pacific: Current Trends and Prospects."; 
Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, "Human Security: Concepts and Implications with an Application 
to Post-Intervention Challenges in Afghanistan," (Centre d'études et de researches 
internationales: 2005), 17-19; and Pranee Thiparat, ed., The Quest for Human Security: The 
Next Phase of ASEAN? (Bangkok: Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS), 
2001), 2. 
29  Steve Grunau, "The Limits of Human Security: Canada in East Timor," Journal of Military 
and Strategic Studies 6, no. 1 (2003): 17.  Grunau argues that despite government policy, 
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international security practice and turned into a technique for military-civil 
interventions and for development related conflict prevention strategies to protect the 
security interests of intervening and donor nations.  In other words, “our” peace and 
security depends on “their” human security.  The focus on the broad individual needs 
is largely lost in this context despite the fact that, as Alkire makes clear in the quote 
at the head of this chapter, people in a conflict situation must, simultaneously, 
address both aspects of their human insecurity.30  This is also reflected to some 
extent in the UN where the Security Council responsibilities are separated from the 
economic and social responsibilities of ECOSOC, but at the same time the Security 
Council urges ECOSOC to do more for conflict prevention.31  However, if aid and 
development assistance are tools for conflict prevention, they must apply especially 
to non-conflict but vulnerable communities as well, giving human security a broad 
domain.  It is also important to recognise that, as will be shown by the Cambodian 
experience in the next chapter, international intervention may be important for 
alleviating human insecurities for some, but may also contribute to creating 
insecurities for others.  
While the difference in the Canadian and Japanese approaches was largely about 
priorities and political perceptions, nevertheless it was a precursor to the academic 
debate that was to follow.  The controversy played out on several fronts: defining 
human security; the relationship between human security and traditional security; 
and how to achieve human security.  The main issues being whether it was 
compatible with international relations and strategic studies which prioritised state 
interests, not the welfare of individuals per se; and whether it was necessary at all 
when human rights and human development already prioritised individual and group 
welfare.  Therefore, a key aspect of the debate focused on how human security 
should be defined and whether it was compatible with existing theory and practice.  
The following section considers this question in detail.  
                                                                                                                                          
human security was not a key consideration on deciding Canada‘s involvement in East 
Timor. 
30  The World Bank in particular brings both together in its Conflict Prevention and 
Reconstruction Unit. 
31  MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong, Human Security and the UN: A Critical History, 153.   
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Definitions of human security 
Defining human security is important because it determines how attention is to be 
focused on the individual and groups.  The argument has been largely about whether 
the UNDP focus is simply too broad to have any useful analytical application and 
whether it risks making everything and anything a potential security issue.  It has 
also raised questions as to whether human security is an extension of the 
development agenda, the security agenda or a hybrid of both.32  
After wide consultation, the Japanese funded Commission on Human Security came 
up with a new broad definition of human security as protection of “… the vital core 
of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment. 
…Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the 
essence of life.  It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive 
(widespread) threats and situations…”33  The Commission also noted that 
individuals and societies may have different views on what is “vital” and what 
constitutes the “essence of life” and went on to add that creating human security 
meant “… using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations.  It means 
creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that 
together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.”34  
Such a definition raised the obvious questions about what “vital core”, “fundamental 
freedoms”, “critical” and “pervasive” meant, and what threats and situations actually 
impacted on human security.  Two studies in particular took up the Commission’s 
definition and refined it.  Sabina Alkire defined human security as the safeguarding 
of “the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats, in a way that is 
consistent with long-term human fulfilment.”35  She also suggested that human 
security be restricted to areas of possible downturns in the people’s situation.  Taylor 
Owen modified Alkire’s definition to read the safeguarding of “the vital core of all 
human lives from critical pervasive environmental, economic, food, health, personal 
                                                 
32  Sara Edson, "Human Security: An Extended and Annotated International Bibliography," 
(Centre for History and Economics, Kings College, University of Cambridge: 2001), 7. 
33  Commission on Human Security, "Human Security Now," (New York: Commission on 
Human Security, 2003), 4.   
34  Ibid., 4. 
35  Alkire, "Conceptual Framework." 1. 
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and political threats.”36  Yet what was meant by “vital core”, “critical” and 
“pervasive” remained unanswered; though they imply the identification of specific 
issues and some form of designated thresholds of severity necessary to constitute a 
human security matter.  Surprisingly, Owen sought to omit cultural security from the 
list of security issues arguing that factors such as education and religion would not 
be active elements in creating critical pervasive threats, or affect the vital core of 
human lives.  On the contrary, as seen below, anthropological studies do identify 
cultural factors as important to human security.  Brown and Stewart, for example, 
also consider educational deprivation to be a human security concern, as do Sen and 
Majumdar who argue that a lack of education could confine one to the margins of 
society and to a precarious existence as evidenced by a demonstrable link between 
mortality, income and education.37   
A much more open approach was proposed by Ramesh Thakur who argued that 
human security was composed of positive (freedom to) and negative (freedom from) 
freedoms, and that: “putting the two together, human security refers to the quality of 
life of the people of a society or polity.  Anything which degrades their quality of life 
– demographic pressures, diminished access to or stock of resources, and so on – is a 
[human] security threat.”38   
Other definitions developed by international commissions include that of the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) which 
describes human security in terms of people living under conditions where “their 
physical safety, their economic and social wellbeing, respect for their dignity and 
worth as human beings, and the protection of their human rights and fundamental 
                                                 
36  Taylor Owen, "Human Security - Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks 
and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition," Security Dialogue 35, no. 3 (2004): 383.  
Owen is working on measures of human security and geographical representation of various 
human security indicators which will be mentioned later. 
37  Amartya Sen, "Basic Education and Human Security," (Background Paper for a Workshop 
on Basic Education and Human Security jointly organised by the Commission on Human 
Security, UNICEF, the Pratichi (India) Trust and Harvard University in Kolkata, 2-4 
January: 2002); Manabi Majumdar, "Child Labour as a Human Security Problem: Evidence 
from India," Oxford Development Studies 29, no. 3 (2001): 279-304; and Graham K Brown 
and Frances Stewart, "Why Horizontal Inequalities are Important for Human Security: Two 
Case Studies from Southeast Asia" (paper presented at the Conference on The Anthropology 
of Human Security, Amsterdam, 29-30 August 2005).  Brown and Stewart also propose 
categorising human security issues in terms of whether they are “conflictual” or “non-
conflictual" which would also see them separated broadly into issues requiring long term 
development policy to address pervasive threats, or immediate humanitarian relief for critical 
threats.  This approach seems speculative and has not been further pursued here. 
38  Thakur, "From National to Human Security," 53.  
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freedoms” are assured. 39  The more recent Commission for Africa says that people-
centred “human security becomes an all-encompassing condition in which individual 
citizens live in freedom, peace and safety and participate fully in the process of 
governance.  They enjoy the protection of fundamental rights, have access to 
resources and the basic necessities of life, including health and education, and 
inhabit an environment that is not injurious to their health and wellbeing.”40   
These last two definitions are important as they both clearly specify human security 
as a condition in which people ought to find themselves.  The condition includes 
areas of protection as well as providing scope for individual and group action 
through rights and freedoms and, in the latter approach, participation in governance.  
They also both imply that human security is an international as well as a state 
responsibility.  A point that will be taken up in following chapters.   
Key aspects of the main human security definitions are identified in Table 2-1 
below.41  It shows is that while most definitions follow the UNDP focus on 
providing safety and protection as the main aspect of the human security concept, the 
later emphasis has moved in the Commission for Africa and ICISS definitions to the 
condition of human security.  Instead of protection from fairly vague notions such as 
“vital core”, “hurtful disruption”, and “pervasive threat”, later definitions include 
more concrete terms of people living in conditions of freedom, peace and safety, 
having access to basic necessities, and, importantly, being free to participate in the 
process of governance.  Governance of course introduces the question of state 
responsibilities, but at the same time it opens the possibility of a more localised 
determination of human security issues which may be anything, as Thakur puts it, 
which degrades people’s quality of life.   
 
 
 
                                                 
39  International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), "The 
Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty," (ICISS, 2001). 
40  Commission for Africa, "Our Common Interest: Report of the Commission for Africa,"  
(Commission for Africa, 2005), 392. 
41  Thakur, "From National to Human Security," 16-20, also provides a comparison of some 20 
definitions.  However, for the purpose of the thesis, I have limited discussion to several key 
examples. 
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 The functional aim 
of human security 
The subject of attention  Specific elements: 
UNDP Safety from  Chronic threats 
Hunger disease repression   
Threats under 7 headings to: 
Economic; Food; Health; 
Environment; Personal; 
Community and Political security. 
Alkire safeguarding The vital core of human lives From critical pervasive threats:  
In a way consistent with long-term 
human fulfilment 
Owen safeguarding The vital core of human lives From pervasive: threats:  Threats 
under 6 headings: Environmental, 
Economic, Food, Health, Personal, 
and Political 
UNDP protection  Pattern of daily life From Hurtful disruption  
Commission on 
Human Security 
protect  Vital core of all human lives 
Fundamental freedoms 
Essence of life 
From Critical (Severe) and 
pervasive (widespread) threats 
and situations 
Human Security 
Centre 
protection Of individuals and communities  From war and other forms of 
violence 
Commission for 
Africa 
protection Of fundamental human rights  
ICISS protection of their human rights and 
fundamental freedoms 
 
Commission on 
Human Security 
enhance Human freedoms and human 
fulfilment 
 
Commission on 
Human Security 
to build On strengths and aspirations  
Commission on 
Human Security 
to create Political, social, environmental, 
economic, military and cultural 
systems 
Give people building blocks of 
survival, livelihood and dignity. 
ICISS to respect Individuals for their dignity and 
worth as human beings 
 
Caroline Thomas achieving Physical survival  
Human dignity 
Personal autonomy, control over 
one’s life, unhindered participation 
in the life of the community 
ICISS condition Live in Physical safety, their economic 
and social wellbeing 
Commission for 
Africa 
“ An all-encompassing condition In which individual citizens live in 
freedom, peace and safety 
Commission for 
Africa 
“ Have access To resources and basic necessities 
of human life - Including Health 
and education 
Commission for 
Africa 
“ inhabit Environment - Not injurious to 
health and wellbeing 
Commission for 
Africa 
“ Participate  fully in the process of governance 
Table 2-1 Comparison of approaches among selected human security 
definitions 
Some critics complain that the broad definitions embracing both freedom from want 
and fear risks becoming little more than “shopping list” approaches whereby the 
label of human security can be attached to any “bad things that can happen” and 
mean anything to anyone.42  Such critics maintain that human security needs to be 
more tightly defined to be of any analytical use.  Others argue that a narrow 
definition limited to freedom from fear can be more useful in practical terms; 
                                                 
42  For example see Keith Krause, "Is Human Security 'More than just a good idea?'" (paper 
presented at the BICC 10-Year Anniversary Conference "Promoting Security: But How and 
for Whom?", Bonn, 1-2 April 2004), 4; and King and Murray, "Rethinking Human 
Security," 591. 
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asserting basically that conflict and violence represent a breakdown in human 
security and are easily identified and measured in terms of deaths and incidents of 
violence.  Some go further and claim that adopting a broad definition means that 
human security would be unmeasurable since, as Mack claims, it would “conflate” 
dependent and independent variables under a single index.43  A narrow definition in 
this view becomes simply “the protection of individuals and communities from war 
and other forms of violence.”44   
There are four main reasons for rejecting these criticisms of a broad human security 
concept.  First, as will be demonstrated in the next section, the demand for a precise 
definition imposes far more stringent requirements on human security as a concept 
than is placed on the additional state based concept which, nonetheless, contributes 
to national security analysis and policy formulation in many countries.  A flexible 
concept of security also allows it to embrace new issues such as environmental and 
economic security, migration and terrorism.  Thus, the prospect that anything might 
be a human security risk has strong parallels in international security practice where, 
for example, definitions are broad enough for baby foods to be classified as a 
security risk in the context of international aviation.   
Secondly, Mack’s conflation problem is something to be worked through rather than 
ignored.  His “pragmatic” solution, as he is aware, simply sets aside the “very 
conditions that gave rise to it [violent conflict] in the first place” such as poverty, 
weak administration, poor infrastructure or declining GDP per capita.45  But, if 
poverty, weak administration and other factors represent threats to human security, 
they must in themselves be human security issues.  However, as a counter to the 
“conflation” problem, Owen has argued it is possible to develop a framework for the 
measurement of human security issues based on livelihood factors.46  In the end, of 
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Mack, "Report on the Feasibility of Creating an Annual Human Security Report," Appendix 
2, 2.  See also Sverre Lodgaard, "Human Security: Concept and Operationalisation,"  
accessed at http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/hpcr/events/hsworkshop/lodgaard.pdf on 23 April 
2005. 
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course, human security in any form cannot be definitively measured any more than 
human rights or human development.  Various indicators may be formulated by a 
variety of statistical methods using selected data inevitably based on a set of 
assumptions peculiar to the analysts involved.   
Moreover, the identification and classification of security issues, their level of 
seriousness and whether extraordinary measures are warranted, are political 
decisions—not ones of statistically pre-determined thresholds.47  Similarly, 
identifying and addressing human security issues at any level is not only a matter of 
definition but also of political choice.  
Thirdly, proponents of the narrow definition turn for support to the extensive 
econometric analysis designed to identify the causes of conflict.  Nonetheless, while 
these studies highlight the decline in the number of civil wars since the end of the 
Cold War in particular, and suggest this is largely due to United Nations conflict 
resolution activities, they are far less convincing in determining the causes of 
conflict, and hence in advising how to prevent them.48  However, in terms of conflict 
resolution and conflict prevention (which are at the heart of human security narrowly 
defined) important econometric analysts such as Collier seek to restore or sustain 
human security through human development and livelihood improvement, which 
thus become unavoidably integral to human security.49  Only a broad human security 
approach can reconcile the interdependence between freedom from war and violence 
and its dependence on development and, as we shall see, human rights.  This aspect 
of the definition in relation to the econometric analyses is considered in more detail 
below. 
Finally, narrowing the definition (and particularly relying on statistical analysis) 
simply removes the opportunity for most individuals and groups to have a say in 
what constitutes their human security.  It does this by excluding political issues such 
as poverty, health and education and by imposing threshold measures, such as the 
number of deaths per year from armed conflict, which are arbitrary and have no 
                                                                                                                                          
Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts, B.A. Bishops 
University, 2000).   
47  Barry Buzan, People States and Fear, 115.  Or as Buzan puts it, “a matter of political choice 
rather than objective fact.”  Even if thresholds were used for administrative convenience, 
they would need to be politically confirmed  by law or regulation to have social legitimacy. 
48  Christian Davenport, David A Armstrong, and Mark I Lichbach, "Conflict Escalation and the 
Origins of Civil War,"  (University of Maryland: n.d.). 
49  Collier, "Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Countries." 
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meaning for people who may be threatened by conflict or violence and who have no 
access to the data in any case.50  These are measures designed for other purposes.  
This thesis, through its field approach, focuses on the matters of concern identified 
by the people themselves, how they are able to respond to them and how a wider 
community might help.  In this context, it is highly likely that a shopping list of 
human security issues is likely to emerge.  It is not for governments, aid workers or 
security analysts alone to decide from an essentially international perspective what 
are, or are not, permissible human security problems.  As a working approach to 
human security in my fieldwork, therefore, I have used Thakur’s open form of 
definition that human security refers to the quality of life of the people of a society 
or polity and anything which degrades their quality of life becomes a potential 
human security threat.  This approach enabled me to avoid predetermining the 
possible forms of human insecurity which might be identified.  Later in the thesis, 
for analytical purposes, I will use the Commission for Africa definition.  I will also 
demonstrate with my fieldwork data that the prioritisation of issues needs to be 
politically determined, as is the case for traditional security.51   
On balance most commentators support the broad definition of human security.  In 
2004, Security Dialogue invited 21 authors who have previously written on the 
subject to respond to the question “What is Human Security?”  Buzan and Paris were 
the main sceptics.52  Despite the academic support, however, the development of the 
broad concept seems to have been largely overshadowed in policy and practice by 
the political support and programme assistance given to conflict and violence related 
issues; other forms of deprivation are left to human rights and human development 
activities despite their close association with security.  This separation is also 
consistent with academic debates concerning the meaning of security and the 
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acceptability of a concept of human security and the implications it would have for 
traditional security studies. 
Human security in traditional security theory – state vs. individual 
In general, the broad UNDP Report definition of human security does not easily fit 
with traditional disciplines of international relations, security and peace studies.  
Much academic discussion on the subject has focused on the contested nature of 
security itself (what is it? whose security? security from what? how is it achieved?) 
and its place in international relations where, traditionally, the state (and not the 
individual) is the primary unit, and where the security of the state is theorised mainly 
in realist terms of anarchy and balance of power relations between states.  However, 
as discussed below, the wide-ranging and inconclusive theories and definitions of 
security itself, the rejection of the concept of human security as ill-defined and too 
broad to be an effective analytical tool seems somewhat ironic.  
There are many approaches to security theories.53  Booth and Buzan also draw 
attention to the variety of meanings of security, which suggests that the concept is 
not well consolidated.54  Buzan goes so far as to say security “is so weakly 
developed as to be inadequate for the task” of understanding national security.55  
Wolfers produced what has been called the standard definition that “security, in an 
objective sense, measures the absence of threat to acquired values, in a subjective 
sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked” while other key security 
scholars such as Morgenthau “hardly bothered to define security.”56  Booth 
summarises “standard” definitions as having “to do with feeling safe from threats 
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and danger.”57  Based on Wolfer’s interpretation, Baldwin argues that acquired 
values could be such things as physical safety, economic welfare, political 
independence, peace of mind or absence of fear, but not (referring back to the UNDP 
meaning of human security) such things as “core values” and “vital interests.”58  
Following this approach, “economic security, environmental security, identity 
security, social security, and military security, are different forms of security and not 
fundamentally different concepts;” thus the need for a conceptual breakthrough.59  
Similarly, while discussions of comprehensive security and cooperative security 
theories give some recognition to the management of economic, environmental, 
health, refugee migration and other issues within the state and regional security 
framework, they also need a conceptional breakthrough since the human dimension 
inherent in these matters are still considered to be security concerns for the state 
rather than the individuals affected.60   
 Also, it has been argued that security has “not been an important analytical concept 
for most security studies scholars” who instead have been interested in military 
statecraft and power while “security has been a banner to be flown, a label to be 
applied, but not a concept to be used by most security studies specialists.”61  And 
yet, despite the apparent neglect and looseness of definition, there are many 
powerful and varied analyses of security which inform national security policies and 
strategies.  While much can be done (and some would say needs to be done) to 
develop the concept of security in all its dimensions—national, environmental, 
economic, military and human—this does not necessarily devalue the usefulness of 
security analyses to policy formulation in practice.  Nor should human security be 
devalued for want of a tight definition.   
Indeed, the politics and practices of international security provide a warning against 
tight definitions of human security, and they provide evidence that in certain 
contexts practically anything may well become a security (or human security) risk.  
Thus events, resources or capabilities may take on security dimensions depending on 
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the nature of the states where they occur, the region concerned or even those 
involved.  There have, for example, been long standing bans on the export of 
commercial equipment, computing devices, chemicals and biological agents and 
other materials to certain organizations, countries and regions where they may be put 
to military, internal security or terrorist application.62  Simple cosmetics, baby foods, 
and fluids have become high-level security risks in the context of international air 
travel.  Security is, by its nature, wide ranging and human security warrants the same 
flexibility.  Just as the strength of the traditional security approach lies to some 
extent in its flexibility and openness to the changing nature of threats and 
vulnerabilities at all levels, the strength of the human security concept can similarly 
lie in a flexible, even “shopping list” approach to identifying and responding to 
human security issues. 
Despite the absence of a common definition of security, however, academic security 
approaches are consistent in being predominantly state centric.  It is not my task here 
to attempt to reconcile state centric and individual centric approaches in international 
relations theory.  However, it is important to note that this issue is being addressed 
even if it still has a long way to go since Booth suggested the need for a  “civil 
society” approach to security as a balance to traditional realist analyses.  Booth, like 
the later econometric analysts such as Gurr, Marshall and Collier, noted that the 
decline in interstate conflict was not matched by a reduction of conflicts within 
states.  Booth’s response was to address the social and political rather than economic 
causes.  Security, he suggested, depended on at least minimum levels of political and 
social justice.  In other words, it related to individual security and this he described 
as “emancipation.”  He further identified emancipation with freedom and with the 
activities of an “embryonic” global civil society.63  On the other hand, while Barry 
Buzan’s People, States and Fear is a key work in terms of the relationship between 
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state security and the individual whom he sees as an element in societal security, it 
always maintains the state as the basic referent of security.64   
The debate on the theoretical status of human security is well summarised in Pauline 
Kerr’s comprehensive review, from an international relations perspective, of the 
issues under debate and the potential for reconciling human security with the 
traditional state-centric concepts and theories of security.65  In brief, she concludes 
that the human security concept is in fact finding a place in theory through the 
various realist and critical debates.  She argues that the various approaches are 
coming to recognise a) both people and state are referent objects; b) there are 
internal and external threats of violence; c) violence may be related to 
underdevelopment; d) there may be a range of methods needed to address the threats; 
and e) that these issues may be inter-related.  She claims that a “via media” or 
middle ground might emerge between the different traditions. 
The difficulty in reconciling state and individual security priorities is evident in 
Thomas and Tow’s contention that emphasis needs to be placed on understanding 
the interstate or regional impact of domestic human security situations and their 
potential to reach across borders.66  However, the result of this, despite their 
objections, is to narrow the concept of human security and to try to squeeze it into 
the traditional security framework rather than to search for a broader approach which 
truly prioritises the individual.67  Thomas and Tow’s own case studies of Haiti and 
Timor Leste and the international interventions in these countries is indicative of the 
problem that state security may well be established in the short term but bring 
limited long-term human security for their populations because of the failure to 
address broad livelihood issues.  
If security is indeed about feeling safe, and can relate to family, tribe and nation, 
there is a need to deepen and broaden the concept to embrace such notions.  Yet 
there is little apparent effort by security academics to step outside the Western 
intellectual framework and social context and to enter other social and cultural 
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contexts in order to ask whether other societies really do have concepts and theories 
of security, and how these may relate to individual security in those contexts.68  
What appears as corruption to some may appear as a security mechanism for others – 
and be accepted as such within certain societies. 
This is important since so much of the international human security effort in conflict 
resolution and prevention takes place in non-Western societies and cultures.  
Security in these environments may find different forms of expression.  Papers 
presented at a conference on the "Anthropology of Human Security" illustrated, for 
instance, that religious and ethnic associations among immigrant groups are 
significant security mechanisms.  Kinship was identified as providing security in 
Vietnam, while in other contexts, security (whether health, economic or other) was 
sought in ritual, which could paradoxically involved considerable risk taking.  
Hence, human security is not some sort of universal state but needs to be 
“contextualised, culturally and historically.”69  Political instability and protest In 
Bolivia was not consistent with a view that people were driven by a quest for 
security, but rather reflected a perception that “the incumbent political and economic 
arrangements in their country [were] … a greater risk to their livelihoods and futures 
than the chancy business of resisting these arrangements on the streets.”70  The 
insecurity, being produced by “an endemic lack of trust” in the state system itself, 
requires that human security be considered in that context.71  Yet another study 
showed how physical and existential security strategies may be adopted by different 
cultural groups within the same urban residential area.72  In relation to Cambodia, 
anthropologist Alexandra Kent has used her studies of the revival of Buddhism in 
Cambodia and its relation to power and moral legitimacy “to begin challenging the 
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inherent ethnocentricity of much security theory.”73  Indeed, anthropologists have 
long recognised that security has been an important aspect of social formation.74  
Beyond the few anthropological studies, there is little focus on the predicaments of 
individuals and communities and how they may relate to state, regional and global 
security.  As referred to elsewhere in this chapter, econometric studies into the 
causes of civil war, conflict and violence also neglect individual and group security.  
They are, however, of particular importance for three reasons.  First, they provide the 
theoretical framework for the Human Security Report and its narrow definition of 
human security; second, they are influential in the formulation of post-conflict 
development policies and strategies; and third, they propose a range of conflict 
prevention mechanisms which, I argue, imply human insecurity in situations of low 
income and lack of human rights and human development.  The econometric 
approach is therefore discussed in the following section. 
Human security and the econometric analyses of conflict 
Econometric analyses of the causes of civil war and violence seek to identify 
indicators which might predict the risk of individual states becoming victims of 
violent conflict, and to identify those areas where international effort may help to 
reduce and eliminate conflict and prevent its recurrence.75  The studies are 
undertaken by a mix of economists and political scientists and use a number of data 
sets.76 The Human Security Report referred to above draws heavily on these 
econometric studies.   
The worldwide surveys of violent conflicts since the end of World War II, 
undertaken by Gurr, Marshall and Khosla, indicate that there has been a significant 
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downturn in their number since the end of the Cold War.77  However, while they 
show that the reduction in conflicts overall corresponds with increasing 
democratisation, the studies also reflect the fact that new democracies are fragile and 
at risk of instability, especially in the short term.  Thus, from 2001 to 2005 they 
reported the number of countries at risk of falling back into conflict increased from 
46 to 51.  Other econometric analyses attempt to probe more deeply into the social, 
political and economic causes of conflict using sophisticated statistical modelling 
and regression analysis methods.  These studies produce important findings in the 
human security context because there is a close link between them, the World Bank 
and its conflict related development assistance.78  Their findings are thus influential 
in the formulation of international policies and strategies which directly impinge on 
the lives and hence on the human security of people during conflict resolution 
processes and beyond.   
In a landmark econometric study, Collier and Hoeffler concluded that grievances 
(such as inequality, political or economic exclusion, ethnic and religious difference, 
and poverty) were not strong indicators of the risk of conflict within states; but that 
economic opportunity factors, which he lumped under the term “greed”, were far 
more significant.79  The key aspect of greed was that it provided better economic 
prospects for the “rebels” than were otherwise available.  Thus, they claimed conflict 
depended upon the prospects for rebel finance (e.g. natural resources, diasporas, 
external government assistance); low opportunity cost (availability of cheap recruits 
– value of rebellion outweighs the loss of education, jobs and so on); and 
possibilities afforded by military advantage (terrain, sympathetic population).  They 
also suggested that there was a close correlation between violent conflict and a 
country’s dependence on the export of single primary commodities (eg oil, 
diamonds, and timber).80  Other statistical analyses supported the conclusion that 
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grievance factors, such as ethnic and religious diversity, inequality, lack of 
democracy and freedom, or state oppression against minority religions or language 
groups, which are all highlighted in qualitative research, were not strong predictors 
of violent conflict.81  However, contrary to those which downplayed grievance as an 
explanation for conflict, Kocher’s study concluded that human rights abuses were a 
“strong predictor of civil war.”82  
Later studies by Collier and Hoeffler expanded their original findings.83  The new 
research, they claim, confirms their previous conclusions that economic factors were 
the primary indicators of civil war and “unambiguously support the proposition that 
feasibility rather than motivation is decisive for risk of rebellion.”84  They conclude 
that the main causes are “the level, growth and structure of income” while, for the 
African experience, being under the French security umbrella, the proportion of 
youths between 15-29 years of age and the extent of mountainous terrain are also 
key variables.85 
Yet, not all studies come to the same conclusions.  Fearon and Laitin, for example, 
despite similar views on grievance, find that it is the weakness of states, in particular 
their limited military capabilities and their inability to control their peripheries which 
are the main causes of civil war.  They emphasize police and military roles in 
containing civil wars and recommend that appropriate training for these groups is 
necessary to help prevent practices which aid recruitment to rebel causes.  Kocher, 
however, is sceptical of military responses in large part because military solutions 
risk association with human rights abuses which, as noted above, he found to be 
closely related to outbreaks of civil war.  Rather, his analysis suggests that 
urbanisation is associated with reduced risk of civil war.86 
Other issues have been tested for their significance in causing or preventing 
violence.  Sambanis explores decentralisation and redistribution as solutions to 
violence, only to find that they may have positive or negative effects depending on 
                                                 
81  James D Fearon and David D Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," (Department of 
Political Science, Stanford University: 2002). 
82  Matthew Kocher, "Is Immunity from Insurgent Challenges Bought or Found?," (Department 
of Political Science, University of Chicago: 2002), 21. 
83  Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner, "Beyond Greed and Grievance: 
Feasibility and Civil War," (Centre for the Study of African Economies: 2006). 
84  Ibid., 19. 
85  Ibid., 19-20. 
86  Kocher, "Is Immunity from Insurgent Challenges Bought or Found?."   
  43 
the circumstances of a particular country.87  He argues that violence may bring a 
tendency towards democracy if states make concessions and achieve negotiated 
solutions with rebels, but at the same time democratisation may also bring repression 
and insecurity to other groups, at least in the short term.  Partition also emerges as a 
doubtful solution to conflict, but in the end he concedes, “…we know little about the 
full range of determinants of democratisation processes and simple tests of the 
relationship between conflict escalation and democratisation do not seem to reveal 
any significant pattern.”88  Nevertheless, he suggests a possible indirect link between 
decentralization and reduced conflict, possibly as a result of increased democracy.89   
However, these studies are essentially statistical analyses of risk.  The methodology 
is one which, rather than analysing conflicts per se, purports to identify those social, 
economic and political factors which are significant in previous conflict situations, 
and whose presence in a given situation would be expected to increase the risk of 
civil war (or violent conflict), based on previous experience.  It is not identifying 
causes in particular cases, nor is it identifying a relationship between causes and 
particular policy responses.  The problem faced by the statistical methods is that 
while they are able to identify, find proxies for and correlate a range of factors, such 
as income, GDP, primary production, population and terrain, they are unable to 
represent the different underlying mechanisms or social relations which may 
influence the way factors are activated in particular cases.  For example, the 
association of primary commodities with conflict may be demonstrated, but whether 
the association with commodities which fuel a conflict is related to greed, or is a 
means of financing a conflict which is itself based on grievances (resulting for 
example from collapsed world prices, the expropriation of commodities by a 
government, or other relationship) is not determined nor analysed.90   
Davenport also finds limitations in the greed-grievance models and claims that 
research based on three models – inflammation of conflict through repression; state 
incapacity to apply sufficient repression to prevent conflict; and ineffectiveness 
when rebels outlast or outfight the repression – has been inconclusive, and that it has 
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also “hindered our understanding of civil war onset.”91  He argues that econometric 
analyses need to look more specifically at low-level conflict and, in particular, to 
consider cultural and normative factors as well as political opportunity in relation to 
conflict.  He also suggests that human rights abuses, protest and social movements as 
well as state repression are possible issues to be studied in relation to low-level 
conflict and its escalation.92  Such an approach would begin to address the local 
problems which may make individuals and groups vulnerable to conflict and which 
are, in themselves, human security issues.   
Finally, as Kocher notes, economic development may also be a factor in the 
emergence of violent conflict, as it brings with it “a basket of highly associated 
empirical factors ranging from personal incomes to more powerful militaries to 
better infrastructure, each of which is plausibly related to the likelihood of civil 
war.”93  While these may be related to civil war or violent conflict, only local socio-
political analysis will help to understand the underlying mechanisms of how they 
may create civil war and violence.  In part this is recognised by the World Bank, 
which, although sponsoring macro-level econometric studies, redirects attention 
back to local sociological and political analysis in the search for solutions to 
conflict.94  The human factor in a given situation will always be the key to conflict 
avoidance and resolution—and to human security.  
While the econometric analyses are important in their contribution to conflict 
management, they are strongly rooted in the assumptions inherent in the modelling 
of the data, the identification of proxies and the allocation of values to political and 
social factors.  The analyses are open to subjectivity and interpretation and are far 
from definitive in their findings.  It is also a concern that, although they note that 
neighbours and unfavourable local regions may influence civil war, the studies still 
project the view that civil conflict and its causes are essentially internal – a view 
which we shall see in the case of Cambodia cannot be supported.95  Policy proposals 
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by all the econometric analysts also place democracy as a central requirement in the 
long term, even though it has been shown that in some cases, authoritarian rule is 
more likely to reduce the risk of civil war at least in the short term.96  This suggests 
that, whatever the political system, political leadership is a key factor in the 
management of conflict.  However, the econometric analyses provide little if any 
scrutiny of the role of political leadership – state or rebel – and any external support 
it may have.    
The practical application of the econometric analyses is found particularly in conflict 
related development policy.  In his work for the World Bank, Collier focuses on 
post-conflict situations to ascertain the appropriate policies to maintain peace and 
reduce the risk of subsequent relapse into violence.97  In assessing four aspects of 
development assistance policy (in order of importance in non-conflict situations) – 
macro economic policy, structural development, social policy and governance, his 
models indicate that in a post-conflict country, “… it would be desirable if social 
policy could improve at a faster rate than structural policy, which in turn should 
improve at a faster rate than macro policy.”98  This recognises the underlying 
importance of local socio-political conditions and mechanisms in achieving peace 
and in preventing a return to violence and is a theme continued in other internal 
World Bank papers, which redirect attention back to sociological and political 
analysis, thereby hinting that grievance is a more telling factor than greed.99   
Yet despite the recognition of social issues, the claim that conflict represents the 
failure of development, and the conclusion that development assistance has been a 
“most disappointing” instrument for its prevention, the econometric studies still 
persist in prioritising macro-economic approaches in the post conflict period.100  
What is important from a human security perspective, however, is that the priorities 
indicated by the econometric models of conflict and post-conflict situations might 
not adequately identify factors in the pre-conflict stage which led to violence in the 
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first place.  As noted above, understanding the circumstances of conflict does not 
fully account for how it arose initially, the particular mechanisms which may 
underpin the rebel control of resources, leadership and public policy failures, or the 
basis of state weakness.101  A better understanding of pre-conflict circumstances 
leading to civil unrest may suggest a shift in the priority of development assistance 
in countries at risk towards addressing social policies and institutions rather than 
assuming that macro-economic policies will bring growth and in turn alleviate social 
conditions.  This reminds us of Booth’s insight that security, and hence the 
avoidance of violent conflict, depends on an appropriate level of political and social 
justice.    
In broad terms, the econometric studies of conflict and the policy proposals 
emerging from them are a form of “globalisation”, breaking down barriers to 
external influences, promoting democratisation and the integration of states into the 
international market economy.  Clearly, more work needs to be done to bring 
together the quantitative and qualitative analyses of the causes of conflict and the 
appropriate policy directions to inform practical solutions.  In particular, issues of 
leadership and the involvement of various movements, civil society and political 
actors are all relevant in determining how communities, societies and even countries 
achieve, or fail to achieve, a peaceful path to development without the emergence of 
civil war.  These actors are not well represented in the econometric studies and limit 
their prescriptions for a human security approach.  Instead, there is appeal to the 
long-term development solutions that have been in vogue for several decades and 
which have failed to prevent the emergence of violent conflict.   
How is human security achieved?   
There are a number of studies which propose ways in which human security can be 
realised.  For example, Pierre Lizée, sees the achievement of human security 
essentially in the achievement of “democratisation and social justice”, in the 
“opening up of politico-economic decision-making which is central to human 
security” and “to the construction of the rule of law and representative democracy, 
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which is at the heart of human security.”102  Lizée also argues a central role for civil 
society in challenging governments and paving the way for improving state 
adherence to the rule of law and principles of democracy.103  However, he also sees 
human security primarily as a “rallying cry” for civil society and does not seek to 
analyse the concept, its measures or impact at the level of the individual or group.  
He is more concerned about state politics and how it can be influenced by civil 
society, as well as by state-to-state relations, to comply with international norms.  
Nevertheless, Lizée captures the major themes widely advocated as the means for 
attaining human security, including democratisation, social justice, politico-
economic decision making, rule of law and human rights.  These are the approaches 
tested by my field-based study in chapter 4. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the promotion of democracy has become a relatively 
uncontested activity of developed countries and the major multilateral institutions.  
There is, however, a risk of democracy appearing as a panacea for all social ills and 
for its Western form to be seen as a universal given.  The Human Security Report 
correlates a reduction in interstate conflict with the spread of democracy, but is 
aware, too, that the econometric analyses have also warned that democracy may 
itself be destabilising, and hence give rise to human insecurities, at least in the short 
term.  Human rights and the rule of law are also significant factors, but they in turn 
raise important questions about state responsibilities, even as there is a tendency to 
internationalise those responsibilities especially through internationally sponsored 
human rights approaches to development and an emphasis on democratic 
governance.104   
There is strong argument for a law-based approach to achieving human security.  
However, this tends to emphasise the role of international civil society in 
achievements such as the formation of the international court, the ban on land mines 
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and international outlawing of child soldiers.105  Less attention is given to the role of 
law at the local level, and how this can provide human security for local individuals 
and groups.  Instead, the focus tends to be more on law enforcement by the military 
and police – so-called security sector reform – and the promotion of international 
efforts to improve the professional behaviour of state militaries, police and other 
security sector institutions, and their subjection to civilian control and acceptance of 
the rule of law and human rights, which it is argued will encourage “good 
governance” and development.106  It is argued, too, that by promoting civilian 
control over security forces, increased professionalism and decommissioning of 
excess service personnel, as well as confining the use of the security sector to roles 
consistent with Western norms and behaviour, human security will also be served.107  
There are of course risks in such approaches as they may appear to represent yet 
more Western imposition and provide a more effective security sector to support 
narrow political and economic interests within countries and militate against 
democratic reforms.  It may also result in more serious oppression against the local 
populations.  
Such strategies assume that despite the individual focus of human rights and the rule 
of law, human security objectives will be achieved by state and regional security 
outcomes.  Nevertheless, others have argued that human security can be achieved 
through social welfare and domestic development programmes which reduce the risk 
of domestic issues spilling over and becoming security issues between states.108  
Something similar emerges in studies which point to civil society approaches to 
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human security.  Thomas and Tow, for example, support a significant role for 
international civil society organizations in providing international interventions, 
based on case studies from Haiti and East Timor.  These are, however, hardly 
convincing examples as the day-to-day livelihoods of populations and the 
engagement of local civil society in these countries is problematic.  Major 
international interventions in a number of countries have failed in the longer term to 
develop an effective civil society and have provided only short-term reprieve from 
violence, much as predicted by the econometric analyses above.109  The emphasis 
needs to shift more to the role of local civil society (which may be very limited in 
some societies) in human security. 
It seems that there is thus very little convincing evidence of how human security is to 
be achieved at the local level, especially if we insist, as Thakur does, that “human 
security puts the individual at the centre of debate, analysis and policy.  He or she is 
paramount; the state is but a collective instrument to protect human life and enhance 
human welfare.”110  At the same time, the achievement of human security must co-
exist with attention to state, regional and global security interests.  In practical terms 
it is recognised that rich countries need to address both traditional and human 
security issues in balancing their foreign policy approaches to ensure their own 
security.  This can be seen in Australia’s relations with East Timor, Papua New 
Guinea and other countries in the Pacific, and in the Solomon Islands in particular.  
There the security threat of a failed state on Australia’s doorstep is being addressed 
both by conflict resolution and the very kinds of welfare and development 
approaches suggested by Liotta.111  Australia’s military, for example, has been asked 
to play the role of peace keeper and to uphold human security in a number of 
countries such as Cambodia, East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq and the Solomon Islands.  
However, these interventions are still suggestive of “doing” human security.  
Overall, there are a variety of factors which are proposed as being fundamental to the 
achievement of human security.  All are relevant, but as will be evident in the case of 
Cambodia, the prioritisation of one over the other in a general or theoretical context 
will have very limited value—the need is for a much more holistic approach to 
                                                 
109  Thomas and Tow, "The Utility of Human Security: Sovereignty and Humanitarian 
Intervention." 
110  Ramesh Thakur, "A Political Worldview," Security Dialogue 35, no. 3 (2004): 347. 
111  Liotta, "Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and Human Security," 473-88. 
  50 
human security in the prioritisation and application of strategies in response to 
specific local and national circumstances.  To do this, human security in developing 
countries, as elsewhere, needs to be considered at the local and state level and not 
bound by an international security framework which depoliticises it locally.112  The 
international approach of external states, international organisations and international 
civil society organisations not only risks divorcing the state from its domestic 
responsibilities for human security, but also reduces it to what is necessary for the 
wider international security interest.  As a result, it may be seen to be achieved 
simply by an absence of conflict and reduced poverty levels.  
The need for civil society in the re-politicisation of national and human security 
issues within the domestic context as well as internationally is significant.  But civil 
society movements must respond to actual conditions and remain politically active.  
The risk for them is that if they become institutionalised after achieving their initial 
aims, they also become de-politicised.113 
Although Tan See Seng, like Booth, sees social movements as important in the 
process of achieving human security, his emphasis is on the international dimension 
of social movement and, while that will be important to the achievement of human 
security, there must also be a similar emphasis on politicising issues through local 
social movements.  This idea of social movements is significant because, if human 
security is to be politicised, then it must be in response to people’s perception of a 
threat to themselves or others.  Hence, there needs to be some way of expressing the 
security concern in a political process in the appropriate context – local government, 
state, regional or global depending on the political dimensions and importance.   
In the absence of local studies of human security it is not surprising that its 
achievement has been largely assumed to depend on international activities, 
especially the promotion of human rights and human development norms.  The 
record to date has not been convincing.  Despite that, however, as noted above, it has 
been argued in support of the narrow definition of human security that the broader 
concept adds nothing to what is already offered by human rights and human 
development.  The next section will explore the relationship between human 
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security, human rights and human development in more detail to show that human 
rights and human development approaches can benefit from being incorporated into 
a broad human security approach.   
Human security, human rights and human development - the 
relationship 
A discussion of human security inevitably brings into play questions of its 
relationship with human rights and human development.  The international human 
rights regime is based upon the Universal Declaration of Human Rights sponsored 
by the US and accepted by the General Assembly of the UN in 1948.  Human 
development has emerged, and continues to be reformulated, over many decades of 
development since the 1950s.  It has grown from the disenchantment with Rostow’s 
“trickle down” theory of economic growth through the failure of structural 
adjustment and a realisation that greater attention to the basic needs of people and to 
their participation and empowerment in the processes of development was 
warranted.114   
Definitions of human security in terms of people’s physical safety, their economic 
and social wellbeing, respect for their dignity and worth as human beings, and the 
protection of their rights and fundamental freedoms are expressed in terms little 
different from those which are to be found in human rights and human development 
literature.  The relationship is in fact treated in a variety of ways, but the distinction 
is not always clear.  They are, for example, described in pairs as two sides of the 
same coin, and it is said you can’t have one without the other.115  More specifically, 
human rights have been described as a “bridge between human security and human 
development.”116  It is argued here that human security, like freedom, represents a 
goal that can be achieved by application of the principles of human rights and the 
mechanisms of human development.  A human security approach has the advantage 
that it is directly associated with state and global security, and captures the purpose 
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of human rights and human development to achieve not only individual, but also 
global, security goals.    
Nevertheless, human security is downplayed even by the UNDP in subsequent 
Human Development Reports which, from 1995, emphasise freedoms as the goal of 
human rights and human development.  For example, the 2000 Report says that:  
“Human rights and human development share a common vision and a common purpose – 
to secure the freedom, wellbeing and dignity of all people everywhere” 
 and that: 
“Human development shares a common vision with human rights.  The goal is human 
freedom.  And in pursuing capabilities and realizing rights, this freedom is vital. ….  
Human development and human rights are mutually reinforcing, helping to secure the well-
being and dignity of all people, building self-respect and the respect of others.”117 
This goal-oriented view of human rights and human development and its association 
with freedom owes much to the influence of Amatya Sen as an adviser to the 
UNDP.118  It is also represented in conflict management studies.  But it is significant 
that the goal of human rights is thus not only the protection of the individual from 
the state but includes also the responsibility of the state to provide a framework of 
opportunity for its citizens.  This latter responsibility of states is spelled out in the 
Declaration of the Right to Development which was adopted by the General 
Assembly in 1986 and reconfirmed in the Vienna Declaration and subsequently by 
the General Assembly in 1993.  Human development works towards the same goal 
by providing the techniques and processes which, in association with other national 
development strategies, enhance the capability of individuals and the opportunities 
necessary for people to achieve human security.  Sen’s goal of freedom is somewhat 
similar to that of human security, but the latter draws the issues of individual welfare 
directly into the international security framework.  It is not necessary in this thesis to 
attempt to argue for or against the primacy of human rights.  However, it is 
important to note that there remains considerable debate on issues relating to the 
universality of rights, whether they concern natural or only legal rights, and the 
major issue of cultural relativity.  It is adequate here to take the view that, pursuant 
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the universality is accepted in 
principle by member states of the UN whether or not they are adopted into their law 
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or constitutions.119  Moreover, human rights—economic, social, civil, and political—
are in the end open to political debate or legislated depending on the approach in 
particular countries and guaranteed only to the extent that societies respect them and 
individual states and their institutions support and implement them.  My human 
security approach and its focus at the local level helps to re-consider the contribution 
of human rights and human development in local practice, suggesting that together 
they may be the bridges to human security. 
In summary, there is an awareness that human rights must be protected or enforced, 
and that societies must either struggle or be ever vigilant to ensure their rights are not 
ignored or taken away.  To be meaningful, rights require positive and conscious 
actions—by civil society, by state institutions, by the international community or 
other “protectors.”  Human development is one tool that can enhance awareness of 
individual and group rights and the opportunities to exercise them.  It requires 
training in human rights; an improvement in the education and capacity of people to 
participate in their societies and in the economy; and an understanding of the 
benefits, in a democratic situation at least, of insisting on their own rights as well as 
respecting those of others.  This presupposes the effective operation of certain 
government institutions, and in particular the justice system.  The concept of human 
security enables a new perspective on how these elements come together to achieve 
their common objectives.   
Human security in practice 
The chapter has traced a path of comment and criticism of the concept of human 
security presented in the 1994 UNDP Human development Report.  The tendency 
since then has been for the UNDP itself to rather downplay the concept in its future 
reports, while isolated UNDP country offices have given it initial support—the most 
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significant being UNDP Human Development Report for Afghanistan in 2005.120  
Other UN organizations and the OECD promote human security but primarily in a 
top-down security-related approach.121  The African Human Security Initiative 
supported by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) is set up 
within a security framework to monitor commitments to democracy, good 
governance and civil society participation.122  ASEAN has also included a human 
security agenda.  A number of states have joined the Human Security Network and 
organise conferences on specific topics from a policy perspective.  Canada has 
continued to support the Human Security Centre, which disseminates related 
research and information.  While Canada, Thailand and several other countries in the 
Network have included human security in their foreign policies, others such as 
Australia and the US have lent little, if any, endorsement of the concept.  The UN, 
through the Secretary General, has given its support though it has tended to 
highlighted the narrow definition, especially by its engagement with the Human 
Security Report.  The UN Security Council, however, has not as yet embraced 
human security.123  
The more visible outcome of human security efforts has been the support for 
political initiatives aimed at conflict resolution as well as for international campaigns 
within the UN and by international NGOs to restrict violence through treaties which 
would ban the production and use of land mines; prevent the spread of small arms 
(which are used in conflicts and violence in many parts of the world); outlaw the use 
of child soldiers, and encourage anti-drug efforts.  In this context, human security 
has emerged as a very effective rallying cry and diplomatic tool for civil society 
groups, the UN and sympathetic governments.  In Cambodia there have been a range 
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of programmes relating to land mine victims, recovery from conflict and violence as 
well as specific human rights issues, largely driven by external agencies such as the 
UN and international NGOs. 
As a concept with “Asian roots”, human security has also achieved a level of 
recognition in regional security dialogue and includes expressions of policy 
commitment to human security principles.124  Both ASEAN and APEC have 
included human security within their policy frameworks.  The 1997 economic crisis 
resulted in many social problems in the affected Asian countries.  These included 
ethnic tensions and widespread urban to rural migration following the extensive loss 
of businesses, markets and jobs.  Attention became focused on people’s security and 
the problems emerging were recognised as human security issues which required the 
establishment of welfare and safety nets to protect people from the consequences of 
this and any possible future economic downturn.125  Both agencies have addressed 
the subject cautiously to avoid implications of interference in domestic affairs.  They 
see human security as being served by such things as trade and health security, 
which can be addressed through consultation and cooperation between states in the 
region.126  Thailand has been foremost in promoting human security, in part due to 
the influence of former Foreign Minister, Surin Pitsuwan, who was a member of the 
Human Security Commission.  Thailand has been chair of the Human Security 
Network where it has sought to balance freedom from fear and freedom from want 
approaches and has promoted people-centred development and empowerment.  
However, it appears that, at this level of policy discussion, there is some caution in 
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relation to the possibility that human security could become a basis for external 
interference in much the same way as human rights was perceived in the past.127 
Thailand’s policy interest in human security was enhanced by the financial crisis of 
1997 which severely undermined the livelihoods of many Thais, especially in the 
absence of social security for workers and professionals who lost their jobs, and for 
their families.128  Many would argue that the harsh demands of the IMF on Thailand 
and the forced privatisation and sale of business and financial institutions to overseas 
investors in accordance with economic globalisation expectations, aggravated the 
extent of the social impact.129  More recent health scares related to Avian Flu Virus 
and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreaks demonstrate how a basic 
human health security issue can be scaled up and indeed become lost in international 
security practices.    
For example, when confronted by threats associated with the potentially devastating 
Avian Flu and SARS viruses, there was rapid international action headed largely by 
the WHO to prevent the spread of the viruses beyond the location of isolated 
outbreaks.  The main form of attack on Avian Flu was the slaughter of large numbers 
of poultry in affected areas with a consequent loss of both food and income for 
businesses and villagers affected.  Curley and Tow detail the background of the 
SARS outbreak and its spread to Vietnam, Thailand, Singapore and elsewhere.130  
Effectively dealing with SARS, they found, depended on the state’s capacity to 
coordinate all relevant agencies and stakeholders and to plan and manage the 
necessary response.  Their study demonstrated a close “intersection between politics, 
economic development and public health.”131  The key human security issue was the 
threat of the outbreak spreading among the population.  The risk of its spreading 
across borders and globally through transport systems was also a significant 
international security matter with implication for human security in other countries 
which might be affected.  McInnes and Lee, after observing a number of 
                                                 
127  Acharya, "Human Security: What Kind for the Asia-Pacific?," 6; and Acharya, "Human 
Security: East Versus West?," 9. 
128  Thailand created a Ministry of Social Welfare and Human Security. 
129  Rapin Quinn, "Social Impact of Economic Crisis in Thailand," Development Bulletin, no. 46 
(1998). 
130  Melissa Curley and Nicholas Thomas, "Human Security and Public Health in Southeast 
Asia: the SARS Outbreak," Australian Journal of International Affairs 58, no. 1 (2004). 17-
32. 
131  Ibid., 28. 
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international conferences and meetings on the issue, concluded that the agendas were 
“dominated by the concerns of foreign and security policy, not of global health”, and 
they mainly reflected the interests of the West in infectious diseases and bio-terror.  
Despite the known links between internal stability and health, they argued that WHO 
lacked the conceptual clarity as to what global health security meant and had no 
clear answer to the question of whose health, whose security risk and what issues 
should be part of the global health security agenda.132  Chen claims that the 
infectious diseases unit of the WHO even suggested that “global surveillance and 
control against infectious diseases, including bio-terrorism, should work with and be 
financed by national departments of defence.”133   
Through such processes, rather than operationalising human security at the local 
level, the international security interests shifted the focus from the immediately 
vulnerable individuals and groups to states and to a global security perspective.  
While there were legitimate global security concerns, they came to override the 
significant human security issue in the frontline countries concerned, much as argued 
by Kaldor and Duffield.  While rich countries can organise and test comprehensive 
response plans and procedures designed to reduce risk and ensure the human security 
of their populations, the poor countries are unequipped to do the same and their 
populations are relegated to the source of risk.  Even though a human security 
approach was attempted by the UNDP in Afghanistan in consultation with the 
people, the approach has not been maintained.134  Rather, human security has been 
operationalised at the international policy level in an attempt to bring it to people as 
                                                 
132  Colin McInnes and Kelly Lee, "Health, Security and Foreign Policy," Review of 
International Studies 32, no. 1 (2006): 22.  See also Steven Lanjouw, Joanna Macrae, and 
Anthony B Zwi, "Rehabilitating Health Services in Cambodia: The Challenge of 
Coordination in Chronic Political Emergencies," Health Policy and Planning 14, no. 3 
(1999): 229-42. 
133  Lincoln C Chen and Vasant Narasimhan, "Health and Human Security: Pointing a Way 
Forward," (2002), at www.fas.harvard.edu/acgei/Publications/Chen/LCC_Health_and_HS_ 
way_forward.pdf, accessed on 17 March 2007. 
134  UNDP, "Afghanistan's first National Human Development Report: Security With a Human 
Face."  "This Report”, says its editor, Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, “is about accountability to the 
Afghan people.  It is a reminder, voiced by the hundreds involved, that the responsibility of 
the government and the international community in Afghanistan is to provide human security 
public goods for all Afghans, regardless of gender, ethnicity or geographic location.  But it 
also calls on people themselves to become actively involved in the process of creating those 
goods.  A first step was to be involved directly in identifying common desired goals and 
threats to these.  This Report and its process are ultimately an expression of hope for a life of 
dignity.” 
  58 
part of a broader global security strategy.  Individuals and local groups have little 
input to these policies and processes.   
Conclusion 
There is considerable debate as to the meaning and utility of the concept of human 
security and there are varying approaches to its study.  At the same time, despite 
scepticism among international relations and traditional security academics as to the 
validity and utility of the concept of human security, it has, with the adoption of the 
narrow definition, found extensive support in the fields of critical security studies 
and research on conflict and conflict resolution.  It has also gained a high profile 
among policy makers and international activists in pursuit of peace and human rights 
agendas.  Many academics in international relations and security areas have found it 
difficult to reconcile security with individuals and groups and therefore continue to 
adhere to existing theories of state-centric security.  There are chinks in the armour 
and the broad concept of human security is making inroads into the international 
relations and security disciplines.  There is a certain pressure coming from other 
disciplines such as anthropology where a range of social conditions is being studied 
in terms of security.  There is little to support a view that human security must be 
only about critical issues and determined by some form of measurable threshold.  
Indeed, such a demand exceeds the security practice of states, which identify and 
address all forms of perceived threats and vulnerabilities, not only critical ones.  
Security practice by states, in peacetime in particular, is mainly about preventing 
issues from attaining a critical status – be it diplomatically or through military 
posture. 
There is still much research to be done to locate human security within the wider 
security framework.  A start has been made through critical theory studies and 
through the attempts to formulate development programmes from a human security 
perspective in Afghanistan.  These approaches reveal that human security must be 
about the actual circumstances of individuals and groups, and about state and 
international influences on that condition.  Human security is either part of a 
continuum of security from the individual to state to the international, or it may be 
considered an area of security alongside international security, national security, 
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environmental security, economic security and so on.  I argue that the former is more 
realistic (as the SARS and Avian Flu examples above demonstrate) and so the next 
chapter explores how the dominant security policies and practices of other states, as 
well as domestic events, created decades of human insecurity in Cambodia through 
war and other forms of violence.  The international, national and individual cannot 
be de-linked in the security context. 
I have shown, too, that there is a close link between the human security condition 
associated with war and violence, and development.  Failures in development are 
shown to be part of the causes of war and violence and, at the same time, 
development is a critical element in the long-term security of post-conflict states.  
Studies have variously suggested that human security is guaranteed by such things as 
the state, civil society, governance, adherence to the rule of law, democratisation or 
development.  I consider all of these are relevant and have also embraced human 
rights and human development as important contributors to human security—though 
some would see these as adequate to achieving humanitarian outcomes making the 
concept of human security redundant.  What I have concluded to be critical, 
however, is how people at the local level identify problems and issues which 
threaten their basic livelihoods and dignity and what opportunities they have to 
address these individually, as a group or in association with state and independent 
institutions.   
This chapter concludes that human security must be defined in the broad sense.  
However, rather than try to produce yet another definition, I have adopted the very 
open approach of Thakur for the purpose of fieldwork that “… human security refers 
to the quality of life of the people of a society or polity.  Anything which degrades 
their quality of life – demographic pressures, diminished access to or stock of 
resources, and so on – is a [human] security threat.”135  As noted above, I also use 
the definition proposed by the Commission for Africa which incorporates the 
important provisions of the role of governance, for analytical purposes. 
What has also been concluded is that security studies have not focused attention on 
the predicament of individuals and communities and how they may relate to state, 
regional and global security.  In the next two chapters, therefore, I will demonstrate 
                                                 
135  Thakur, "From National to Human Security." 53.  
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how individual and community security have been caught up in international security 
practice in Cambodia, and how human insecurities persist long into the post-conflict 
period despite the high level of international development assistance.   
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 CHAPTER 3 
HUMAN SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT -  
THE CASE OF CAMBODIA   
I think Cambodia has an importance beyond itself, because there in its fragile heart 
paraded, throughout the 1970s, many of the most frightful beasts that now stalked the 
world.  Brutal civil war, superpower intervention carelessly conducted from afar, 
nationalism exaggerated into paranoid racism, fanatical and vengeful revolution, invasion, 
starvation and back to unobserved civil war without end.1 
The fundamental components of human security – the security of people against threats to 
personal safety and life expectancy – can be put at risk by external aggression, but also by 
factors within a country, including ‘security’ forces.2 
 
 
As Shawcross points out, Cambodians in the 1970s faced some of the worst 
conditions imaginable and human security was denied to the majority of the 
population through war and state violence against its own citizens.  However, the 
insecurity of Cambodians was not always a result of domestic factors and the 
international politics of the cold war played a significant role in the people’s ongoing 
distress.  With the decline of the cold war, the international community played a 
belated role in bringing a peace settlement to what had become Cambodia’s civil 
war.  It also brought the hope that democracy and development would bring a 
significant improvement to the human security situation. 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold.  First, to show that in addition to domestic 
issues, international security practice and the way in which external states use both 
military and political power in their own interests, contributed directly to creating 
and maintaining human insecurity in Cambodia in the 1970s and 1980s.  Secondly, 
to outline the processes of state rebuilding by the Vietnamese installed government 
of Heng Samrin following the destruction of the Pol Pot years, and the later 
rebuilding under the auspices of an internationally sponsored post-conflict 
development assistance programme.   
                                                 
1  Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia, 14.   
2  Thakur, "A Political Worldview," 347. 
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Cambodians through their long history have been subject to the violence of war as a 
result of tensions with neighbours, rebel activities, banditry and in colonial times in 
particular, military responses to rural instability.  They have also been subject to the 
harsh demands of a predatory state and the social disruption produced by economic 
and political change.  While it is possible only to hint at the human insecurities 
present in Cambodia’s early periods, it is important to outline the process of 
Cambodian state formation and the major forces that have shaped it, because it 
brings its own social, political and administrative legacy and has a bearing on later 
events and on human security in Cambodian in more recent times.  I have therefore 
provided, at Appendix A, a short historical background to state formation in 
Cambodia and to events leading to the 1970 coup which sent Cambodia into the 
spiral of war and human insecurity.   
Cambodia’s descent into war and related violence is outlined from a human rather 
than state security perspective.  The following two sections provide an overview of 
the different situations of human insecurity endured by Cambodians, in war and as 
refugees, as a result in part of domestic politics and in part, also, of the security 
politics of external states.  A section is then devoted to the reconstruction of the 
communist state in Cambodia following the demise of the Pol Pot regime and 
describes the revival of patrimonial government systems which form the basis for a 
new state rebuilding exercise taken up by the international development community.  
The final section outlines the new international engagement with Cambodia through 
extensive democratisation and development assistance programmes.  International 
assistance in Cambodia is a continuation of international security practice in the 
belief that democracy and development will bring economic benefit, stability and 
security to Cambodia and to the region.  
The chapter argues that although human security is an essentially local condition, it 
is not only a domestic issue of state governance but is also strongly influenced by the 
security interests and practices of other states and of international governance 
organisations.  It will demonstrate how international humanitarian efforts and peace 
negotiations themselves were at times hampered by the separate security interests of 
the states involved in the Cambodian conflict.  There is evidence of such influence in 
many aspects of the human insecurities suffered by Cambodians in different 
situations since the 1970s.  Even after the negotiation of the peace agreement, the 
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international community continued to have an influence on the human security of 
Cambodians through the development policies and programmes proposed by 
Western development theories and development organisations such as the World 
Bank and UNDP.   
 Cambodia – conflict, devastation and reconstruction 1960-2004  
Figure 3-1 below depicts rice production in Cambodia from 1961 to 2004.  It is not 
presented to analyse food security as such, but as a useful way of illustrating the 
impact of key political events and periods on a basic human security condition.  Each 
period identified in this section will be further analysed to identify the various forms 
of insecurity co-existing at different times in Cambodia’s recent past.  Features of 
initial interest are the unusual peaks and troughs in production from 1967 to 1970 
followed by a radical collapse in production by 1975.  What was happening in the 
countryside in these and the following years?  
  
 
Figure 3-1 Rice production in Cambodia 1961-20063 
War and the Khmer Rouge victory – 1970 to 1975 
During the 1960s there was increasing unrest in the countryside where trends in 
some parts towards larger landholdings and landlordism, and poor prices meant that 
                                                 
3  Compiled from FAO, Statistics Division, Commodities by Country and IRRI database at 
http://www.irri.org/science/ricestat Tables 1 & 2, accessed 20 September 2005.  A similar 
table appears in Puckridge, The Burning of the Rice: A Cambodian Success Story.  
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there were growing numbers of peasants, either landless or with smallholdings, who 
were desperate and prepared to support revolutionary activities.4  At the same time, 
there was growing discontent among the urban, educated class.  Entry to the civil 
service became difficult, alternative employment was not available, political 
corruption was rife and left-wing opposition politicians and intellectuals were 
increasingly suppressed by Sihanouk, forcing many to flee to the “maquis”, or 
Khmer Rouges as Sihanouk dubbed them, in fear for their lives.5  Across the 
countryside, leftist rebel groups and younger revolutionaries from the towns 
conducted political activities among the peasants.6   
A new right wing government elected in 1966 sought to reverse Sihanouk’s politics 
of neutrality in relation to the Vietnam War, to restore relations with the US and to 
subdue the rebels in the countryside.  Increased military activity against rebels and 
widespread peasant discontent led, in April 1967, to a rebellion in the Samlaut region 
of Battambang province, which spread quickly to other provinces.7  The Samlaut 
rebellion was put down on Sihanouk’s instruction by General Lon Nol who, in 1970, 
led a successful coup against Sihanouk and declared himself President of the new 
Republic. 
A drastic collapse in rice production in Cambodia followed the coup which also saw 
Cambodia embroiled in the Vietnam war, and brought renewed US bombing and a 
ground war which spilled over into Cambodia.8  Cambodia’s direct involvement as a 
                                                 
4  Ben Kiernan and Chanthou Boua, eds., Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea 1942-1981 
(London: Zed Press, 1982), 6 and 13.  
5  Michael Vickery, Cambodia: 1975-1982 (Boston: South End Press, 1984), 18-25;  Justin 
Corfield, "Khmers Stand Up! A History of the Cambodian Government 1970-1975,"  (Centre 
of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University: 1994), 33; and Milton E Osborne, Politics 
and Power in Cambodia, Studies in Contemporary Southeast Asia (Camberwell: Longman, 
1973), 61 and 88-9.  
6  Kiernan and Chanthou Boua, eds., Peasants and Politics, 167. 
7  Ibid., 177; and Jean-Claude Pomonti and Serge Thion, Des Courtisans aux Partisans: La 
Crise Cambodgienne (Paris: Gallimard, 1971), 112-45.  Samlaut was also at the centre of 
anti-French rebellions in the early 1950s.  Corfield, "Khmers Stand Up!”, 16.  The peaks in 
rice production in 1968 and 1970 seasons may be simply due to the collection of rice by the 
military reducing the amount smuggled  into Vietnam.  The 1969 crop being reduced by the 
rural unrest. 
8  For example Shawcross interviewed a governor of Kompong Cham who argued that support 
for the Khmer Rouge grew due to the bombing, the destruction of homes and killing of 
animals.  William Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy: Cambodia, Holocaust and Modern 
Conscience (London: Andre Deutsch, 1984), 35.  Secret bombing was understood to have 
begun in 1969, however, it has been more recently revealed the bombing began in 1965 and 
was more extensive than formerly believed.  See Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, 
and the Destruction of Cambodia; and Taylor Owen and Ben Kiernan, "Bombs over 
Cambodia," The Walrus (Canada), October (2006): 62-9.  
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US ally in the Vietnam War, however, provided the impetus for an eventual surge of 
support for the Khmer Rouge, mainly from the rural population but also from 
sections of the educated urban class.  Strong opposition to Lon Nol’s erratic 
leadership and Sihanouk backing the rebels from his exile in China, meant that 
support for the Khmer Rouge was far greater than what they had been able to muster 
in their own right.9  Lon Nol’s seizure of power and the ousting of Sihanouk had 
contributed to a rapid decline in the political, economic and military situation and to 
the ultimate victory of the Khmer Rouge in April 1975.10  The rise of the Khmer 
Rouge occurred in a complex environment not only of domestic factionalism and 
corrupt government but also in a world of revolutionary movements and 
independence struggles fuelled by cold war antagonisms.11  As Shawcross noted, the 
careless application of superpower military action facilitated the rise of the Khmer 
Rouge which proceeded to decimate the country and its people.12 By 1975, Phnom 
Penh and other towns were swollen with refugees dependent on US food supplies.   
The Pol Pot regime 1975-9 
The Khmer Rouge regime instigated a return to “year zero.”  This involved 
draconian policies including the evacuation of cities; massacres and purges of 
perceived class enemies; rapid and harsh communalisation of production; destruction 
of the family and village society; elimination of religion; forced migrations, 
enslavement and militarisation of a whole population.13  Under Pol Pot’s leadership, 
the Khmer Rouge exhibited a ruthless political and military disregard for human life 
as over one and a half million Cambodians died in purges and of overwork, disease 
and starvation.  Cambodians in this period were thus deprived of any semblance of 
                                                 
9  After 1975, Sihanouk returned to Phnom Penh as head of state but was held as a virtual 
prisoner by the Khmer Rouge and retired in mid-1976.  
10  The advent of the new regime in Phnom Penh signalled the end of one Indochina war and the 
start of another among the "Red Brotherhood."  See Grant Evans and Kevin Rowley, Red 
Brotherhood at War: Indochina since the Fall of Saigon (London: Verso, 1984).  The 1st 
Indochina War was with the French; the 2nd was with the US; and the 3rd was between 
Cambodia and Vietnam.  The latter two involved the superpowers, ASEAN and other and 
regional players. 
11  Osborne makes the point, too, that it is important to understand the domestic causes of 
dissent in Cambodia in the 1960s as well as the international influences which contributed to 
Cambodia's collapse into war.  See his discussion in Osborne, Politics and Power, 4-11. 
12  Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia; and Shawcross, 
The Quality of Mercy. 
13  Meas Nee, "Social Reconstruction in the Post-Conflict Situation" (PhD Thesis, La Trobe 
University, 2000).  Nee discusses the destructive effect of militarisation on Cambodian 
society and its deep ongoing effect long after the end of the Pol Pot regime. 
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human security.14  The chart illustrates that under the Pol Pot regime and its 
draconian agricultural practices, rice production languished way below pre-war 
levels.15   
Vietnamese intervention and civil war – 1979-1991 
A sharp improvement in rice production began in 1979 after Vietnam, partly in 
response to persistent incursions by the Khmer Rouge army and attacks on 
Vietnamese villages, invaded Cambodia and installed a new Cambodian 
government.16  The new government - the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) – 
was made up largely of former Khmer Rouge cadres who had fled to Vietnam to 
escape the purges.  While the continued Vietnamese military presence brought 
widespread international condemnation, the PRK also confronted two other major 
problems.  First, it had to engage in an ongoing armed conflict with the Khmer 
Rouge and other opposition factions operating from bases near the Thai border; and 
secondly, it had to immediately set about improving agricultural production and 
restoring government services inside Cambodia.    
The demands for rebuilding Cambodia presented a different set of problems, but also 
established the basis of governance in Cambodia upon which a post-peace agreement 
state would in turn be rebuilt.  The major reconstruction effort inside Cambodia from 
1979, which was largely hampered by international opposition and ongoing civil war 
as well as poor governance, is considered in detail in the next section.   
                                                 
14  On the rise of Pol Pot see for example: Ben Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and 
Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-79 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1996); Ben Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power: Colonialism, Nationalism, and 
Communism in Cambodia, 1930-1975, Second Edition ed. (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2004); Vickery, Cambodia: 1975-1982; and David Chandler, Brother Number One: A 
Political Biography of Pol Pot (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1992).  Personal accounts of 
conditions under Pol Pot include Loung Ung, First They Killed My Father: A Daughter of 
Cambodia Remembers (Sydney: HarperCollins, 2000); and Molyda Szymusiak, The Stones 
Cry Out: A Cambodian Childhood 1975-80 (London: Sphere Books, 1986). 
15  Though some Cambodians I spoke to suggested that under slave conditions more rice was 
produced and exported to China leaving little or nothing for the people. 
16  The invasion began in December 1978 and was seen as an “aggression” by some while 
others considered it to be an “humanitarian” intervention.  The issues are discussed in Gary 
Klintworth, Vietnam's Intervention in Cambodia in International Law (Canberra: Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1989).  
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International intervention from 1992 
Finally, a significant improvement in rice production is shown on the chart following 
the implementation of the peace agreement and United Nations sponsored elections 
in Cambodia in 1993 and the influx of major international development assistance.  
It is the period since 1993 that has offered the greatest potential for achieving an 
acceptable level of human security in Cambodia as international aid and 
development assistance poured into the country.  The international contribution as it 
impacted on rural Cambodia will be examined in greater depth below.   
Human insecurity - civil war, refugees and the international role 
1970-1991 
Civil conflict produced a range of human security situations discussed below.  First, 
there was international support for the Cambodian opposition factions, including the 
Khmer Rouges, and for the Vietnamese installed government.  This prolonged the 
conflict and stalled peace efforts until the end of the cold war.  Secondly, refugees 
fled to the border where they were taken into camps.  There, UN humanitarian 
agencies were hampered by governments which withheld the necessary agreements 
to allow the organisation to freely provide protection and assistance to refugees in 
accordance with their international mandates.  Thirdly, some refugee camps become 
resistance bases for the opposition parties and were subject to military actions.  
Fourthly, insecurity inside Cambodia arose from the ongoing war and state 
rebuilding and finally, during the peace settlement process, the international 
community continued to propose a role for the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia’s political 
future. 
Internationally sponsored civil war 
Despite its appalling record of abuse, the Pol Pot regime retained its seat in the UN 
by vote of the General Assembly in September 1979 as international geopolitics 
focused its wrath firmly on the Vietnamese, supported by China which launched an 
attack on northern Vietnam to “teach Vietnam a lesson.”   
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The Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia was referred to the UN Security Council 
by the government of Democratic Kampuchea in January 1979.17  It sough the 
condemnation of Vietnam’s action and an immediate withdrawal.  China’s punitive 
attack on Vietnam broadened the international debate to include wider issues of 
security and stability in Southeast Asia.18  
Security Council debates placed more emphasis on political rather than on legal 
argument.  The main issues addressed revolved around the principles in the UN 
Charter concerning fundamental human rights; that states not use forces against each 
other; that states not interfere in the internal affairs of another; and that disputes 
within and between states be resolved peaceably.  Generally, the position of the 
Western nations in the debates was that no matter how reprehensible or detestable a 
government might be, this could not justify a military attack on it by another state.19  
This theme carried over into General Assembly credentials debates, and the 
confirmation of Pol Pot’s regime as the legitimate government of Cambodia resulted, 
despite its record of abuse and the gross human insecurity it had created.20  While the 
Vietnamese sought the expulsion of the regime on the grounds of genocide, the word 
was carefully avoided by China and the US.  Only in 1988 would the US Congress 
change US foreign policy to acknowledge the “genocidal Khmer Rouge.”21 
With the permanent members locked into cold war opposition, the Security Council 
was unable to agree on any resolution, and was simply sidelined as a global 
governance institution in relation to the human and state security concerns of 
Cambodia and the immediate region.  It was not until 1990 that the Security Council 
made resolutions on Cambodia and then only to acknowledge and approve a peace 
process and the agreement made outside the framework of the UN, and to commit 
the UN to the pivotal UNTAC process.22   
                                                 
17  S/13089, 16 February 1979. 
18  S/PV.2109 to 2112, 12-15 January 1979; S/PV.2114, 23 February 1979;S/PV.2117, 27 
February 1979. 
19  S/PV.2111, 15 January 1979, (3); S/PV.2109, 12 January 1979, (17). 
20 For issues and voting patterns see Ramses Amer, "The Resolution of the Cambodian 
Conflict: Assessing the Explanatory Value of Zartman's 'Ripeness Theory'," Journal of 
Peace Research 44, no. 6 (2007). 
21  Tom Fawthrop and Helen Jarvis, Getting Away with Genocide?  Elusive Justice and the 
Khmer Rouge Tribunal (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2005), 85-86. 
22  UNSC Resolution 668 in September 1990 was followed by a further 13 resolutions over the 
next three years concerned with approval of the peace process. 
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In the UN General Assembly, countries such as the UK, which had brought evidence 
of Pol Pot’s human rights abuses to the Commission on Human Rights, effectively 
set these concerns aside to uphold the continued occupation of the seat by 
Democratic Kampuchea and supported the annual General Assembly resolutions 
condemning Vietnam’s actions and demanding immediate withdrawal.23  The 
General Assembly justified its continued recognition of Pol Pot on the fallacious 
grounds that to seat the new government, or to leave Cambodia’s seat vacant as 
proposed by India, would be to condone Vietnam’s invasion and presence in 
Cambodia.24  Two years later the regime was ‘de-recognised’ and Cambodia’s seat 
left vacant until it passed to a coalition government in exile in 1992.  
From 1979, border camps in Thailand and across the frontier became politico-
military bases under the effective control of opposition political factions including 
the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) under the leadership of Pol Pot (Khmer 
Rouge); the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF) under the 
leadership of president Lon Nol’s former prime minister, Son Sann (created late 
1979); and the National Union Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and 
Cooperative Cambodia (Funcinpec) formed in 1982 under the leadership of 
Sihanouk and later his son, Prince Rannarith.  To appear united in their resistance 
against the Vietnamese, the three factions formed the Coalition Government of 
Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) under Sihanouk in 1982.  However, each 
continued to receive independent support from their particular patron states.   
The camps were used by the opposition factions to support their military operations, 
by international humanitarian agencies to channel humanitarian assistance to 
refugees and by states—such as US, China, and Thailand—to provide military 
support to them.  This latter support for the various factions effectively ensured the 
continuation of the civil war in Cambodia until the late 1980s when relations 
between the three key states changed due to the collapse of the cold war.  As the 
                                                 
23  The United Kingdom brought the issue of human rights abuses in Cambodia to the attention 
of the UN Human Rights Commission in 1978.  An investigation report was issued early in 
1979 after the Vietnamese intervention.  See Colin Warbrick, "Kampuchea: Representation 
and Recognition," International and Comparative Law Quarterly 30, no. 1 (1981): 234. 
24  Ibid; and Ramses Amer, "The United Nations and Kampuchea: The Issue of Representation 
and its Implications," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 22, no. 3 (1990): 55.  It was also 
the case that the General Assembly accepted changes of government under very similar 
circumstances in Uganda (by Tanzanian forces in 1978); in Central African Empire (by 
France in 1979) and in Grenada (by the US in 1983).   
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three were permanent members of the UN Security Council, the more cooperative 
climate made peace in Cambodia possible.25   
Until then the power of veto and cold war posturing rendered the UN Security 
Council powerless to protect the Cambodian people and powerless to condemn or act 
on the atrocities of the Pol Pot regime.  For their own security reasons, the US and 
China had been prepared to countenance the return of the Khmer Rouge regime and 
thereby to abandon the Cambodian people to further abuse.  Their overriding 
objective was to see Vietnam out of Cambodia.  The security of states and 
international security practice again overshadowed concern for individual human 
security.  States were able to pursue security strategies shielded, as it were, from 
human security concerns by the efforts of international humanitarian agencies and 
their programmes of assistance as discussed below.    
Despite inflicting major defeats on the Khmer Rouge with their numerical and 
military superiority, the Vietnamese forces were unable to silence the resistance or, 
in particular, to wipe out the Khmer Rouge.26  Major offensives in 1984-5 by the 
PRK forces, which were taking responsibility for fighting the war, severely 
weakened the Khmer Rouge but did not prevent it from mounting further guerrilla 
attacks in the east (Pre Veng and Svay Rieng) and on Battambang suburbs.27  
However, the civil war was at a “stalemate” by 1987 and the three resistance armies, 
though barely cooperating, were still able to mount occasional guerrilla attacks 
across the country.28  The PRK army remained weak and unable to fully counter or 
defeat the opposition forces.  
There was political stalemate, too, as Coalition faction leaders bickered and, in 
Phnom Penh, a cabinet reshuffle in late 1986 signalled that all was not well within 
                                                 
25  The five permanent members are China, France, The United Kingdom, United States of 
America and (then) the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) - now Russia. 
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country.  Elizabeth Becker, "Stalemate in Cambodia," Current History 86, no. 519 (1987): 
156-59, 86. 
27  Nayan Chanda, "Cambodia in 1986: Beginning to Tire," Asian Survey 27, no. 1 (1986): 116; 
and Becker, "Stalemate," 158. 
28  There was also considerable bickering between the resistance parties and one arm of the 
Khmer Rouge refused to cooperate and even attacked KPNLF troops.  Chanda, "Cambodia 
in 1986," 117.  Chanda also reports that there were desertions of soldiers  in both directions.   
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the government.29  Humanitarian programmes were in a sense also at a stalemate, 
with little change at the border and a limited programme continuing in Phnom 
Penh.30  The stalemate meant the continued human insecurity of countless 
Cambodians either in the camps at the border, or inside Cambodia under government 
control.  Various peace initiatives had been attempted since the early 1980s but, 
without the serious commitment of the major powers, there would be no relief for 
Cambodians.31  Only with the end of the cold war in 1989 was the proxy war in 
Cambodia no longer perceived as critical to the international interests of the key 
sponsors.   
In this new strategic environment the war quickly became little more than an 
international nuisance.  By then, China was more interested in improving relations 
with the Soviet Union and Vietnam than in supporting the Khmer Rouge which, it 
conceded, had made mistakes.  Vietnam, with the loss of Soviet aid, could no longer 
afford the war and was keen to improve relations with the US, but insisted that the 
Khmer Rouge not be allowed back into Phnom Penh through an international peace 
agreement.  Thailand in 1988 began to imagine turning the “battleground into a 
market place” while the US, reluctantly it seems, was prepared to give peace a 
chance if the Vietnamese left Cambodia and democratic elections were held.32  In the 
meantime, international relations and security analysts could pore over the intricate 
                                                 
29  Indeed, the Vietnamese were again concerned, as they had been in 1983, that the resistance 
was making inroads in the PRK government.  Becker, "Stalemate," 159.  Becker also refers 
to Vietnamese treaties which suggested they were in Cambodia to stay or at  least to see it as 
a sphere of influence. 
30  Western official aid was restricted as the regime was not recognised by the UN and sanctions 
were in force.  However, a significant amount of official aid was disbursed through national 
NGOs such as Oxfam, Caritas, World Vision and Save the Children Fund which operated as 
a consortium set up in Phnom Penh. 
31  The UN General Assembly proposed a peace conference in 1980 which was boycotted by the 
USSR and Vietnam.  For brief outline of initiatives in the 1980s see Trevor Findlay, 
Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC, SIPRI Research Report no. 9 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995), 1-5.  Australian Foreign Minister Bill Hayden was active 
from 1983 in trying to bring the parties together to negotiate a peace deal.  See Philip G 
O'Brien, "The Making of Australia's Indochina Policies under the Labor Government (1983-
1986): the Politics of Circumspection?," (Centre for the Study of Australian-Asian Relations, 
Australia-Asia Papers No. 39: 1987).  David P Chandler, "Cambodia in 1984: Historical 
Patterns Re-asserted," Southeast Asian Affairs 12 (1985): 184, refers to attempts by the 
Vietnamese to “woo Sihanouk back to Phnom Penh …” in 1984. 
32  Though changing its position later, the US had imagined the Khmer Rouge as part of a new 
government in Phnom Penh.  See Ben Kiernan, "Conflict in Cambodia, 1945-2002," Critical 
Asian Studies 34, no. 4 (2002): 489.  The US was later “berated” by ASEAN for reducing 
support for the opposition Coalition Government in exile and seeming to back the State of 
Cambodia.  See Justus M van der Kroef, "Cambodia in 1990: The Elusive Peace," Asian 
Survey 31, no. 1 (1991): 94-102. 
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details of the perceived interests and positions of the various players—Vietnam, 
China, ASEAN, the US and USSR—with little or no reference to Cambodia, the 
Cambodian factions or, more importantly, to the Cambodian people.33   
During the civil war from 1979, the wellbeing and security of the Cambodian people, 
was not the immediate concern of the states involved.  This responsibility had been 
delegated by the very structure of the United Nations to its specialist economic and 
social agencies, in particular the United Nations High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR), and other international agencies such as the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) and the many private NGOs.  However, in the absence of a 
common objective for the people, the efforts of humanitarian agencies were not 
necessarily united nor were they always perceived to be consistent with the interests 
of states.  How this affected the human security of the people in camps and inside 
Cambodia is outlined in the following sections before returning to the peace process. 
Refugees, international humanitarian response and human insecurity 
As the Vietnamese advanced into Cambodia in 1978-9, the Khmer Rouge forces 
were pushed back to bases at the Thai border where they took refuge and even 
herded civilians under their control across the border to established camps from 
which they could launch attacks against the Vietnamese and PRK forces.  Refugees 
fleeing to Thailand were considered by Thailand to be “illegal immigrants” or 
“displaced persons” and in some cases driven back into Cambodia.34  Thailand 
already had camps with refugees from the 1975 “liberation” of Laos and Cambodia, 
and did not want more.  Nor did it want a de facto frontier with the Vietnamese army 
and therefore preferred to support resistance groups from the border rather than, as 
they saw it, to provide a haven which would allow the Cambodians to abandon their 
territory to the Vietnamese.  Hence, Thailand, which was not a signatory to the 
Refugee Convention or Protocol, simply refused to countenance the establishment of 
refugee camps under UNHCR control.  State security took precedence over the 
human security of individuals caught up in fighting or seeking refuge. 
                                                 
33  Simon, for example, gives a very useful summary of the issues as perceived from the various 
Capitals in realist terms but neglects the people involved.  See Sheldon W Simon, 
"Cambodia and Regional Diplomacy," Southeast Asian Affairs 9 (1982): 196-207.   
34  Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy, 84-92.  The worst case being some 45,000 people bussed 
north to Preah Vihear and forced down the escarpment through minefields back into 
Cambodia without adequate food or shelter.  
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The main surge of refugees from Cambodia came in the second half of 1979, under 
threats of famine and starvation.  While UNHCR, UNICEF and ICRC had been 
trying to negotiate a presence at the border in Thailand, UNICEF and ICRC, whose 
mandates allow more flexibility of action, were also trying to get access to Phnom 
Penh.  Many diplomatic ‘niceties’ hampered these efforts, not least of which was the 
continued occupation of the UN seat by the Pol Pot regime which made the 
Vietnamese reluctant to cooperate with western agencies, in particular those also 
engaged in providing assistance to opposition factions at the border.  For the 
multilateral humanitarian agencies and many NGOs, therefore, there was a serious 
problem of ‘neutrality’ and being able to provide humanitarian relief within 
Cambodia by agreement with the Phnom Penh regime, as well as at the border in 
opposition controlled areas.  Humanitarian agencies were thus pressured to bow to 
state security concerns which overshadowed the needs of individuals.  This was a 
key issue and the source of dispute between aid officials.35  The Government in 
Phnom Penh was adamant that it would not allow humanitarian operations in Phnom 
Penh if international assistance also went to the Khmer Rouge at the border.  It was 
also afraid that Western aid would compromise its socialist objectives.  The 
international agencies sought to stand by a principle that aid should be neutral and 
provided as needed to civilians anywhere.  At the same time, the Thai military and 
officials bickered over the border relief effort, eventually agreeing to the 
establishment of the United Nations Border Relief Operation (UNBRO), but not 
refugee camps under UNHCR control.36     
In July 1979, however, the focus of attention was to shift, with reports from ICRC, 
UNICEF, Oxfam and other aid representatives given access to Phnom Penh, as well 
as a number of journalists, that the situation inside Cambodia was dire and that both 
Phnom Penh and the Khmer Rouge were requesting international food aid.37  Threats 
                                                 
35  Ibid.  Shawcross provides a detailed account of the manoeuvring of the various governments, 
international agencies and commentators in the face of the desperate plight of hundreds of 
thousands of Cambodians.   
36  Only Khoa I Dang camp was  under the control of the UNHCR and provided full refugee 
rights.  Other camps were under UNBRO authority with aid initially managed by UNICEF 
and later by UNDP, while the Thai government retained responsible for the disposition and 
security of camps.  
37  News report by Pilger and Howard received world-wide attention.  See John Pilger, "Please 
Help Us," The Age, 14 September 1979 1979; John Pilger, "Country of the Dead," The Age, 
13 September 1979; Jim Howard, "Kampuchea: a Dairy of Death,"  (Oxfam, 1979).  See also 
Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy, 362-84.   
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of famine and starvation later proved to be exaggerated.  However, descriptions of 
the pitiful state of the people and their accounts of Khmer Rouge atrocities, sparked 
widespread international attention and appeals for immediate humanitarian aid.38  
Relief was provided to the border camps, but unable to agree upon a comprehensive 
programme inside Cambodia, the international agencies and Phnom Penh settled for 
a “land bridge” whereby truckloads of food and other goods were delivered to the 
border to be distributed to vast lines of bullock carts and taken back into 
Cambodia.39  Much of this aid filtered through the Cambodian countryside, to 
Phnom Penh and beyond in the hands of traders.  Some villagers went to the border 
and returned to their villages with food and other goods.40  Monitoring of the 
dispersal of goods overall was almost impossible and considerable amounts were 
siphoned off to militaries to support their troops or for private gain.41 
The immediate and urgent humanitarian response benefited the people but it also 
contributed to sustaining the troops and the fighting capacity of the various 
                                                 
38  The sensational reports of Pilger and Howard led to public outcry around the world.  This 
soon degenerated into ideological debate as to the veracity of refugee accounts as a basis for 
knowing the truth.  See for example: François Ponchaud, "Le Kampuchea Democratique: 
une Revolution Radicale," (Paris: Echange France-Asie, Dossier, 1977) and his later book 
François Ponchaud, Cambodia: Year Zero, trans. Nancy Amphoux (London: Allen Lane, 
1978).  See also John Barron and Anthony Paul, Murder of a Gentle Land: The Untold Story 
of a Communist Genocide in Cambodia (New York: Readers Digest Press, 1977); Noam 
Chomsky and E S Herman, "Human Rights in Kampuchea: Distortions at Fourth Hand," 
Southeast Asia Chronicle (1977): 17-24; A Langer, "Kampuchea: The Problem of Facing the 
Facts," Arena (1980): 81-112; R A Connell, "Letter to Editor," Quadrant (1980): 112-13; 
Gavan McCormack, "Letter to Editor," Quadrant (1980); Robert Manne, "Letter to Editor," 
Quadrant (1980): 118-20; and T Retboll, "Kampuchea and the Reader's Digest," Bulletin of 
Concerned Asian Scholars  (1979): 22-27.  
39  Approximately 50,000 tonnes food aid and 35,000 tonnes of seed was directed across the 
land bridge.  Smuggled goods also crossed the border to be distributed on the other side.  The 
border was the market place providing goods for the whole country and not only helped the 
forces at the border, but also the Vietnamese backed government.  Shawcross, The Quality of 
Mercy, 376-77.  
40  Evan Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge: Inside the Politics of Nation Building 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 89.  Michael Vickery, Kampuchea: Politics, 
Economics and Society (London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1986), 58.  Shawcross also notes 
the range of “scarce consumer goods—cloth, soap, cigarettes, pins, sugar, nails, bicycles, 
fishhooks—acquired on the black market at the Thai border”—arriving  in Phnom Penh in 
late 1980 by train from Battambang.  Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy, 23, 35. 
41  Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy, 331 and 342.  Heder argues the border trade impact was 
felt mostly in Battambang, while other provinces - including Siem Reap and Pursat - 
benefited more from the internal relief activities.  Overall he put the proportion of internal 
aid getting to the villages at 1/5th to 1/3rd while that from the border was 1/4th to 1/2.  See 
Steven Heder, "Kampuchea: From Pol Pot to Pen Sovan to the Villages," in Indochina and 
Problems of Security and Stability in Southeast Asia, ed. Khien Theeravit and MacAlister 
Brown (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Press, 1981), 47-52. 
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factions.42  It helped to reconstitute trade and commercial links across the Thai 
border and within Cambodia.  While institutionally there was a separation between 
the practices of state security and humanitarian activities, they were in fact shown to 
be inseparable in practice.  State security priorities were instrumental in restricting 
humanitarian efforts and hence in exacerbating the human insecurity of many 
Cambodians.  This occurred in refugee camps as well as inside Cambodia where a 
state and economic rebuilding exercise was in progress.   
Human insecurity in the camps.   
There were reportedly up to 600,000 people in various camps at the border by the 
end of 1979.43  This had fallen to 200,000 in 1983.44  Up to 500,000 refugees were 
processed through Khao I Dang to the US and other countries.45  Some camps 
remained functional until 1999 when the final groups were repatriated.  
Many Cambodians spent years in these places and, even if life in terms of regular 
food and services was better than in Cambodia itself, camp residents were subject to 
military control and the constant fear of shelling, forced movement and violence—
including banditry and rape.46  The population profiles of the camps were distorted 
with a large number of children under five years of age, who aid workers feared 
might be permanently affected by the poverty of the environment and their lack of 
opportunity.  There was also the possibility of lasting psychological damage which 
could come from the constant fear, the life of dependency and the absence of 
                                                 
42  Shawcross says 30% of food in some camps went directly to the Khmer Rouge.  Shawcross, 
The Quality of Mercy, 340-61. 
43  The first refugees fled the Khmer Rouge; a second flood followed the Vietnamese invasion 
in 1979 and subsequent food shortages inside Cambodia.  For details of subsequent refugee 
movements and camp numbers see Chandler, "Cambodia in 1984," 184; Michael Eiland, 
"Cambodia in 1985: From Stalemate to Ambiguity," Asian Survey 26, no. 1 (1985): 125; and 
Becker, "Stalemate," 156.  See also the web site “Thai /Cambodia Border Refugee Camps 
1975-1999; Information and Documentation Website” at www.websitesrcg.com/ 
border/index.html accessed on 16 June 2005.   
44  Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy, 227, 252 and 393.  The average population over the 1979-
81 period was 300,000.  It was also claimed that over the period, up to a million Cambodians 
were drawn to the border and were encouraged to do so by politically motivated Voice of 
America broadcasts.  Eva Mysliwiec, Punishing the Poor: The International Isolation of 
Kampuchea (Oxford: Oxfam, 1988), 96-97. 
45  Khao I Dang was the only UNHCR refugee camp able to arrange resettlements.  In Khao I 
Dang included mainly people from the former middle class.  They had originally welcomed 
the Vietnamese invasion but worried about their future prospects under an ongoing 
communist system.  Shawcross, The Quality of Mercy, 305. 
46  Chanda, "Cambodia in 1986," 121; Nayan Chanda, "Cambodia in 1987: Sihanouk on Centre 
Stage," Asian Survey 28, no. 1 (1988): 111; and Mysliwiec, Punishing the Poor, 96-97.  
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opportunity for people to secure their future.47  Meas Nee, having experienced life 
under Pol Pot and other factions, emphasises the loss of trust and dignity in a 
militarised society, and the “numbness of trying to stay alive, never to think,” and 
yet he complains, too, of the loss of dignity and on occasion of being “degraded by 
foreign aid workers.”48  Knowledge and experience of traditional life and skills, in 
agriculture for example, were lost to the young, and forgotten by the parents after 
years of inaction.  Any dispute between camp residents could flare into violence.  
These were factors which had significant impact later when refugees and internally 
displaced people were resettled inside Cambodia and were expected to return to 
normal life.  For many from the camps, not only war and violence but also the very 
abnormality of refugee life over a long period constituted a persistent threat to 
individual human security.  The camps, thus, did not provide for the human security 
of all who sought asylum within them.   
On the other hand, there were those who were able to benefit from the opportunities 
within some camps to learn English, work with relief agencies and to learn new 
skills.  Some were able to engage in commercial activities or trade through the land 
bridge.  Many returnees were later employed by UNTAC and international NGOs 
ahead of resident Cambodians because of their better education and the training they 
had received in the camps.49    
Human insecurity inside Cambodia 
While we have considered the basic human insecurity of refugees, it is important to 
recognise that there was also widespread war-induced human insecurity within 
Cambodia.  As a result of war and the Pol Pot regime the population profile was 
distorted by the loss of men and boys to military service, as well as the general toll 
of hardship, disease and purges.  Few families were untouched and many, including 
                                                 
47  Mysliwiec, Punishing the Poor, 96-97; and Josephine Reynell, "Political Pawns: Refugees 
on the Thai-Kampuchean Border,"  (Oxford: Refugee Studies Programme, Occasional Paper: 
1987). 
48  Meas Nee, Towards Restoring Life: Cambodian Villages (Melbourne: Overseas Service 
Bureau, 1996; Third Edition), 25 and 28.   
49  Um says that in anticipation of repatriation there were “…stepped up efforts to generate 
skills-training programmes in the camps.  The UN has attempted to superimpose a Western-
style judicial system, aimed not so much at reducing the rising crime rate, especially 
prevalent in the two non-communist camps, as to ‘re-inculcate’ a sense of rule of law that the 
repatriates can carry back with them to their home areas.”  Khatharya Um, "Cambodia in 
1988: The Curved Road to Settlement," Asian Survey 29, no. 1 (1989): 104. 
  77 
female headed households, were deprived of the normal household labour necessary 
for survival.  People who moved across the country in 1979 to return to their former 
villages found infrastructure damaged, houses in disrepair or gone.  There was little 
farm equipment, few animals, and rice fields had, in some places, been damaged by 
the irrigation works and collectivisation approach of the Khmer Rouge.  
As the new regime set about restoring agriculture and village administration as 
detailed in the following section, it also confronted the ongoing insecurity by setting 
up local village and commune-based militia for the protection of villagers.  
“Operational teams” (later called armed “propaganda teams”) were also established 
by the Vietnamese to protect local authorities.  These teams were later formed into 
district and provincial “command committees” before being finally structured into 
the Khmer People’s Revolutionary Army (KPRA).  Problems of recruitment, as well 
as high attrition rates from death, disease and desertions, led the Council of Ministers 
to decide on the conscription of young men aged 17-25 for 5 years.50  By 1985 the 
military numbered 80,000, which matched the resistance numbers and which the 
Vietnamese hoped would allow them to leave.51  Most Cambodians tried to avoid 
conscription, as they were not interested in ideologies and revolution, and simply 
wanted to lead normal lives.  Some leaders were concerned by the negative impact of 
conscription and in particular the opposition to the state that grew from it.   
The largest direct impact on the peasants came from the so called K-5 programme 
which was set up to recruit men (supposedly for 6 months) to construct defensive 
barriers along the Thai border.  In 1984, about 50,000 workers were conscripted and 
150,000 in 1986.  However, “oversight of K-5 funds, equipment, and provisions 
coincided with widespread confusion, inefficiency, theft, and corruption.”52  
Vietnamese advisors, annoyed by central government failures, urged greater 
provincial contributions.  As the provincial authorities took over K-5 infrastructure 
projects, they also used logging and gem mining to raise their own revenue and, as a 
                                                 
50  Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge, 225-26. 
51  Ibid., 227.  Other estimates were 40,000 Khmer Rouges, 14,000 KPNLF and 10, 000 ANS.  
Chanda refers to a “weak” force of only 30,000.  He also estimates the Khmer Rouge at 
28,000 “but some claim only 15-20,000;” the KPNLF at about 20,000 men under arms and 
8,000 combatants; and the ANS at 12-15,000 troops.  Huxley gives different figures 
respectively of 30-35,000;  10-15,000; and 7-10,000.  Chanda, "Cambodia in 1987," 108-07; 
and Tim Huxley, "Cambodia in 1987: The PRK's Eight Year," Southeast Asian Affairs 14 
(1987): 171.  
52  Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge, 233. 
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result, “K-5 evolved into an enormous network of self-supporting economic ventures 
involving provincial authorities and branches of the Ministries of Defence, 
Communications, and Commerce.”53  For the workers it was a disaster.  In the first 
year food for only 33,000 was delivered for the 50,000 recruits.  Living supplies 
(clothing, mosquito nets, and so on.) never arrived or were inadequate, and there was 
often no shelter.  Disease, lack of medicines, and landmines which claimed up to 60 
amputees per month, made conditions even worse.  There was so much malaria 
among returnees that rice-growing in some areas was being affected by labour 
shortages, and provinces were asking to be relieved of the requirement to provide 
workers for K-5.54   
Human insecurity was inflicted on individuals and families alike by the civil war, 
supported as it was by major powers and their allies.  In addition to the continual 
threat of conflict and violence and the demands of military and K-5 service, the 
people faced food insecurity and a lack of basic needs.  Confronted by an urgent 
need to restore agriculture and the functions of state, the government established 
“solidarity groups” to restart agriculture and began the restoration of bureaucratic 
institutions.  These, as is further discussed below, were major tasks hampered by the 
lack of human and material resources, but also by ineffective governance and the 
rapid emergence within newly formed state institutions of nepotism, rent taking 
activities and other abuses of power.  Within Cambodia, therefore, human insecurity 
was created by both international and, increasingly, domestic factors which were 
most evident in corrupt and incompetent governance. 
Despite the wide ranging and drawn out human insecurity of the Cambodian people, 
the preoccupation of states with their own national security interests prevented the 
negotiation of a peace settlement prior to the collapse of the Cold War.  When it did 
come about, negotiation of an international peace agreement for Cambodia was 
completed in only a few years and would see the international involvement in 
Cambodia shift from support for civil war and the prolongation of human insecurity 
to a new involvement in Cambodia’s democratisation, reconstruction and 
development.   
                                                 
53  Ibid., 233.  See also Eiland, "Cambodia in 1985: From Stalemate to Ambiguity," 122-23. 
54  Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge, 233-37; and Huxley, "Cambodia in 1987," 
171-72.  Malaria, affecting up to 80% of recruits.  Huxley also refers to the creation of 
“strategic hamlets.” 
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Peace process 
In the absence of UN Security Council action, the General Assembly’s annual 
resolutions on Cambodia “regretted the armed intervention of outside forces in the 
internal affairs of Kampuchea,” called for the withdrawal of all foreign troops and 
urged a political settlement to enable Cambodians “… to decide their own future and 
destiny free from outside interference, subversion or coercion, and to respect 
scrupulously the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of 
Kampuchea.”55  They also called for international assistance to be provided “for the 
reconstruction of its economy and for the economic development of all [s]tates in the 
region.”56  
The General Assembly proposed an International Conference on Kampuchea and 
established an ad hoc Committee to pursue peace, but these were boycotted by 
Vietnam and the USSR.  This reflected the ASEAN position on a peace settlement 
which was supported especially by China.  However, within ASEAN, Thailand and 
Singapore were staunchly anti-Vietnam while Malaysia and Indonesia in particular 
took a more conciliatory position.57 
There were other tentative peace proposals between 1980 and 1986 such as that by 
the Australian Foreign Minister who, concerned by the humanitarian as well as the 
political situation, met with Hun Sen and Vietnamese officials in 1983.  However, 
these initiatives were blocked by China and the US.58  It was not until 1988 that the 
UN resolutions began to reflect other peace initiatives emerging since 1986, 
including the informal Jakarta talks.  These produced concrete proposals for: 
international oversight of troop withdrawals; the creation of an interim administering 
authority; the leadership role of Sihanouk; (and most important of all in response to 
repeated calls from the Heng Samrin and Hun Sen governments) condemnation of 
Khmer Rouge genocide; and “the non-return to the universally condemned policies 
                                                 
55  A/RES/34/22 of 14 Nov 1979. 
56  A/RES/35/6, 22 October 1980; A/RES/36/5, 21 October 1981. 
57  Amitav Acharya, Pierre Lizée, and Sorpong Peou, "Introduction," in Cambodia -The 1989 
Paris Peace Conference: Background Analysis and Documents, ed. Amitav Acharya, Pierre 
Lizée, and Sorpong Peou (New York: Kraus International Publications, 1991), xxiii-xlviii.  
This book provides a summary of the peace process leading to the Paris Conference. 
58  Fawthrop and Jarvis, Getting Away with Genocide, 77 and 82. 
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and practices of a recent past…”59  The following year the General Assembly 
encouraged the work of the Paris Conference on Cambodia.60   
Yet the peace process advanced more through independent diplomatic efforts rather 
than through UN intervention.  In 1986, the Chinese hosted the leaders of the three 
resistance factions, following which the coalition issued a “new peace proposal 
calling for Vietnamese troop withdrawal in two stages and an intermediary 
quadripartite coalition government with the PRK” and, in early 1987, the Soviet 
Union also indicated its openness to a four-party solution.61  The French, too, were 
active and organised meetings between Sihanouk and Hun Sen in December 1987, 
which resulted in a communiqué, agreeing to the need for a political settlement to 
achieve a peaceful and neutral Cambodia, and for Cambodians themselves to work 
out a settlement for international agreement.62  Informal meetings were held between 
the parties in July 1988 and February 1989 in Indonesia.  At subsequent working 
group meetings, there was broad agreement to a framework of Vietnamese 
withdrawal, a ceasefire, coalition government, peacekeepers, elections, disarmament, 
neutrality and international organisation of the peacekeeping.63  There was also an 
ASEAN proposal for a Supreme National Council (SNC) under Sihanouk’s 
leadership comprising members of each group as an interim government.   
Key issues in the negotiations included the demand from the US and coalition for 
full Vietnamese withdrawal.  However, Phnom Penh, fearing that a Vietnamese 
withdrawal would leave a vacuum to be filled by the Khmer Rouge, stood firm in 
insisting that the Khmer Rouge not be given an opportunity to reclaim government.  
                                                 
59  A/RES/43/9 of 3 November 1988.  Thus US Congress had only the previous month approved 
a Bill referring to the “genocidal Khmer Rouge.”  Fawthrop and Jarvis, Getting Away with 
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In 1988, under Soviet and Chinese pressure, Vietnam eventually agreed to the need 
for withdrawal from Cambodia while also accepting an assurance, finally supported 
by the US, that the Khmer Rouge would never be allowed to become the government 
in Cambodia.  A subsequent announcement of withdrawal by Vietnam led the way 
for all external parties to halt their material support for the Khmer Rouge, which 
would, nevertheless, be included in the political process.64  Even as the peace 
process was unfolding, and after the Vietnamese withdrawal in 1989, the Khmer 
Rouge, still seeking a military solution, was able to consolidate control over 
significant areas of western Cambodia and to launch intensive attacks on 
Battambang, destroy rail links and conduct widespread raids in Banteay Meanchey 
and Pursat Provinces.  Nevertheless, the international impetus for resolution of the 
situation in Cambodia remained firm, and the UN Security Council, which was 
finally engaged in the issue of Cambodia, approved a peace plan based on a 
comprehensive Framework Document in late 1990.65  The Framework Document 
called for the formation of a Supreme National Council (SNC) including two 
members from each of the three resistance factions and six members from the State 
of Cambodia (SOC).  This body, under Sihanouk’s leadership, was able to progress 
the peace plan despite early divisions over a number of issues including the 
membership of the SNC, its relation with a proposed interim UN transition authority 
which would oversee elections, the disarmament process and how to deal with past 
Khmer Rouge crimes against humanity.66  In June 1991, the Cambodian parties 
finally agreed the outstanding issues and, following acceptance by the Security 
Council, a final agreement was eventually reached and the Paris Peace Agreement 
signed in October 1991 and adopted by the UN.67   
                                                 
64  Becker, "The Progress of Peace," 171-72 and 200-1.  A/RES/43/9 of 3 November 1988. 
65  Security Council Resolution 668 (1990).  For the framework, see Commonwealth of 
Australia, "Cambodia: An Australian Peace Proposal,"  (Canberra: Department of Foreign 
Affairs, 1990). 
66  The issue of genocide and crimes against humanity have persisted and a joint 
international/Cambodia tribunal for the trial of former leader for crimes against humanity 
only recently commenced.  See Fawthrop and Jarvis, Getting Away with Genocide?  Pol Pot 
and Ieng Sary had been convicted in absentia of genocide and other crimes by a court in 
Phnom Penh in August 1979.  See also Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge, 60-66.  
67  Findlay, Cambodia; and Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge, 337.  It seems that 
pressures were brought to bear to get a Khmer Rouge signature despite their consistent 
opposition to the plan and subsequent reneging on its conditions.  About 80,000 refugees 
were relocated inside Cambodia to establish a Khmer Rouge ‘liberated zone.’  See van der 
Kroef, "Cambodia in 1990: The Elusive Peace," 97-8; and Frederick Z Brown, "Cambodia in 
1991: An Uncertain Peace," Asian Survey 32, no. 1 (1992): 93. 
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All four Cambodian factions were signatories to the Agreement along with the 
eighteen countries which had participated in the Paris Conference.68  Although they 
had reached a consensus, the Cambodian parties to the agreement were not jubilant, 
but rather resigned to the withdrawal of patronage by members of the P-5 and 
Vietnam which had, in the end, forced the agreement on them.69  The preamble to 
the Agreement called for elections, acknowledged the prior formation of the 
Supreme National Council (SNC) and recognised the need for a United Nations 
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) to administer the country until a new 
government and constitution were in place.70  In typical diplomatic speak, it also 
recognised Cambodia’s “tragic recent history” and the need for “special measures to 
assure protection of human rights, and the non-return to the policies and practices of 
the past.”  In other words, the Khmer Rouge had been relieved of more serious 
charges of genocide and war crimes.  Nevertheless, the Khmer Rouge saw its grip on 
what power it had slipping away and engaged in fierce fighting in early 1991.  Soon, 
the factions began to manoeuvre for political advantage.  Hun Sen’s government in 
Phnom Penh had begun early with the introduction in 1989 of economic reforms –
including the privatisation of government enterprises – in anticipation of a peace 
agreement.  However, despite the accords, fighting continued along the border with 
occasional incursions deep into Cambodia from mainly Khmer Rouge strongholds.  
Khmer Rouge strikes would continue, albeit diminishing, until the death of Pol Pot 
and demise of the Khmer Rouge in 1999. 
Thus, from a human security perspective, the peace agreement did not immediately 
lift the spectre of war and related violence but did promise hope for the people of 
                                                 
68  Signatories included the permanent member of the Security Council – USA, Great Britain, 
France, China and the Soviet Union; members of ASEAN – Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines; India, Lao PDR, Vietnam, Brunei Darusalam, Australia, 
Canada and a representative of the Non-Aligned Movement. 
69  Findlay, Cambodia, 3, 16-17.  It was suggest that without the international community there 
may have been no Pol Pot and no war and  in the first place!  Sihanouk is quotes by Vickery 
as saying that “To save Cambodia … all you had to do [in 1979] was to let Pol Pot die.  Pol 
Pot was dying and you brought him back to life.”  Michael Vickery, "Cambodia after the 
Peace," Thai-Yunan Project Newsletter, no. 17 (1992): 12.  Quoted in David Roberts, 
Political Transition in Cambodia 1991-99 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001), 30, Ott 
argued that the agreement was “not about Cambodia itself – Paris provided a useful 
opportunity to jettison some embarrassing baggage.  For many in the US, the agreements 
were a means to artfully disengage from a nasty little problem” and central to this nasty little 
problem had been the issue of KR genocide.   
70  The final Agreement (Part 1) specified that while the sovereignty and source of authority was 
enshrined in the SNC, it would delegate all necessary powers to UNTAC to enable it to 
complete its mandate (effectively reducing the SNC to an advisory role only).  This was to 
overcome legal issues of the UN appearing to assume sovereignty of Cambodia. 
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Cambodia.  In addition to free and fair elections, it committed the parties to the 
withdrawal of all foreign forces, a ceasefire and a cessation of outside military 
assistance to the parties, voluntary repatriation of refugees, and a new constitution 
which would incorporate respect for human rights and Cambodian neutrality and be 
approved by the elected Assembly (leaving little to chance, a full set of principles for 
a constitution were included at Annex 5 to the Agreement).  It also included 
principles for future economic development and a promise of international support.   
From an international perspective, the agreement transformed the thrust of 
international security practice in relation to Cambodia.  An anti-communist national 
security and balance of power politics, backed by military and strategic might, was 
replaced by a new security practice based on an assumption that democracy and 
economic development would bring long-term peace and stability, as well as human 
rights and human development.  The international community would be firmly 
engaged in the development process through global institutions.  In other words, 
international relations and the security of states would continue to assert a powerful 
and direct influence over human security in Cambodia. 
Summary – human insecurity as the failure of international security 
practice 
The peace agreement initiated the ending of war and violence which had denied 
human security to Cambodians for nearly three decades.  It remained to be seen 
whether it would bring human security in the broader sense as defined by the UNDP 
in 1994.  This chapter has so far demonstrated that human security was compromised 
in a variety of ways by the militarisation of society, international and state security 
policies and practice, and by the very conditions experienced in refugee and other 
camps.  Using a human security approach has shown that human security is not 
automatically provided by humanitarian organisations establishing refugee and other 
camps in conflict situations, nor by the provision of humanitarian aid more 
generally.  Nor can it be assumed that human security is achieved by a negotiated 
peace and democratic electoral processes. 
What has also been highlighted in this section is the failure of the UN Security 
Council to engage with the global and human security concerns presented by the 
situation in Cambodia.  Key to the Security Council’s inability to act were the power 
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of veto held by the permanent members; its inability to define its responsibilities in 
the face of gross human rights abuses by Pol Pot; and its overriding state focus 
which concentrated its attention on the Vietnamese intervention.  These are 
fundamental problems which have present-day parallels in deliberations of situations 
such as Dafur, Burma and Zimbabwe and in discussions on Security Council reform. 
Inclusion of the veto was controversial and opposed by many delegates at the time of 
the negotiation of the Charter but it was non-negotiable for the five permanent 
members whose agreement to the Charter was fundamental.71  It meant that the 
realist perspective, which prioritises state security over the rights of individuals, is 
built into the Security Council charter.  It also protected the permanent members’ 
right to unilateral military action to protect their own security interests – a right 
exercised by the US in relation to Vietnam and Cambodia.  Proposals for increasing 
the number of permanent members have also received little support from the current 
five. 
Nevertheless, the UN has been a major forum for the development of normative 
positions on human rights and the protection of the individual from abuse through its 
comprehensive covenants and conventions on human rights, refugees, the use of land 
mines, and other issues.72  However, while these are agreed by world leaders on the 
international stage, they often remain un-ratified and little respected by governments 
in practice.73  Thus, Cambodians crossing the Thai border for protection were not 
considered to be refugees but illegal immigrants.  Consequently, the humanitarian 
organisations such as ICRC, UNHCR and UNICEF were hampered by UN member 
states in the exercise of their duties towards these people.  They were also hampered 
in bringing humanitarian assistance within Cambodia.  Despite the clear concern for 
human security in its Charter and many conventions addressing the protection of 
                                                 
71  United Nations, "Charter of the United Nations,"  (United Nations, New York) Article 24.  
Early on in its life the Security Council had shown its limitations in the case of Korea which 
had led the US to pursue its objective of UN sanctioned war against North Korea through the 
General Assembly.  See United Nations, "Uniting for Peace Resolution,"  (United Nations 
General Assembly: 1950).   
72  MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong, Human Security and the UN: A Critical History, 61-
106.  There is an extensive list of human rights instruments including declarations, 
covenants, protocols, conventions, principles and guidelines available on the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights web site at 
www2.ohchr.org/english/law/index.htm#instruments. 
73  The US, China and Russia have, for example, refused to sign or ratify the treaty banning land 
mines on national security grounds.  The UK, France and nearly all other developed 
countries have ratified the treaty. 
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individuals and groups, membership of the UN imposes few if any obligations on its 
members. 
What is evident is that the normative regimes do not protect people unless they are 
implemented by states, and enforcement by the international community is extremely 
difficult, even if there is the will.  The ICISS report has made a series of 
recommendations, and the Secretary General’s High Level Panel, and the Secretary 
General himself have also addressed the issue, and proposed guidelines for the 
Security Council in considering intervention in humanitarian crises.74    
From the perspective of its narrow definition, conflict resolution and an end to war 
and related violence should see an end to human security concerns as responsibility 
for the welfare of individuals transfers to the international domain of human rights 
and human development.  I have argued, however, for a broad human security 
approach which harnesses human rights and human development to achieve a 
common human security objective.  This sets the stage for my case study in the next 
chapter which explores the application of the broad approach to human security in 
contemporary rural Cambodia.  Thus, it is necessary here not only to summarise the 
implementation of the peace agreement, but also to understand the institutional 
framework and culture existing in Cambodia on the arrival of UNTAC.   
In the following section, therefore, I digress briefly and return to the devastated 
country inherited from Pol Pot in 1979 to describe the reconstitution and operation of 
the institutions of state under the Heng Samrin regime.  The reconstruction of the 
institutions also illustrates how former patterns of administrative behaviour re-
emerge and persist in the subsequent process of internationally sponsored democratic 
state building from 1991, and, as will be shown in the next chapter, with a strong 
impact on human security.  Therefore, the following section discusses state 
rebuilding and its effect on human security from 1979 to 1991 before returning to the 
implementation of the peace agreement and development approaches established 
under international donor influence. 
                                                 
74  See United Nations, "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,"  (Report of the 
Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, United Nations, 
2004), 67; and ICISS, "The Responsibility to Protect." 
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State building – Communist government and administration – 1979-
1991   
The newly installed Heng Samrin regime in Cambodia in 1979 confronted many 
immediate problems.  There was the Vietnamese overlordship, and the need to wage 
war against the opposition factions and to restructure the state while sorting out its 
own internal political differences.  These differences were often ideological and 
reflected the history of the Communist Party in Cambodia, its links with the 
Vietnamese communists, and the backgrounds of the leadership, some of whom had 
fled Cambodia in the early 1970s and resided in Hanoi during the Pol Pot period, 
while others had been part of the Khmer Rouge until 1977 when they deserted to 
Vietnam.75  These groups were not destined to remain comfortable partners in the 
rebuilding of a revolutionary Cambodia.  There were also vexed questions of how to 
separate the image of the Communist Party from the Pol Pot regime and whether 
former Khmer Rouge cadres should be recruited to the Party and to positions within 
the administration; or how to manage intellectuals whose skills were needed but 
whose sympathies for the non-communist resistance might be anticipated.76  Over 
time, the leadership of the party shifted from the Hanoi “old guard” to the former 
Khmer Rouge defectors and to Hun Sen in particular.77   
The new communist state structure 
As head of the National United Front for the Salvation of Kampuchea (KNUFSK) 
declaring the birth of a new regime for Cambodia in December 1978, Heng Samrin 
promised tolerance and the rallying of all patriotic forces regardless of political and 
religious tendencies, and announced that Cambodians were free to move to “native 
lands, and to build their family life in happiness.”78  
                                                 
75  Hun Sen was one key figure who deserted from Khmer Rouge ranks. 
76  Party membership stayed low and the new regime’s dependence on former Khmer Rouge  
cadres and their acceptability was strongly debated within the Party Central Committee.  See 
Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge, 49 and 65-69; and Chandler, "Cambodia in 
1984," 179-81.  On engaging intellectuals see Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge, 
73-74. 
77  Chanda, "Cambodia in 1986," 119; Heder, "Kampuchea," 17-29; Khatharya Um, "Cambodia 
in 1989: Still Talking but no Settlement," Asian Survey 30, no. 1 (1990): 102; and Huxley, 
"Cambodia in 1987," 161-73.  
78  Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge, 7-8. 
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People took the new regime at its word despite some apprehension that the regime 
was still communist and revolutionary.79  Nagging doubts remained that there could 
be a return to former ways or, at least, that those who had been officials or in the 
military during Sihanouk or Lon Nol times, those who had been part of the Khmer 
Rouge regime, or those who were educated, would be disadvantaged.  Some people 
set out to search for food, others headed for the border and still others sought their 
former villages.  People also flocked to the edge of towns but were barred entry.  
They settled in camps waiting to be admitted, since the authorities needed staff and 
labour to revive the towns and to establish some form of civil administration.  Others 
sneaked in to collect goods from their former residences or to leave messages on 
walls in the hope of contacting other family members, or simply to loot.  Some 
bribed their way in.  However, preventing people from entering the towns was 
reminiscent of the Khmer Rouges and, along with revolutionary slogans, suggested 
that the risk of a return to old times was not completely removed.80  The educated, in 
particular, who were sorely needed, tired of war and oppression, simply decided to 
leave the country all together.   
Interim and often ad hoc arrangements were put in place in the first months of the 
new regime.  The Front had been given the task of holding the revolution together 
and, with the Vietnamese, had decided to create village committees; village militia 
and “solidarity groups” (krom samakki).  People were also urged to rise against the 
Khmer Rouge and to elect “people’s self-management committees” particularly from 
those who had suffered at the hands of the Khmer Rouge and those who had 
supported their overthrow, as well as patriarchs trusted by the villagers.  Former 
village heads and civil servants from the Sihanouk and Lon Nol periods were 
favoured by this approach which was, in the end, necessary due to the dearth of 
experience and ability.  While it gave some confidence to the people that the Khmer 
Rouge period was really over, it also meant that the middle level and poor villagers 
of the past gave way to the better-off and experienced.81   
The solidarity groups were important and basically successful in meeting the 
immediate and urgent need in early 1979 to share whatever resources existed to 
                                                 
79  The following discussion is from ibid., 38-41. 
80  Ibid., 76.  Phnom Penh had a population of around 300,000 by end of 1979.  This had risen 
to 700,000 in 1986.  See Huxley, "Cambodia in 1987," 166. 
81  Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge, 55-56; Heder, "Kampuchea," 31-32. 
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restore agricultural production and provide for a rural population not only disrupted 
by the war, but left with few animals and little production equipment.82  To some 
extent, as small groups of ten to fifteen families, they would appear to have roughly 
replicated traditional agricultural practices whereby families shared resources and 
labour.  However, these groups were also designed to become part of functioning 
socialist communes in due course but, to maintain political support, there was 
considerable caution in the official approach due to innate fears among the people of 
a return to Khmer Rouge cummunalism.  The government therefore adopted an 
approach under which land would be communal but the means of production would 
remain private.83  In the longer term, however, the solidarity groups failed for a 
variety of reasons including lack of economic incentive and lack of interest in 
communalism by group members, shortage of cadres and a government more 
concerned to improve production than to impose socialist objectives.84  They also 
failed because state and local officials, at village and commune level, began to 
misappropriate land for their own purposes, social differentiation emerged, land was 
rented out for sharecropping, and usury returned.  There was thus a return to the past 
as solidarity groups ended up with the worst land and those who had been poor 
before the Khmer Rouge, and privileged under that regime, were mistrusted, 
marginalised and returned to poverty.   
While the reluctance of peasants to cooperate in the formation of communal 
production has been discussed in terms of peasant resistance and everyday politics 
by Scott and Kerkvliet, it would seem that in the Cambodian countryside everyday 
politics took several forms.  While the majority of people simply clung to private 
plots to secure their own household needs, others, mainly officials, deliberately 
abused or obstructed government policies to accumulate personal wealth and status.  
They did so with the knowledge and connivance of more senior officials.  Everyday 
local politics was confronted on the one hand by official policy and, on the other, by 
the corrupt ‘everyday’ politics of a hierarchy of officials.85  A similar problem 
                                                 
82  Viviane Frings, "The Failure of Agricultural Collectivisation in the People's Republic of 
Kampuchea (1979-1989)," (Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University: 1993).  
The solidarity groups which seemed initially to fall under the direct oversight of the Front, 
were later moved to the control of the Party and Council of Ministers.  
83  Heder, "Kampuchea," 32-33; and Frings, "The Failure of Agricultural Collectivisation." 
84  Ibid.: 54-67. 
85  See James Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 396-418; and Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, "Village-State 
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confronted the Commune Revolutionary Committees which were later set up as part 
of the government administrative system.  
Committee elections were organised in 1981 but a half-hearted response meant that 
only about 400 of 1,300 communes completed their elections.86  A democratic 
process was considered necessary to encourage the people to enhance production, to 
increase security and to improve their lifestyle and happiness under the new regime.  
The Committees had broad responsibilities, ranging from security to oversight of 
solidarity groups and production, health and welfare, education and party 
propaganda.  Their responsibilities had a strong resonance with those of today’s 
commune councils.  Committees were expected to be instruments of hierarchical 
government, functioning, in theory at least, side by side with Party organisations and 
Front “mass movements.”87  The actual involvement of government ministries in the 
work of the Committees is unclear though many of the decisions and circulars 
quoted by Slocomb and Frings were prepared by ministries (such as agriculture and 
education) and addressed directly to local officials.  There is little to explain whether 
provincial authorities had a direct role in overseeing the implementation of policies 
by local Committees.  However, their poor performance was the subject of a 1988 
Decision of the Council of Ministers which tightened instructions requiring them to 
prepare development plans and to properly manage their budgets.  It also placed 
them under direct Party oversight.88  Members of these committees remained in 
office into the 1990s and some were elected to the new commune councils in 2002. 
National governance arrangements 
As well as addressing urgent local problems of production and security, a state 
organisation had also to be established.  This comprised three organisations – the 
                                                                                                                                          
Relations in Vietnam: The Effect of Everyday Politics on Decollectivisation," Journal of 
Asian Studies 54, no. 2 (1995).  Scott argued that peasants adopted certain passive or non-
conforming strategies to resist government programmes.  Kerkvliet, however, opens the 
concept to everyday politics which has the advantage that it reflects peasants picking and 
choosing their responses and as politics rather than simple resistance.  Thus governments 
may respond by altering policies to accept the reality on the ground much as the Cambodian 
government and Party bowed to private property and the unwillingness of the people to 
upgrade their communal production.    
86  Margaret Slocomb, "Commune Elections in Cambodia: 1981 Foundations and 2002 
Reformulations," Modern Asian Studies 38, no. 2 (2004): 455-57.    
87  Ibid.: 448 and 453.   
88  Ibid.: 462.  
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Front, the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP) and a National 
Assembly.    
Front Party State Authority 
National United Front for the 
Salvation of Kampuchea 
(KNUFSK) 
Later becomes the 
Kampuchean United Front 
for National Construction 
and Defence (KUFNCD) 
14 Central Committee 
members’ 
Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary 
Party (KPRP)  Only named and public 
in 1981 
 
National Assembly 
 
Mass organisations Political Bureau 
7 members 
Council of State 
Judiciary and Court system 
Chairman = Head of State 
7 members from CoM 
 Central Committee 
- 21 members 
- elects Politburo 
- elects General Secretary 
- has range of ‘sub-committees’ 
Council of Ministers (CoM) 
formerly the People’s Revolutionary 
Committee (PRC) or Khmer People’s 
Revolutionary Council (KPRC) 
Administrative centre of government  
 
 Party Congress 
- 162 delegates ,at the 4th congress 1981 
- elects Central Committee 
Ministries of State under ‘control’ of 
Central Committee sub-committees 
 Party Provincial Secretary Provincial/municipal Revolutionary 
Committee (PRC) 
 Party Committees 
Province; District; and Commune 
District/ward  
Revolutionary Committee (PRC) 
Solidarity groups Party branches, circles and cells in 
government agencies, armed forces, 
internal security organs, mass 
organisations, enterprises, factories, and 
farms  
Commune/sangkat 
Revolutionary Committee (PRC) 
People’s self-management 
committees 
Table 3-1 Cambodian governance structure 198189 
Table 3-1 outlines the parallel bureaucratic structures of the Party and the state 
institutions under the National Assembly.90  It shows that the various Party 
committees established Party oversight and control of the state Ministries at central, 
provincial and local levels.  There were three main streams of administration—the 
Front, the Party and a government structure, formalised in the 1981 Constitution, 
                                                 
89  The table is compiled from data in various sources including Gottesman, Cambodia after the 
Khmer Rouge; Frings, "Rewriting Cambodian History to 'Adapt' it to a New Political 
Context: The Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party's Historiography (1979-1991)"; 
Vickery, "The Cambodian People's Party" and the US Library of Congress Country Profile: 
Cambodia at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cambodia/kh04_03a.pdf  accessed June 2006. 
90  Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge, 45-49.  The name given in 1981 at 4th 
Congress when in Vickery’s words, the Party “emerged from its closet.”  Until then the Party 
was “hardly mentioned.”  Michael Vickery, "The Cambodian People's Party: Where has it 
Come From, Where is it Going?," Southeast Asian Affairs 21 (1994), 103.  See also Viviane 
Frings, "Rewriting Cambodian History to 'Adapt' it to a New Political Context: The 
Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party's Historiography (1979-1991)," Modern Asian 
Studies 31, no. 4 (1997): 808.  Chandler  notes that the Khmer Rouge was part of the 
ongoing history of the Cambodian  communist parties.  Chandler, "Cambodia in 1984," 179-
80.  
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comprising a National Assembly, Council of State and Council of Ministers 
overseeing a range of ministries.  A judicial system was also created under the 
Council of State. 
Between Front, Party and government there was considerable overlap in terms of 
rural administration.  The Front was responsible for ‘mass organisations’, while the 
Party, extremely limited in membership initially, appointed Party Provincial 
Secretaries and sought to set up branches at each level according to the broad 
administrative structure, as well as branches and cells within organisations such as 
the Ministries, Armed Forces, and factories.91  Commune Revolutionary Committees 
were in theory subject to policy ‘guidance’ from the parallel Commune Party 
Committees while at the same time they fell under the joint authority of the National 
Assembly, Council of State and relevant ministries through the Provincial 
Governor.92  A clumsy arrangement that, without the formal Party involvement, is 
little changed today.   
Governance institutions 
The establishment of ministries was not without its difficulties.  Once appointed, the 
minister and his staff had to search for suitable premises and clear this with the 
Vietnamese, hire staff to clean up and repair the premises, and hunt down chairs, 
tables and other office requisites such as pens, paper and typewriters.  They, then, 
had to find staff who had some technical knowledge and experience of how a 
department worked.  Some educated people were recruited – especially into Hun 
Sen’s foreign relations department and the justice department.93  However, it was 
also evident from the start that with a totally shattered economy, ministers and their 
appointees placed great priority on appointing family and friends to positions in the 
civil service.  The government became concerned and put a freeze on employment in 
June 1979 and the Party suggested that unqualified persons, and those who came to 
the ministries just to eat, should be given food and sent back to their villages; they 
also saw nepotism as a serious security risk.  Party instructions on vetting staff and 
removing unqualified staff were simply ignored.  These matters were continually 
                                                 
91  Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge, 48-49. 
92  Vickery, "The Cambodian People's Party," 114.  
93  Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge, 208.  The following discussion is also based 
on Gottesman. 
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discussed at Party level and, to some extent, reflected the insecurity of the new 
regime and the difficult position in which it found itself as promoter of revolution 
while at the same time trying to eliminate the vestiges of a failed revolution.  Party 
leaders were also fearful of the return within their ranks and into the bureaucracy of 
non-communist and, worse, anti-communist, personnel.94  Civil service salaries were 
deliberately kept low to prevent the emergence of too wide a social and economic 
division.95  It is perhaps this policy which reinforced a need for rent taking and also 
provided opportunities for wealth accumulation through patronage, an issue which 
persists in present day Cambodia. 
By 1982, the Council of Ministers was also aware that ministries were not 
functioning effectively.96  It knew of the widespread patronage and bribery in the 
civil service which had turned into a sprawling and fragmented administrative 
network at central, provincial and local levels.97  There is little doubt that the 
patronage started at the highest levels of government.   
Provincial Governors and their officials seem traditionally to have been very 
independent of the central bureaucracy, and this emerges again as the new systems 
consolidated in this period.  Provincial governors and provincial Party secretaries 
were chosen by the leaders in Phnom Penh, often on the basis of personal 
allegiances, thereby providing a power base, other than ministries, for government 
and Party members in Phnom Penh.98  A key aspect was the integration of the 
Cambodian and Vietnamese economies through the establishment of “sister 
province” arrangement between the countries.  Through them, a de facto economic 
decentralisation occurred in Cambodia as sister provinces dealt directly with each 
other leading, in early 1981, to the Council of Ministers concluding that the Ministry 
of Commerce could no longer control trade at a national level.  Therefore it decided, 
in January 1985, to authorise direct trade between the provinces.99    
                                                 
94  Ibid., 51-2 and 77.  Many former educated did return to places in the bureaucracy where they 
were desperately needed, however, the demotion of some in 1981 prompted an exodus of 
intellectuals from the services and Cambodia.  Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer 
Rouge, 121; and Chanda, "Cambodia in 1987," 106-7. 
95  Vickery, Kampuchea, 55-6. 
96  Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge, 139.   
97  Ibid., 211-2.   
98  Ibid., 54.  
99  Ibid., 148-9; and Huxley, "Cambodia in 1987," 166.   
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Decentralised provincial control of resources, also meant that the Cambodian central 
government lost control of rice acquisition and could not provide rations to its own 
officials.100  It failed also to control fishing, rubber or timber production and exports.  
Provincial and local authorities simply raised money for their own administrative 
and private purposes by imposing various taxes, informal roadside rent collection 
and seizure of goods.101  The Council of Ministers records consistently reflect an 
awareness of corruption right through the system in the ministries, the provincial 
organisations and the communes, and in the way businessmen paid off soldiers and 
commerce officials for political influence.  
Economic reforms and the state of the nation 
Hun Sen was aware that the peace process would bring political competition from 
the resistance parties and pressures for a free market economy.  Therefore, in 
February 1989, he advocated opening the economy and freeing up state enterprises 
and announced that, like other communist states, it was necessary to move from the 
left to the right.  The privatisation of state industries proceeded apace, not only to 
provide income but also to ensure that they remained out of the clutches of the 
returning political groups in the event of a political settlement.  However, the 
management of the privatised factories did not change as “the old state and Party 
apparatus simply took over the newly privatised enterprises, administrators and 
accountants.”102  The privatisation of land was more relevant to ordinary 
Cambodians but the programme for granting titles “… was plagued by corruption, 
military land grabs, distribution to local officials, the use of false names, nepotism, 
and incompetence”, and peasants lost money and sometimes their land.  Heng 
Samrin in 1990 complained, “There are some institutions, organisations, and 
individuals who have taken land, funds, and buildings that are supposed to be state 
                                                 
100  Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge, 152 and 155-56.  See also Huxley, 
"Cambodia in 1987," 164.  Huxley details efforts by the government to capture a greater 
share of rice production by raising prices.  But people were still reluctant to sell at the price, 
some sold to the Khmer Rouges who paid in gold, others simply chose to store more because 
of the war.  The Vietnamese and Cambodian military were directly involve in cutting timber 
and exporting it to Vietnam. 
101  Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge. 
102  Ibid., 319. 
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property to distribute to their factions or their families to sell for their own 
benefit.”103  
The problem was that there was already an entrenched private economy in Cambodia 
and, since 1979, state cadres and their families had been permitted, unofficially, to 
supplement their wages through private business activities.  Also, in the context of 
pitifully low salaries, “state doctors gave private consultations, teachers taught 
privately, and government workers and cadres of all kinds, as well as their families, 
made their living as barbers, tailors, and merchants in the free market.”104  At the 
same time, private incomes earned by these state workers also filtered up to their 
patrons and helped maintain loyalties.105  Economic reforms also extended to the 
recruitment of foreign economic experts and the opening of trade with Thailand. 
These reforms basically legitimised the seizure of public assets and their use for 
private gain and were calculated to consolidate popularity and power in the event of 
Sihanouk’s return and popular elections.106  Others saw it as a move to a “pseudo-
capitalist country where the gap between rich and poor gets wider every day” and 
where corruption and instability increase.107   
Corruption in 1990 was, indeed, rampant and was a topic recorded in Council of 
Ministers deliberations:   
“Smuggling by car, train, or boat; evasion of customs, failures at checkpoints, ferry docks, 
and licensing [agencies]; gambling and prostitution; the problem of videos; [corruption in 
the] hospitals; pornography; negligence and anarchy in the areas of electricity, water and 
construction; and traffic that effects the beauty of Phnom Penh” 
 and: 
“complications in the social order and in port warehouses, failure to implement decisions 
and court verdicts, problems related to travel documents and people’s land, the 
unauthorised taking of weapons from people, illegal imports, food companies importing 
radios and televisions, and so on.”108   
                                                 
103  Ibid., 320.  The Constitution was amended in 1989 to give citizens full rights to “hold”  and 
“use”  land.  It also gave rights of inheritance but a prohibition on the sale or renting of land 
remained.  Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge, 275-76. 
104  Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge, 280-81.  Chanda, too, notes that the 
government was encouraging civil servants to ‘moonlight’ in other jobs to subsidise their 
meagre income of less than $2 per month.  Chanda, "Cambodia in 1987," 109. 
105  Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge, 282. 
106  Ibid., 300. 
107  Chanthou Boua, "Development Aid and Democracy in Cambodia," Viet Nam Generation 
Journal and Newsletter 3, no. 4 (1992).  
108  Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge, 321. 
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The Minister of Justice announced “… there is no justice at all, and it is better to go 
back to working in the fields …”109   
It was this formal administrative structure, with all its flaws and strong Party links 
and political posturing, which greeted UNTAC.  The bureaucracy was inefficient, 
bloated, and rent taking was the norm.  Patronage rather than merit dominated the 
internal workings of the departments.  There was extensive high-level corruption at 
central and provincial levels.  Most of all, though, the Party, newly renamed the 
Cambodian Peoples’ Party (CPP) for electoral purposes, retained strong links within 
the bureaucracy and with the communes together with the beneficiaries of the 
economic reforms and privatisations. 
State building – democracy and international development 
assistance from 1992 
UNTAC process and human security 
The terms of reference for UNTAC, which was responsible for implementation and 
oversight of the agreement, were contained in Annex 1 to the Paris Agreement.110  
These covered general procedures; civil administration; military functions; elections; 
human rights; and repatriation of refugees.  UNTAC was required to oversee the 
cessation of hostilities and in particular the cantonment, demobilisation and 
disarmament of factional forces and to ensure a climate conducive to free and fair 
elections.111  UNHCR was given the lead role for the voluntary repatriation and re-
integration of refuges.112  
UNTAC was not charged with undertaking rehabilitation and reconstruction tasks.  
Instead, a separate Declaration on Rehabilitation and Reconstruction specified that 
“the main responsibility for deciding Cambodia’s reconstruction needs should rest 
with the Cambodian people and the government.”113  In the meantime, the UN 
Secretary General was requested to address immediate rehabilitation requirements 
                                                 
109  Ibid., 238.  The Council of Ministers was well aware of the situation which had been 
documented in a 1985 report to the Council.  
110 Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict; Paris, 23 
October 1991. 
111  Ibid.,  Detailed military provisions were contained in Annex 2 to the Agreements. 
112  Ibid.,  Detailed provisions were contained in Annex 4. 
113  Ibid., Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia, Paragraph 2. 
(emphasis added). 
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with particular attention given to “food security, health, housing, training, education, 
the transport network and the restoration of Cambodia’s existing basic infrastructure 
and public utilities.”114  The Declaration also noted the need for detailed assessment 
of Cambodia’s assets and reconstruction needs prior to decisions being made by a 
new government.  It also specified that a consultative body of donors, the 
International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC), be set up to 
“harmonise and monitor” donor contributions.115  
UNTAC faced major difficulties in completing its tasks.  First, it had not been 
established before the peace accords were signed.  The UN, therefore, hastily put in 
place a United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) to initiate 
oversight of the cease-fire.116  However, the delay was accompanied by ceasefire 
violations, lawlessness in the cities and banditry in the countryside.  The factional 
armies did not comply with ceasefire and demilitarisation obligations, and the 
UNTAC military contingent was basically redeployed to protect and promote the 
electoral process.117  Despite Khmer Rouge attacks on villages, sporadic violence, 
murders and intimidation, including attacks on UN personnel, 4.6 million voters 
were enrolled and the election went ahead peacefully on 23-8 May 1993.118   
The election was followed by charges and counter charges of electoral fraud, 
rumours of succession and military coup.  Although Funcinpec had achieved a 
majority (45 per cent versus 38 per cent for CPP), Hun Sen refused to relinquish 
power.  Cambodia’s newfound democracy stumbled at the first obstacle as Sihanouk, 
negotiated a Provisional National Government of Cambodia (PNGC) which included 
                                                 
114  Ibid.,  Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia, Paragraph 10. 
115  Ibid. 
116  UNAMIC was set up in Phnom Penh on 9 November 1991.  The Special Representative of 
the Secretary General arrived in Phnom Penh on 15 March 1992.  UNTAC would not be at 
full force until mid-July 1992. 
117  United Nations, “Cambodia – United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
(UNTAC), Background,” www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untac.htm, accessed on 
25 October 2006, provides detail of ceasefire and cantonment difficulties and eventual 
abandonment of this aspect of the peace process.  Findlay put much of the blame for 
UNTAC’s failure on the delays in setting up UNTAC’s operations while Smith considers the 
shortcomings in civil administration and policing (rule of law not achieved) had much to do 
with the CPP maintaining both administration and police under their political control.  
Findlay, Cambodia, 94-100; Hugh Smith, ed., International Peacekeeping: Building on the 
Cambodian Experience (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, Australian Defence 
Force Academy, 1994).  
118  United Nations, “Cambodia – UNTAC Background,” provides detail of difficulties with 
Sihanouk and the SNC over preparations for the elections, continuing violations of the 
ceasefire, and violence associated with the election campaign.  See also Findlay, Cambodia, 
55 and 75-79. 
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members of all parties that had won seats in the election.  With Sihanouk as head of 
state (and soon to be recrowned King), Rannarith and Hun Sen were proclaimed first 
and second “co-Presidents” respectively, while “co-Ministers” were appointed to the 
various Ministries.119  A new constitution was signed into law on 24 September 1993 
and Rannarith and Hun Sen became First and Second Prime Ministers 
respectively.120 
Cambodia’s political leaders were simply not prepared to see their positions of 
power determined electorally and neither the society nor the institutions of state were 
able to insist on the outcome of the election being respected.  There was no concept 
of ‘loyal opposition’ in Cambodian political tradition.121  Those involved in the 
electoral process had been factional opponents for years and to some extent the post-
election negotiations represented the continuation of war by other means.122  It also 
meant the sharing of wealth and power.  Sihanouk’s deal defused the confrontation 
between the CPP and Funcinpec for the moment.123  It flared again into military 
conflict between forces loyal to the two parties in1997 when Hun Sen seized total 
control of government in a coup.  Hun Sen the “strongman” has, since then, 
engineered the demise of Funcinpec as a viable opposition party.124   
Other aspects of the UNTAC operations had mixed success.  Repatriation of some 
360,000 people from the border was a complex task, but completed to schedule 
before the election.125  Control of the SOC administration by the Civil Component 
                                                 
119  Ibid., 91.  The US in particular was unhappy about this, demanding that the election results 
be recognised fully.  Their approach exacerbated the conflict and failed to recognise local 
political realities.  The US eventually accepted the solution.  Funcinpec took the lead 
position over the Finance, Economy and Foreign Affairs portfolios, while the CPP took 
Justice and Information while Defence remained with Sihanouk. 
120  The same practice of sharing portfolios was retained, at least in principle and has extended to 
sharing of portfolios, provincial governor appointments and senior positions in the 
bureaucracy.  
121  Roberts, Political Transition in Cambodia 1991-99, 32-34 
122  Ibid.  Roberts argues that the inability to accept a electoral outcome arises in part from the 
patron client structure of society and the fact that a loss of power at the top could destroy not 
only the patron but also feed down through the whole network with consequences for many.  
Therefore, he concludes, those at the top will do anything to prevent democratisation of 
power. 
123  David Roberts, "Finishing what UNTAC Started: The Political Economy of Peace in 
Cambodia," Peacekeeping and International Relations 28, no. 1 (1999): 14-17.  He argues 
that a culture of authoritarianism and the tradition of patron clientism prevent the acceptance 
of democracy, and that the élite politics is removed from the population at large.   
124  On Hun Sen’s aspiration to “strongman” status see Harish C Mehta and Julie B Mehta, Hun 
Sen: Strongman of Cambodia (Singapore: Graham Brash, 1999). 
125  United Nations, “Cambodia – UNTAC Background.”  Land shortage meant that plans had to 
be changed to give returnees several options including a mix of cash, food, household plots 
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“failed completely” while the Human Rights Component, which conducted 
widespread training, faltered in large part because the biased, poorly staffed and 
corrupt SOC administration remained intact.126   
International development agencies and NGOs flooded into Cambodia to provide 
rural development assistance.  Much of their work was based on the early studies by 
UN and other organisations of Cambodia’s development needs.  These provide the 
policy and institutional framework, outlined below, and set the context for the 
human security case study in the next chapter. 
International identification of development needs. 
In anticipation of the peace settlement, the UNDP had already undertaken a needs 
assessment study in 1989.127  As with a later World Bank study, the UNDP study 
gives a fairly positive assessment of what had been achieved by the PRK in terms of 
agriculture and the restoration of basic services and infrastructure under the 
circumstances of war and limited external assistance.128  However, it also 
emphasised the difficulties that would arise in this new stage of state building in 
Cambodia and its integration into the capitalist global economy.  In particular, the 
UNDP report concluded that there was an immediate need for “training-cum-
observation tours for senior professionals both from Phnom Penh and the border 
camps” to familiarise them with modern development assistance practices, including 
the management of what would become a massive aid programme, and the ability to 
“negotiate, appraise, coordinate and monitor foreign aid proposals.”129  Training in 
                                                                                                                                          
and house kits as well as employment.  Most opted for the cash option of US$50 per adult 
and $25 per child.  
126  Findlay, Cambodia, 63-6.  Many local and international organizations protested to UNTAC 
about the human rights situation.  There was some discussion of bringing in foreign judges 
but no action.  Findlay, Cambodia, 67-8. 
127  Kenneth Watts et al., "Report of the Kampuchea Needs Assessment Study (For UNDP),"  
(UNDP, 1989).  There were many different missions and surveys by official agencies, 
country donors and NGOs.  UN studies included: FAO, "Kampuchea: report of the 
FAO/WFP/UN mission – assessment of the food and agriculture situation," (Rome: FAO 
Office for Special Relief Operations, 1988); FAO, "Cambodia Agricultural Development 
Options Review: Volumes 1-3," (Rome: FAO Centre for Investment, 1994); UNTAC, 
"Rehabilitation and Development in Cambodia: Achievements and Strategies/Report," 
(Phnom Penh: UNTAC with the collaboration of UNDP and UN specialized agencies.); 
UNTAC, "Donors Review Meeting,"  (Phnom Penh: UNTAC with UNDP, 1993); and 
UNDP, "Comprehensive Paper on Cambodia,"  (Phnom Penh: UNDP, 1992). 
128  World Bank, "Cambodia: Agenda for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction," (The World Bank, 
East Asia and Pacific Region, Country Department, 1992). 
129  Watts et al., "Kampuchea Needs Assessment," iv-v. 
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health and education as well as upgrading research capabilities for development 
officials were also identified along with a list of potential sectoral projects in 
agriculture, water supply, transport, communications, power generation and industry 
rehabilitation.    
Various missions noted, as had been the case in 1979 for the Heng Samrin 
government, the dearth of qualified and experienced personnel available to manage 
the new challenges ahead.130  It was inevitable, therefore, that the international donor 
community would wield considerable influence in the formulation and 
implementation of development plans and strategies, not only through ICORC (later 
reformed as the Consultation Group of donors), but also through the large number of 
NGOs which descended on the country to undertake local small scale development 
work and which formed their own representative groups to work with and critique 
official aid and government policies.131 
The World Bank considered the civil service to be “excessively developed” and in 
need of downsizing.  It noted, too, that the civil service was remote from the 
population and provided few beneficial services outside provincial centres, it offered 
poor pay and conditions and limited career prospects making it “… not conducive to 
dedication.”132  In addition, the World Bank warned that public service improvement 
would be needed to manage aid “without the proliferation of ad hoc project units, 
which typically weaken public administration …”133  These issues remain 
unresolved today despite nearly a decade of technical assistance and a major focus 
on “good governance” and public sector reform.  As will be argued in the following 
chapters, the implementation of these concepts and policies has contributed to the 
many human insecurities which persist in rural Cambodia.   
                                                 
130  In early 1990, Mya Than noted that “… there were only 3,000 individuals with education 
beyond secondary school, and not a single person capable of highly sophisticated macro-
economic planning” …and only 360 persons with managerial skills.  Mya Than, 
"Rehabilitation and Economic Reconstruction in Cambodia," Contemporary Southeast Asia 
14, no. 3 (1992): 281. 
131  Such as the Coordination Committee for Cambodia (CCC) set up in 1991 by international 
NGOs and the NGO Forum on Cambodia which had its roots in the 1980s.  Local NGOs 
were also set up under international NGO auspices. 
132  World Bank, "Cambodia: Agenda for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction." vi.  
133  Ibid., vi.  Despite the warning, this is exactly what happened.  To engage staff in the ad hoc 
projects, a system of salary subsidy was implemented which helped draw the better officers 
away from the normal administration.  The Department of Health today included twelve 
separate health sector projects. 
  100 
Part of the problem was that from 1992, the international donor community was in a 
position of relative power and able to insist on the Cambodian government’s 
adoption of the standard “Washington consensus” development approach in its 
national policies (at least in words), with little regard for the uniqueness of 
Cambodian society, the legitimacy of the institutions within it, or in political 
consultation with the population. 
National policies to rehabilitate and develop Cambodia 
The strength of donor influence on Cambodian development policies can be seen in 
the various national plans.  With the assistance of UNDP, the government produced 
its National Programme to Rehabilitate and Develop Cambodia in 1994.134  The 
National Programme was presented to Donors at the ICORC meeting in March of 
that year.  It was a carefully prepared statement of general principles and contained 
little in the way of concrete plans.  Its objective was to encourage support from 
international donors.135  The Programme was, according to the Office of the Council 
of Ministers, based on the principle that the government was the “strategist” and 
“manager” of development, providing the direction and leadership.136  Further 
proclaiming its neo-liberal governance credentials (presumably to meet donor 
expectations) the National Programme “encourages, coordinates, facilitates and 
monitors through such indirect means as legislation, regulations and rules, and 
important instruments of macroeconomic management such as fiscal policy, credit 
policy, monetary policy etc.”137  It also promised to foster a strong and stable private 
sector which was critical to the new form of governance.  “All this requires massive 
and extensive reform of the State’s structure and administration and a change in the 
                                                 
134  Followed in 1995, again with UNDP assistance, by the government’s Implementing the 
National Programme to Rehabilitate and Develop Cambodia.  This maintained the 
commitment to sustainable development, equity and social justice, while attempting to move 
on from the sense of rehabilitation and reconstruction to one of development.  Grant Curtis, 
Cambodia Reborn? The Transition to Democracy and Development (Washington: Brookings 
Institution Press, 1998), 65. 
135  Ibid., 60-1; and R B St John, "The Political Economy of the Royal Government of 
Cambodia," Contemporary Southeast Asia 17, no. 3 (1995): 265. 
136  Royal Government of Cambodia, "Concepts Underlying Cambodian Development," Office 
of the Council of Ministers, http//ocm.gov.kh/c_med3.htm accessed on 10 September 2006.  
The OCM paper also emphasises the breadth of consultation in its preparation which 
included “110 Ministers and high ranking officials of the Royal Government and national 
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137  Ibid. 
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motivation behaviour of the entire population.  The main objective is to make 
Cambodia a state respecting the rule of law.”138  It also identified the need for 
“personal security, political stability and social cohesion” and “the need to motivate 
and change the behaviour patterns, attitudes and mentalities of the people, including 
those of government officials and civil servants.”139   
There is little evidence that the Cambodian government had a serious commitment to 
these changes, however, as the confrontational and often threatening and violent 
behaviour of political leaders had shown little concern to set an example for such 
change or to demonstrate a serious commitment to the rule of law.  Nevertheless, 
further policy and planning documents followed.  They were prepared in 
consultation with government and donors and there was little if any political debate 
and no public input.  Following the international trend, poverty reduction became a 
more prominent theme in the country’s First Socio-Economic Development Plan 
1996-2000 (SEDP I), “crafted by Cambodia’s donors, to put that unfortunate country 
back on the road to reconstruction and sustainable development.”140  The Second 
Socio-economic Development Plan, 2001-2005, (SEDP II), following a similar 
process and aimed to halve poverty in 15 years.141  As the international development 
focus on poverty deepened, the World Bank introduced and demanded that 
developing countries prepare Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and 
Cambodia, after much prodding by the World Bank, complied.142  A Governance 
                                                 
138  Ibid. 
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140  Ozay Mehmet, "Development in a War-torn Society: What Next in Cambodia?," Third 
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141  Kingdom of Cambodia, "Socio-Economic Development Priorities and the Official 
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Referred to as SEDP II, the submission aimed to address poverty through growth and 
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Action Plan (GAP) and a Financial Sector Development Vision and Plan for 2001-
2010 were to follow and appeared to complete the framework of the Government’s 
development strategies and policies.  Then, in 2003, as part of a UN initiative for 
developing countries generally, Cambodia’s Millennium Development Goals (MDG) 
were also added to the list of development policy documentation demanded by the 
international development community.  Finally, in a break with the pattern in 2004, 
Prime Minister Hun Sen produced his own, supposedly homegrown development 
policy, the “Rectangular Strategy: for Growth, Employment, Equity and Efficiency” 
which will be discussed below.143   
The internationally sponsored documents were, however, primarily strategic policy 
documents with few concrete proposals for eliminating poverty.  Nevertheless, they 
provided insight into a wide range of human security issues.  The NPRS policy in 
particular detailed what it saw as the key poverty issues: namely the lack of 
opportunity for the poor and their lack of capabilities.144  Lack of opportunities was 
described basically as having inadequate productive land or alternative employment 
options, while lack of capability was reflected in the country’s dismal record in 
education, health, mortality and nutrition.  The NPRS identified problems such as 
social exclusion of the poor and lack of “good governance”, as well as insecurity as a 
result of food insecurity, HIV/AIDS, landmines and natural disasters.  The plight of 
street children and gender disparities were also noted.  Thus, “good governance” was 
considered to be essential for poverty reduction as well as for sustainable socio-
economic development and social justice.145  It is also the central element in Hun 
Sen’s Rectangular Strategy.   
Government Rectangular Strategy 
The Rectangular Strategy is not only important as a government initiative, but also 
because it embraces the international neo-liberal approach to government and adopts 
it as its own strategy.  Thus, the Government’s goal, in accord with the international 
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Reduction and Political Economy (London: Routledge, 2006), 16-17. 
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development themes, is “to build Cambodian society by strengthening peace, 
stability and social order, entrenching democracy, ensuring sustainable and equitable 
development, and strengthening Cambodia’s social fabric to ensure that the 
Cambodian people are well educated, culturally advanced, engaged in dignified 
livelihood and living in harmony in family and society.”146   
Echoing the international calls for “good governance”, Hun Sen’s Rectangular 
Strategy makes it central to his policy which includes anti-corruption measures, legal 
and judicial reform and, importantly, public administration reform which extends to 
decentralisation and deconcentration.147  As shown in Figure 3.3 below, the 
environment for implementation is also in four parts: peace, political stability and 
social order; partnership with stakeholders; favourable macroeconomic and financial 
environment; and integration of Cambodia into the region and the world.148  The 
priority areas for development and growth are identified as the foursome: 
agriculture, private sector development, infrastructure, and human resources.  
The ‘strategy’ is at best hopeful.  Its core element – “good governance” – is 
promoted as technical reform rather than in terms of political leadership and social 
change.  There are no concrete proposals which would suggest a genuine 
commitment to reform.  As depicted, the plan is complex and confusing and while it 
addresses donor concerns, has little chance of being understood and embraced by the 
majority of Cambodians, or of contributing in a practical way to human security.  
However, the policy commitment to decentralisation is important because it has been 
a critical area of international attention since 1991 and has a significant role to play 
in human security at the local level.  
                                                 
146  Royal Government of Cambodia, "Address by Samdech Hun Sen, Prime Minister of the 
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Table 3-2 Rectangular Strategy Diagram149 
Decentralisation 
Donors have promoted decentralisation in Cambodia since the earliest UNTAC 
interventions, including the UNDP Cambodia Area Resettlement and Reintegration 
Project (CARERE I) (1992-5) to repatriate people from the border areas and to help 
them settle back into working rural communities.150  Its follow-up programme, the 
Cambodia Area Rehabilitation and Regeneration Project (CARERE II) (1996-2000), 
was designed “to promote peace and alleviate poverty” and to “strengthen the links 
and increase the mutual understanding between the state and civil society.”  It 
                                                 
149  Reproduced from Ibid. 
150  Robin Biddulph and Chor Vanna, "Independent Monitoring and Evaluation of the Local 
Planning Process: Final Report," (Phnom Penh: 1997).  Some of this work was subcontracted 
to NGOs. 
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supported “the decentralisation of development activities to provincial and local 
levels, and encourage[d] people to actively participate in making decisions and 
implementing local projects.”151  At the heart of its activities was the introduction 
and development of a village based participatory Local Planning Process (LPP) and 
the allocation of funds direct to the local level activities.  This international initiative 
was later developed into a pilot decentralisation project – the Seila Programme – 
which was established under a Task Force in the government’s Council of 
Agricultural and Rural Development to distinguish it from the donor run CARERE.  
This was done also because the government was concerned to maintain its hold on 
activities in the countryside.  The Seila Programme was included in the 
government’s 1996-2000 First Socio-Economic Development Plan (SEDP).152  
Nevertheless, the Seila “experiment,” as it was also called, in participatory 
development planning and administration through local communities was driven by 
the UNDP and cooperating donors.  The model for the approach was provided by the 
United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) which believed that “sustained 
peace in Cambodia can come only through equitable development to raise the 
standard of living for all citizens by strengthening the bonds between civil society 
and the State and by empowering rural Cambodians to participate fully in the 
development process.”153  Themes which are consistent with a broad concept of 
human security.  
Commune Council laws passed by the government in 2001 were based on the Seila 
experience and defined the roles and responsibilities of elected commune councils, 
and mandated certain budget and planning techniques and defined processes to be 
followed.154  Councils were given wide-ranging governance responsibilities in 
relation to preparing and approving village and commune development plans; 
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152  Seila Program, "The Seila Programme and the CARERE Project within the Context of the 
Royal Government of Cambodia's First Socio-economic Development Plan, 1996-2000,"  
(1996), 3-4. 
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154  Royal Government of Cambodia, "The Law on Khum/Sangkat Administrative 
Management,"  (National Assembly, Royal Kram No. 0301/05, 2001).  Please note that I 
have omitted reference to  municipal elements and sangkat as I am dealing with rural 
administration only. 
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preparing council budgets; establishing commune rules and regulations; and 
imposing local taxes and service charges.155  They also have responsibilities for 
security and public order, the well-being of villagers and their improved living 
standards, environmental and general social cohesion.156  In other words, it aims to 
enhance people’s human security. 
Significantly, donors considered the Seila programme to be not only an exercise in 
restructuring local government institutions, but also an experiment in social 
engineering which assumed that participation in planning and local activities would 
expand civil society and promote democracy.157  Donors were also keen to try to 
bypass and replace the system of local government inherited from the SOC.  
However, the first Commune Council elections held in 2002 were a major victory for 
the Cambodia People’s Party which received over 60 per cent of the vote.  Thus, the 
elections effectively re-confirmed existing commune leadership, which means that in 
most parts the same personnel have exercised local authority since the 1980s, 
initially as members of the Cambodian People’s Revolutionary Party.  It also means 
that the Cambodia People’s Party retains its well organised and controlled political 
power and influence throughout the countryside.  The second round of elections held 
in 2007 produced the same dominant CPP result, the main change being the fall in 
support for Funcinpec which has been largely discredited at the national level.158  
The Table below provides the detailed electoral outcomes for the major parties.159  
 
 
 
                                                 
155  Royal Government of Cambodia, "Inter-Ministerial Prakas on Commune/Sangkat 
Development Planning,"  (Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Planning, No. 098, 2002); 
UNDP, "Cambodia Area Rehabilitation and Regeneration Project (CARERE)," (UNDP 
Cambodia: nd).  Seila conducted extensive training in planning for the development 
committees, including training in Participatory Rural Appraisal methods to provide socio-
economic information for villager to consider in discussing future needs and plans.   
156  Royal Government of Cambodia, "The Law on Khum/Sangkat Administrative 
Management." 
157  UNCDF, "Cambodia."   
158  Rannarith had split from Funcinpec and formed his own party the Norodom Rannarith Party 
(NRP) 
159  UNDP, "Report on the Elections of the Commune Councils,"  (Phnom Penh: UNDP, 2002), 
18-19.  Other parties which contested the elections in 2002 were the Khmer Democratic, 
Vongkot Khmera, Khmer Angkor, Khmer Progress, and Cambodian Women parties.  These 
were all unsuccessful apart from the Khmer Democrats which won a single seat. 
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 Commune 
Council Chief 
1st Deputy 2nd Deputy Member Totals 
Year 2002 2007 2002 2007 2002 2007 2002 2007 2002 2007 
CPP 1,598 1,591 789 1,125 154 185 5,162 5,092 7,703 7,993 
Funcinpec 10 2 547 47 852 155 802 70 2,211 274 
SRP 13 28 285 403 615 963 433 1,266 1,346 2,660 
NRP       46   317   62 0 425 
Total 1,621 1,621 1,621 1,621 1,621 1,620* 6,397 6,490 11,260 11,352 
*  One other 2nd deputy seat went to the Hang Dara Democratic Movement Party in 2007. 
 
Table 3-3 Commune Council election results 2002 and 2007160 
The government’s claim that the Seila experiment provided “… concrete evidence 
[emphasis added] that this process enhances the participation of the people, increases 
local ownership and strengthens the bonds between the State and civil society” 
appears to have been premature.161  Similarly, its expectation that decentralisation 
would encourage political debate and make governments accountable has yet to be 
realised; while its claim that the success of decentralisation in achieving 
development objectives would depend on the performance of other governance 
institutions, such as the ministries of health and education, has proved to have 
substance.162  Thus, the government recognised the combined importance of local 
governance and of central ministry and line-departmental governance not only in 
creating development, but also in enhancing democracy and the role of civil society.  
These matters are taken up in the next chapter. 
Conclusion 
The first part of this chapter has shown that human security in Cambodia was 
seriously compromised, not only by domestic politics but also by the practices of 
states during the cold war confrontation.  It has shown how the actions of states in 
protecting their own perceived security interests had a devastating impact on the 
human security of Cambodians, in terms of the physical violence of war, and in 
terms of people’s human development, their dignity and their future prospects.  It 
shows, too, that powerful states were able, through their power of veto in the United 
Nations Security Council, to thwart the objectives of the United Nations Charter to 
                                                 
160  Data from www.silaka.org/resource/communecouncilelectionresults2002_2007.pdf accessed 
on 27 September 2007 for the year 2002; and National Election Committee for 2007. 
161  Kingdom of Cambodia, "SEDP II," v-vi. 
162  Ibid., xi-xii. 
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protect people from war and violence.163  It also shows how, in the absence of 
serious attention to human security by the United Nations General Assembly and the 
Security Council, powerful states were able to prolong the civil war and violence in 
Cambodia and exacerbate conditions in the border camps.  Thus, there are serious 
shortcomings arising from the way in which the Security Council itself is bound by 
the concerns of its permanent members with their own state security, which may be 
at the expense of human security elsewhere.   
The chapter also makes it clear that the security concerns of powerful states can have 
a direct impact on the ability of humanitarian organisations to properly carry out 
their internationally designated functions to protect individuals and groups.  This is 
particularly the case in reference to protecting refugees at the Cambodian border 
where humanitarian aid, despite its benefits, did not prevent the agencies from 
becoming involved in the civil war crisis.  Recognition of a human security approach 
would have ensured that these and similar issues were brought directly into the 
security framework of the UN rather than left largely isolated within its humanitarian 
and development organisation.  
Being able to act only with the agreement of the permanent members makes the 
Security Council ineffective in many cases of international security or humanitarian 
concern.  It also means that the UN humanitarian agencies cannot always perform 
their global governance roles and responsibilities, especially if the countries 
concerned are not signatories to conventions or are not otherwise bound by Security 
Council resolutions in support of humanitarian interventions.  The potential for the 
United Nations to bridge the gap between its security and humanitarian arms is 
discussed in chapter 5. 
The latter part of this chapter concerns the complex and difficult rebuilding of 
Cambodia following the removal of Pol Pot.  Despite the civil war, the economy was 
restored to where it had been under Sihanouk.  It was also the case that despite the 
different ideological basis and form of government and administration under the 
communist regime, the culture of governance which emerged was little different 
                                                 
163  The veto was in effect a mechanism to institutionalise the reality of balance of power even 
among allies and victors of WWII and without it there would have been no agreement on the 
establishment for the establishment of the UN.  “We the people …” was an artifice of states 
and maybe only now with the growth of international civil society are the people becoming 
more relevant to international security.   
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from earlier times.  (This included patronage and rent taking, and high-level 
corruption.)  State building in Cambodia has, over time, carried with it the 
hierarchical social structure and patronage networks which were integral, it seems, to 
earlier Cambodian society and culture.  The peace Agreement introduced yet a new 
approach to state building based on democracy, respect for human rights and 
participation in the free market economy, and mapped out a comprehensive plan for 
Cambodia’s future development.   
International development as we have seen is the province of a number of very 
powerful global governance institutions such as the World Bank, UNDP, FAO, 
WFP, IMF and WTO.  They are supported in their development work by a large 
number of civil society NGOs.164  Together, particularly as donors, they present the 
imposing face of standard development concepts, norms and plans which must be 
adopted, in principle at least, by recipient countries such as Cambodia.  The 
international community, through them, continued to have a significant impact on 
human security in Cambodia.  Decentralisation was a part of the strategy in the belief 
that local government was crucial to social, economic and ideological reform.  This 
was not new, however, and also had resonance in the past introduction of commune 
councils by the French and their later re-establishment by the Heng Samrin regime as 
commune committees.  
The promise of human security arising from the international commitment to 
assisting in Cambodia’s development appeared to be strong.  However, the 
economic, political, and social performance of Cambodia in the fifteen years since 
the UNTAC intervention has been mediocre with persistent poverty, high level 
corruption and human rights abuses which leaves open the question of whether 
human security has been realised in practice.  It is this question which will be 
pursued in the next chapter based on field research in rural Cambodia. 
  
                                                 
164  Although referred to as civil society NGOs, many of the international NGOs have become 
entrenched corporate organizations with close association with formal agencies and donors 
which begins to question their civil society credentials and whether they continue to be social 
movements. 
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CHAPTER 4 
HUMAN INSECURITIES IN RURAL CAMBODIA 
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to 
realisation, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with 
the organisation and resources of each [s]tate, of the economic, social and cultural rights 
indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.1 
… human security becomes an all-encompassing condition in which individual citizens live 
in freedom, peace and safety and participate fully in the process of governance.  They 
enjoy the protection of fundamental rights, have access to resources and the basic 
necessities of life, including health and education, and inhabit an environment that is not 
injurious to their health and wellbeing.2  
 
 
The UNDP, with the support of key donors and NGOs, was a strong proponent of 
decentralised development in Cambodia and contributed significantly to the reform 
of the local government system inherited from the State of Cambodia.  The Seila 
project played an important role in re-designing local government processes, funding 
infrastructure and other village projects, and organising training for officials and 
villagers on administration techniques, health, agriculture, conflict resolution and 
other matters.  It also included training on the ideas of democracy, human rights and 
human development, rule of law, participation and empowerment.  These have 
become familiar, though not necessarily embedded, concepts in rural Cambodia.  
They were promoted with a view to consolidating peace and improving the standards 
of living for all Cambodians by expanding access to justice, health care and 
education, as well as improved economic opportunity and poverty reduction.  They 
were also intended to develop local democracy and to enhance the development of 
national democracy.  
This chapter aims to explore the situation of ordinary Cambodians to show that, 
despite the many positive developments since 1993, there are persistent threats to 
human security in rural Cambodia.  The fieldwork will emphasise the sort of 
concerns which the people consider constitute problems for their future wellbeing.  It 
                                                 
1  United Nations, "Universal declaration of Human Rights," 7, 240. Article 22. 
2  Commission for Africa, "Our Common Interest: Report of the Commission for Africa," 392.  
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adopts the approach of Thakur that anything that reduces quality of life is a human 
security issue. 
Exploration of conditions in rural Cambodia reveals that there is a range of 
vulnerabilities and that these owe much to the failure of state governance institutions 
to adequately deliver the services they were set up to deliver – a failure not only of 
decentralised local government, but also of ministries and their line departments.3  
The chapter shows that the nature of domestic politics and social and cultural factors 
may also be important factors bearing on human security.   
To achieve its aims, the chapter begins with a description of general conditions in the 
research area of Battambang in 2005.  It then identify more detailed current issues on 
the ground in rural Cambodia, to expose the reality of everyday existence of the 
people and to analyse their situation in terms of human security.  It integrates 
findings from field visits to several communes near the provincial township of 
Battambang, with secondary source material covering other parts of the country.  
The basic objective of the field visit was to identify the economic, social and 
political issues which confronted villagers on a day-to-day basis and whether these 
conditions might constitute threats or vulnerabilities to their human security.  I 
therefore discussed general concerns with the villagers, individually and in groups, 
and sought to understand the kinds of problems which confronted them, and how 
these would be interpreted in a human security approach.   
While using the widest possible approach to identifying potential human security 
issues, the findings of the research are analysed using the broad approach of the 
Commission for Africa.  Its definition required that people experience, 1) freedom, 
peace and safety; 2) participation in governance; 3) protection of rights; and 4) 
access to resources to fulfil basic needs (including education, health, and suitable 
environment).  However, these four conditions are interrelated and in considering 
access to resources, for example, other issues of rights, governance and freedom may 
emerge as inherent human security problems.  Since I wish to preserve the holistic 
nature of human security and not to separate it into sectoral issues, I have decided to 
                                                 
3  Ministries such as the Ministry of Agriculture, Forests and Fisheries are structured into 
departments whose provincial offices may be referred to as respective provincial 
departments.  These departments are subject to central policy, budgetary and bureaucratic 
oversight, though they interact with provincial authorities in relation to provincial policies 
and plans.  They are also referred to as line departments.   
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combine the categories 3 and 4 under one section heading.  I will also consider 
governance last as it leads in to the next chapter.   
The chapter concludes that while local governance shows significant opportunities 
for advancing human security, and despite important gains to the present, local 
government is hampered by the failure of line departments to meet adequate 
standards of service delivery.   
General situation in Battambang in 2005 
There have been significant improvements in the lives of Cambodians since the early 
1990s.  Most significant has been the end of military confrontation and the risk to 
villagers of military raids and intimidation by Khmer Rouge groups, following the 
death of Pol Pot in 1998.  While at least civil conflict is over, other physical and 
livelihood security issues remain to be addressed.   
The outward impression passing through Battambang town, and out along the 
‘suburban’ roads to the countryside and villages is mixed.  The overall drab 
streetscapes of un-maintained houses or business premises are dotted with the 
occasional brightly coloured restored or rebuilt building.  Out of the town centre, in 
some areas, the housing is poor and cramped.  In other places there are picturesque 
tree-lined lanes along canals and river banks which reveal varied forms of housing 
from basic thatched houses to smart tiled concrete and wooden structures, often in 
compounds.  Everywhere in Battambang there is the impression of activity – traffic 
is on the move, shops abound, street hawkers, traders, motor repairers, chemists, 
dentists, restaurants and all sorts of services (laundry, printing, photocopy, and 
mobile phones).  In the evenings, many food stalls are set up on street corners.  One 
is also struck by the number of establishments promoting private English language 
education and management courses.  There are a number of universities and 
institutions (both government and private) of varying credibility delivering English, 
management, economics and accounting courses.4  Internet cafés, appear to draw a 
reasonable clientele among the young.  The central market is a hive of activity and 
shops nearby stock the latest hi-fi, TV and electronic equipment.  In the lead up to 
                                                 
4  The EIC has raised doubts as to the credibility of some of these in the absence of adequate 
accreditation.  Economic Institute of Cambodia, Cambodia: Economic Watch, April 2005, 
37. 
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the Buddhist New Year (mid-April), there was a flurry of wedding and other 
ceremonies which suggested tradition was alive and well – at least for those who 
could afford it.  This same energy and commercial activity can be found in other 
regional centres and along major thoroughfares across Cambodia.  Despite the 
industrious bustle, however, there is poverty and many people struggle to make ends 
meet and to endure the substandard working conditions that exist in many enterprises 
and especially on building sites and small industrial sites. 
As one moves out of the urban area, there are small shops and markets, petrol sellers, 
food stalls and simple household mini-stores.  Country roads are busy and many 
people travel on the intercity buses and in long-distance taxis.5  Remorques 
(motorcycle carts) and small trucks, motorcycles and bullock carts are on the move 
with produce and household goods.  School children abound, dressed in white shirts 
and blue skirts or trousers going to and from school in long lines along the dusty 
roads – on foot, on bicycles, and a surprising number on motorcycles (many flash 
new models) – which suggests an enormous energy and, on the surface at least, a 
positive future for the country.  
Villages are often linked to the main roads with laterite roads or simple dirt tracks.  
In the dry season, dust covers the homes and gardens lining the routes, creating a 
health hazard.6 In the rainy season, many roads and paths become quagmires as the 
dust turns to mud and potholes are enlarged by the slowed and churning traffic.  The 
hazards are considerable as people are delayed and often find sections impassable.  
In times of medical emergency, for example, there is no assurance that the short 
journey to district or provincial health services can be undertaken easily.  Bad roads 
can also affect villagers’ access to markets, children’s school attendance, and general 
mobility for employment, social and cultural purposes.  There is no rural 
electrification service, though some homes have basic lighting provided by car 
batteries and there are generator-based battery charging services available in some 
locations.7  
                                                 
5  Toyota pick-up with 20 or more people and luggage crammed aboard—on the cabin roof and 
even on the bonnet.  Once I even saw a vehicle, with a motorbike tied upright on the cabin 
roof, travelling on the highway with a passenger seated comfortably on the motorbike. 
6  Interview 21-2/3/05.  
7  The ADB recently approved a project for electricity supply from Thailand to Siem Reap, 
Battambang and Banteay Meanchey, which is expected to also provide some rural 
electrification along the transmission line.  See ADB News and Events at 
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Village structures, agricultural systems and land use have changed little since 
described by Jean Delvert in his major study of agriculture in Cambodia in the late 
1950s.8  The villages vary significantly in size and layout and may be dispersed, 
clustered or, more commonly, spread out along a river bank or road much as 
described by Delvert.9  They comprise a mix of unpainted wooden houses on stilts 
with elegant stairs and verandas, and poorer plain structures with thatched roofs – 
some barely more than shelters.  There is the occasional ‘rich’ house on a concrete 
base and painted bright blue – often a sign that the “rich” owner receives help from 
relatives overseas.10  Indeed, classifications of rich, medium and poor peasants have 
long been made in terms of the roof type of family dwellings.11  The approach is 
carried over into the Seila Commune Council Databases, organised by Province, 
which provide basic village statistics on such matters as population, education and 
literacy, as well as housing, water supply and sanitation.  In Cambodia in 2004, some 
40 per cent of rural dwellings are thatched, which is slightly more than the 35 per 
cent national poverty line.12  Figure 4-1 provides figures for thatch in several 
communes in Battambang.  While there is a trend towards the replacement of thatch 
since 2002, the association of thatch with poverty suggests a widespread variation in 
wealth at the local level across the country.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
http://www.adb.org/media/articles/2008/12387-cambodian-electricities-project/ accessed 10 
February 2008. 
8  Delvert, Le Paysan Cambodgien.  This is a comprehensive and unique study and in the 
absence of other similar work, stands as the point of comparison for present studies. 
9  Ibid., 198-220.  In the eastern parts of Cambodia, Delvert notes that there had been 
considerable ‘regroupment’ of villages for security reasons in the period 1948–1954 in the 
lead up to Cambodian independence and the 1954 Geneva Convention.  
10  In the villages, one occasionally meets these overseas relatives on visit to their families and 
friends.  Some expatriate Cambodians collect money in the US or elsewhere and fund the 
building of local wats and occasionally other infrastructure in their former home villages.  
Local relatives of the donors are often contracted ahead of others to complete these works.   
11  Kim Sedara, "Reciprocity: Informal Patterns of Social Interractions in a Cambodian Village 
Near Angkor Park" (MA, Northern Illinois University, 2001), 38-39.  neak kror – poor 
villager (thatch roof); neak kour som – middle-level villager (tiled roof, wooden house); neak 
mean – rich villager (tiled roof, concrete house).  Zinc roofs are now the more prevalent for 
the better off villagers. 
12  Figures compiled from the Seila Commune Council Database 2004 available from 
http://www.seila.gov.kh/downloads/cdb_briefing/, accessed on 15 October 2006.  
Battambang has 44 per cent thatch, Takeo and Kandal are at or below 25 per cent while 
several poorer provinces, Mondul Kiri, Otddar Meanchey and Rattanakiri have over 60 per 
cent thatch.  These figures are broadly consistent with other poverty data. 
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Commune Commune  
% thatch 
Lowest Village level 
% thatch 
Highest Village level  
% thatch 
Prek Norin 13% 3% 26% 
Bansay Treng 34% 10% 49% 
Bay Damran  51% 25% 80% 
Phnom Sampeou 40% 13% 70% 
Table 4-1 Proportion of thatch houses in four Battambang communes13 
However, there needs to be caution in association human security with poverty 
measures which, although being important drivers of development policy and 
planning, are an inadequate measure of human security.  CDRI’s Moving Out of 
Poverty Study (MOPS), for example, found that of the 26 per cent of households in 
their study villages that moved out of poverty in recent years, some 22 per cent fell 
back into poverty.14  It also classified seven so called mobility groups identified by 
villagers and detailed in Table 4-2 below.15   
 
Comfortably 
rich 
Climbing 
into wealth 
Escaping 
poverty 
Static middle Falling into 
poverty 
Deepening 
poverty 
Chronically 
poor 
24% 12% 13% 14% 15% 7% 14% 
Table 4-2 Mobility across all villages in MOPS study – 2004/516 
Assuming that the national poverty index falls somewhere between “static middle” 
and “falling into poverty,” it is evident that “escaping poverty” requires and 
additional leap beyond simply crossing a national poverty threshold or being part of 
a “static middle.”  In other words, the higher level represents a level beyond which 
vulnerability to relapsing into poverty is minimised.  It is, thus, the higher level of 
income and basic needs and not the poverty level which helps attain human security.  
Therefore, if human security is to be achieved, there is a need for more differentiated 
                                                 
13  Figures compiled from the Seila Commune Council Database 2004 available at 
www.seila.gov.kh/downloads/cdb_2004 accessed on 15 October 2006.  There are also 
significant variations within villages in a given commune. 
14  Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI), "Moving Out of Poverty,"  (Phnom 
Penh: Cambodia Development Resource Institute, 2007),  40. 
15  Ibid., 16-17. 
16  Ibid., 34.  Percentages represent the number of households which moved into the particular 
category over the period 2004/5. 
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targeting of development assistance to households from the static middle as well as 
those falling into poverty and the chronically poor. 
Problems of access to resources, services and rights. 
The most important resource for the vast majority of rural Cambodians is land.  
Much as described by Delvert, villagers tended to have small garden plots near the 
place of residence while rice fields are located beyond the village perimeter.  
Villages along the lower reaches of the Sangke River had narrow strips of land for 
gardens (chamcar) running perpendicular to and immediately adjacent to the river 
banks while their rice fields were established beyond the garden land on flood plains.  
Further upstream, where river banks permitted, dry season gardens were established 
on the sandy banks exposed by the falling river level, residences were along the river 
bank and rice fields beyond that.  These patterns of agriculture are determined by the 
local geography and the nature of flooding in the wet season.17  However, many 
Cambodian farmers are unable to meet their family needs from agriculture alone and, 
as in the past, they depend also on access to commons for fishing, forest goods and 
other opportunities to meet their annual subsistence needs.  
National figures indicate that while rice consumption per capita is increasing, the 
availability of rice land, and rice production per capita, are tending to decrease due 
to rapid population growth.  Increased national consumption is thus sustained largely 
by improved yields.  Figures 4-1 and 4-2 illustrate these trends.  However, as with 
house types, Figure 4.3 below shows that there is a considerable variation at district 
level in rice yields and production per family.  A divergence that is reproduced also 
at commune and village levels, emphasizing the importance of local conditions to a 
human security approach.  Indeed, in some areas nutrition levels are so poor that the 
WFP continues to run food for work and other nutrition programmes assisting up to 
1.5 million Cambodians.18   
 
                                                 
17  Delvert details the various geographical systems, the relationship between rivers and flood 
plains, the location of villages, gardens and ricefields.  Delvert, Le Paysan Cambodgien.  See 
also Puckridge, The Burning of the Rice: A Cambodian Success Story.  Village structures and 
the agriculture practiced today appear little different from the late 1950s as described by 
Delvert despite the disruption of the Pol Pot years and subsequent civil war.   
18  See the WFP we site at http//www.wfp.org/English/?ModuleID=137&Key=2347. 
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Figure 4-1 Cambodia – rice production per capita19  
The pressure on land is significant since, in addition to population increase, in many 
parts of Cambodia agricultural land has been lost to landmines laid during decades of 
war and civil strife.  There is also a significant loss of agricultural land to speculators 
and to urban expansion.   
 
 
Figure 4-2 Cambodia – hectares of rice land per capita 
Access to the commons is also becoming more difficult with population growth and 
compounded by dwindling resources and over exploitation, including by commercial 
operations.  The evidence, suggests that as population grows, access to land becomes 
more difficult and with cost of living increases, agriculture is providing a less secure 
base for achieving basic needs.  Agricultural land, nevertheless, remains a critical 
                                                 
19  Compiled from "FAO, Statistical Division, Commodities by country" at www.fao.org 
accessed 16 Sept 2005 and updated for 2005 on 10 May 2008 using IRRI data as FOA 
database is under reconstruction. 
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resource for most Cambodians.  Its contribution to family food and income security 
is, as shown above, highly variable.   
 
 
Figure 4-3 Rice yield in Battambang province – 200320 
Land distribution and landlessness  
In the previous chapter, the failure of solidarity groups and the misappropriation and 
mismanagement of land by officials after 1979 was noted.  Conditions were 
extremely difficult for the villagers and once a harvest was completed there was the 
inevitable shortfall in the annual needs of a household so that people left their 
villages in search of work in district and provincial centres and in Phnom Penh.  Dry 
season planting was out of the question due to lack of working irrigation systems.21  
The 1989 land reforms, which included a land redistribution of 1 hectare per family, 
were popular, but the actual allocation of land was often skewed in favour of 
officials and their associates.  
The land situation is nicely captured by the villagers of Kanh Chraong, who recorded 
that in the period immediately after Pol Pot people had nothing, but that a ‘middle 
class’ quickly emerged from the former rich who revived the practice of lending with 
interest, where before there had been sharing of resources.22  After 1979, they 
recalled, many people returned to their birthplace, but those who came first “claimed 
                                                 
20  Compiled from 2003 Web CDB 1.0 available at http://203.189.130.76:8080 
/database/webcdb, accessed on 10 May 2006. 
21  Heder, "Kampuchea," 37-8 and 42. 
22  Krom Akphiwat Phum, "Changes in the Villages: An Examination of the Development 
Process at Village Level, Battambang Province, Cambodia,"  (Battambang: Krom Akphiwat 
Phum, 1996), 42. 
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a lot of land and those returning later got small amounts of land.”  Later, they said, 
there was a mix of co-operative farming and private ownership and “one hand 
worked with the solidarity group and the other hand worked their own rice land. … 
When community land was distributed at the end of the solidarity group time the 
local authorities and solidarity group leaders had the opportunity to take a larger 
share” so that land ownership at the time ranged from one to fourteen hectares.23  
Further disruption to land distribution was experienced with UNTAC, due to the 
resettlement of returnees from the border camps, and of internally displaced people. 
Many studies since the mid-1990s have noted the importance of land to household 
survival in Cambodia and linked small land holdings and landlessness directly with 
high levels of rural poverty, especially where landlessness has been as a result of 
distress sales and seizures by the military and other officials.24  Distress sales arose 
when illness struck a household requiring immediate access to money for medical 
costs or, in times of food shortage, where a household had limited access to family or 
other villager support.25  Sales of land were also likely where a household did not 
have the capital or assets necessary to work their land (e.g. cow, plough, cash for 
seed, food for helpers or for themselves to survive until harvest).  Micro-finance was 
also lacking with NGOs being virtually the sole providers of financial services, but 
reaching only about 11 per cent of rural households.26  Often too, those lacking 
farming skills fell into poverty and lost their land.  This was not uncommon in 
Cambodia where many men had spent a large portion of their adult life in armies 
                                                 
23  Ibid., 42. 
24  Robin Biddulph, "Landlessness: A Growing Problem," Cambodia Development Review 4, 
no. 3 (2000): 1-2.  Kato also refers to the distress sale of land in Elisabeth Kato, 
"Landlessness in Kompong Reap," Cambodia Development Review 3, no. 3 (1999): 7-11.  
Quoting an OXFAM study, which found that 13 percent of the 30,000 families sample were 
landless.  While the expanding rural population appears to be the largest single cause of 
landlessness, of the 43.6 percent of landless families who previously had land, but 
subsequently lost it, the vast majority (86.9 percent) were distress sales.  The largest single 
cause being illness.  Many reported also that their land was taken from them without 
compensation by the military or provincial authorities. 
25  Elisabeth Kato, "'We have Rights, they have the Power': A Case Study of Land 
Expropriation in Northwest Cambodia," (Phnom Penh: Oxfam, Cambodia Land Study 
Project, 1998); and John McAndrew, "Interdependence in Household Livelihood Strategies 
in Two Cambodian Villages,"  (Phnom Penh: Cambodia Development Resource Institute, 
1998). 
26  Manet Hun, "Is Market-Assisted Land Reform an Appropriate Choice for Cambodia at the 
Present Time?" (MA, New York University, 2001), 5.  NGOs were providing financial 
support services to the poor in the villages I visited.  ACLEDA was mentioned, but 
unfavourably due to interest rates and confiscation of assets, often land, on failure to meet 
repayments. 
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before resettling into village life, or in female-headed households which lacked basic 
labour resources.27  Population increase was also a significant factor, especially as 
many families had no land to allocate to young married couples.28  The impact of 
population can be shown by comparing the population in villages at present and as 
reported by Delvert who in the late 1950s surveyed the land holding of 54 per cent of 
families (434 families) in Kauk Khmum commune.29  By extrapolation the total 
number of families in the commune would have been 803 and the total land occupied 
3720 hectares.  Official figures (Seila 2003) for Kauk Khmum indicate that there 
were then 2398 families and the number of hectares of rain fed wet rice was 4169 
hectares.  Although a rough comparison, it does indicate a significant increase in 
population for little increase in land.30   
While some villagers are at risk of land loss through economic conditions, others are 
at risk of land expropriation at the hands of local government officials (village, 
commune, district), often acting on behalf of military officers or businessmen with 
government contacts.31  Such expropriations demonstrate the power and authority of 
officials who are able to treat public and even private land as their own to dispose of 
as they choose.  Courts are largely inaccessible to the poor as they are costly, there is 
a risk of retaliation and, in any case, judgements are likely to be influenced by the 
powerful.  Access to land is closely tied to people’s rights which are denied not only 
by the powerful, but also by the legal system itself.32  Departments such as the Land 
Titles Department are too weak to assert the validity of titles and choose to avoid 
involvement in challenges to expropriations as they are “hobbled by the network of 
                                                 
27  One Seila official indicated to me that it was too readily assumed that all Cambodians were 
capable farmers if given the land.   
28  Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI), "Moving Out of Poverty."; Elisabeth 
Kato, "'Poor People Can't do Rice': A Case Study of Poverty and Landlessness in Kompong 
Reap Village, Takeo Province,"  (Phnom Penh: Oxfam, Cambodia Land Study Project, 
1999); and McAndrew, "Interdependence."  1-9.  
29  Delvert, Le Paysan Cambodgien, 457-62. 
30  Delvert also surveyed Chamcar Samrong commune where a similar calculation shows that 
where 546 families previously occupied 1,420 hectares of rice land, in 2003 there were 3,081 
families in Chamcar Samrong which is now urban and has no rice land.   
31  Kato, "We have Rights."; and Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI), "Moving 
Out of Poverty."  Hun also notes the likelihood that even where there were willing sales in an 
open land market context, the rural poor were likely to be exploited due to their lack of 
information, knowledge of the market and skills in relation to sales processes.  Hun, 
"Market-Assisted Land Reform.”  Land seizures remains a major political issue in 
Cambodia.  
32  World Bank, "Justice for the Poor: An Exploratory Study of Collective Grievances over 
Land and Local Governance in Cambodia,"  (Phnom Penh: Center for Advanced Study 
(CAS), World Bank, 2006). 
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corruption and influence that pervades the civil service.”33  Knowledge of new 
government legislation enables those wishing to acquire land for commercial use to 
exploit those who are ignorant of the new legal procedures for land registration and 
use.34  Confronted by such issues, Kato noted the importance of NGOs in supporting 
villager claims and quotes a villager’s summing up that: “If we have to depend on 
local government, we will die … We have the rights… They have the power… They 
respect power.”35  Thus, human insecurity arises not only from landlessness but also 
from the failure of the legal systems to provide just services and to uphold the 
people’s rights.   
There are also significant economic security issues associated with access to land.  
The landless, and those having less than half a hectare of land, were considered in 
2001 to be particularly vulnerable to economic downturn.36  Yet, even though the 
viability of such small holdings is questioned, agriculture is still promoted by many 
development agencies as the basis for reducing poverty.  The problem, however, is 
that access to rural land is becoming increasingly competitive as the population 
grows and, since production is also limited, such access may not represent a viable 
means of achieving food or economic security.  Nor can land provide an increasing 
opportunity for employment.  A 2006 survey of agriculture emphasised that “… the 
ability of the current agricultural system to serve as a generator of additional 
employment has apparently come to an end” since, between 1999 and 2004, “a mere 
2.6 per cent of the increment of the labour force was absorbed in agriculture.”37   
Closely related to whether agriculture can provide food and economic security for 
rural Cambodians is the fact that the more productive dry season rice is limited by a 
lack of irrigation infrastructure.  Cambodia has a mere 7 per cent of irrigated land 
compared with 45 per cent in Vietnam and an average 20 per cent in the region.  
Irrigation has received only 8 per cent of international development assistance and is 
unlikely to show any improvement in the near future without significant 
                                                 
33  Kato, "We have Rights," 13.   
34  See for example Ruth Bottomley, "Contested Forests: An Analysis of the Highlander 
Response to Logging, Ratanakiri Province, Northeast Cambodia," Critical Asian Studies 34, 
no. 4 (2002); John McAndrew, "Tampuan Villagers Adapt to a Rapidly Changing 
Economy," Cambodia Development Review 5, no. 3 (2001): 5-8. 
35  Kato, "We have Rights," 12. 
36  Bhargavi Ramamurthy, Sik Boreak, and Per Ronnås, "Cambodia 1999-2000: Land, Labour 
and Rural Livelihood in Focus,"  (Stockholm: SIDA, 2001), 57-58. 
37  Lundström and Ronnås, "Employment and Growth in Cambodia: An Integrated Economic 
Analysis." 46. 
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investment.38  Thus, it is not just access to land that is critical to food and economic 
security but also the development of the agricultural infrastructure to increase the 
productive potential of the land and with it the prospects for improvements in human 
security.  
Landlessness has been shown to be associated with low incomes in some villages, in 
others where alternative income sources are available, it has been associated with 
higher levels of income growth.39  This was observed by Delvert in the late 1950s.  
Although he identified poverty as an issue and put the figure at about 10 per cent in 
Kauk Khmum commune and 23 per cent in the “urban” commune Chamcar 
Samrong, he further reported that 43 landless families in Kauk Khmum rented 
houses and were well off as they were employed on the railways and in the public 
service.  Similarly, in Chamcar Samrong, over one half of those with less than 0.5 
hectares (65 families) were employed in Battambang.40  The MOPS study again 
points to the fact that poverty need not be directly related to landlessness.41  
While consideration of access to resources has tended to be concentrated on land and 
denial of rights to secure tenure in this and other agrarian societies, a human security 
approach requires a broader understanding of the sources of threats and 
vulnerabilities.  Too close a focus on the consequences of issues, such as 
landlessness and distress sales and a search for solutions in agricultural expansion, 
risks overlooking other causes of human insecurity in the village.  The next section, 
therefore, provides a broader understanding of human security concerns arrived at 
through discussions with villagers.  It identifies resources and related concerns raised 
by the people during interviews and discussions in the villages, in association 
meetings with sponsoring NGO representatives, and in a two day forum between 
villagers and provincial authorities, where I was an observer.  Since the matters were 
widely raised I have referred only to the main sources of information by date which, 
in association with the schedule at Annex A, identifies the commune visited on the 
particular day.  If its inclusion might serve to identify a particular interviewee, the 
date has been omitted to comply with ethics requirements. 
                                                 
38  Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI), "Moving Out of Poverty," 8 and 10. 
39  Ibid., 100. 
40  Delvert identifies “une masse de pauvres gens à peu près sans terre dont l’importance (23 per 
cent) est due au voisinage de la ville,… “ Delvert, Le Paysan Cambodgien, 460. 
41  Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI), "Moving Out of Poverty," 99-100.   
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Contested fish resources 
Fish form an important part of the Cambodian subsistence food intake; it is caught 
by villagers in the rivers, rice fields and flooded areas (including flooded forest) 
mainly during the wet season.  In the many villages influenced by the floodwaters 
from the Tonle Sap, or in floating villages on the lake itself, fishing takes on a more 
significant commercial role in the lives of the people.  Maps 4.1 and 4-2 below show 
the extent of the Tonle Sap flood and the location of fishing lots near Battambang. 
 
 
Map 4- 1 Tonle Sap Lake: Showing extent of annual flood and location of 
Battambang and Sangke River42 
In the villages of Prek Norin and Prek Loung communes, downstream from 
Battambang, people were concerned about climate change, illegal fishing activities, 
and poor economic returns from fishing and from vegetable growing.  As I stood 
with local men looking across the barren land, which would be transformed by 
seasonal rains and floods into a vast green plain of rice, smoke rising from forests on 
the horizon indicated illegal logging and perhaps hunting activity.  The men told me 
                                                 
42  Adapted from maps at:  http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/0/00/Cambodia-map-
wiki.png accessed 12 May 2008.   
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that illegal fishing was widespread and that it was not uncommon for water to be 
pumped out of storage ponds to get the very last of the available fish.43   
Traditionally in this area, fishing in the floodwaters and rivers could contribute up to 
one third of household annual income.  However, in Battambang Province over 99 
per cent of fishing households have reported decreasing availability of ‘products and 
benefits’ from inundated forests, big rivers and lakes, and from flooded rice fields.44  
The villagers also complained to me that this contribution to their annual needs was 
now being jeopardised by overall dwindling fishing resources, which they put down 
to a number of factors – the main one being over-exploitation.45   
 
 
Map 4-2 Fishing lots near Battambang46 
More generally, there was a view that the nature of the seasonal flooding was 
changing as a result of bigger and more irregular river floods, which they blamed on 
                                                 
43  Village interviews 15/3/05.  These ponds which are dug by villagers to provide crucial dry 
season water storage are dotted throughout the countryside.  They may be on household land 
or large communal ponds.   
44  Mak Sithirith, "Fishing for Lives: Conflicts and Struggles between Communities and Fishing 
Lots in Kompong Chhnang Province,"  (Phnom Penh: NGO Forum on Cambodia, 2000). 
45  Village interviews 15/3/05; This was reiterated in other village interviews 27/3/05 and 
21/4/05.  One survey found that of respondents claiming decreased availability of resources 
over the past 10 years, 77 per cent put this down to over-exploitation while only 7 per cent 
suggested population growth.  Ramamurthy, Boreak, and Ronnås, "Cambodia 1999-2000: 
Land, Labour and Rural Livelihood in Focus," 48-50. 
46  Adapted from: Evans, Patrick T, Melisa Marschke, and Kiran Paudyal. "Flood Forests, Fish 
and Fishing Villages: Tonle Sap, Cambodia." Tagbilaran City: Asia Forest Network, 2004. 
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logging in the mountain forests where the Sangke River rises.  They also explained 
the loss of some fish species and lower quantities of others as due to the 
environmental changes and their impacts on spawning, including the changing river 
flows and the clearing of forests within the Tonle Sap flood zone.  Fish populations, 
they said, were depleted by illegal fishing, the use of indiscriminate methods and out 
of season fishing which reduced breeding stocks.  Modern fishing gear was also 
considered to be too efficient and to be “catching everything”, leading also to 
decreased stocks.  A village head complained that the people felt they were left out 
of deliberations about the future of fishing.  He was concerned, too, that the fish 
were being left out of consideration.  The large and the small fish, he said, needed to 
be treated differently to protect them.  Some types were already lost completely, 
while others were becoming rare.  He spoke of the different species which had 
disappeared and the need to remind the younger generations of what could happen if 
there was no protection.47   
Clearly, access to this important resource is being affected by a combination of 
climate and environmental factors, as well as human agency such as forest clearing 
and over-fishing.  Illegal methods are also being used to access the depleted 
resource.  These include out of season river fishing by the method of tree branches 
placed in the river and netting, which was to be seen all along the lower reaches of 
the Sangke River in the dry season.  Much of the illegal fishing, it was said, was 
done under the auspices of the military and “powerful people” who paid police and 
fisheries officials to turn a blind eye to their activities, or to silence those who 
protested.48   
Villagers also asserted that they were being unlawfully excluded from areas claimed 
by fishing lot holders.49  Around the Tonle Sap these lots are licensed to private 
                                                 
47  Village interview 15/3/05. 
48  Village interviews 15/3/05; and 21/4/05.  It was claimed that soldiers were supported by 
wealthy people to do the illegal fishing.  The wealthy provided the capital to buy branches to 
put in the river.  “Only the high ranking and wealthy can do that kind of fishing.  Only they 
can pay the police and fisheries officials.” 
49  Village interviews 21/4/05.  The exclusion from fishing lots was not a new phenomenon.  
Already in the 1920s under the French colonial administration, villagers were excluded from 
flooded forest areas around the Tonle Sap by regulations which banned forest clearing and 
designated fishing lots which were auctioned to private businessmen.  The regulations also 
imposed limitations on fishing seasons as well as restrictions on fishing tackle.  The 
restrictions impacted on the villagers’ needs and they began to fish illegally.  Delvert had 
already noted in the late 1950’s that due to rapid population growth and a fall in fish yields, 
the level of illegal fishing had become ‘alarming’  Delvert, Le Paysan Cambodgien, 163.  
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businessmen by auction, and many disputes arise from this system which excludes 
villagers from access to a traditional resource.  As well as such exclusion and 
reduced fish stocks, any fish that the people do catch must be sold direct to a 
licensed businessman who sets the price unilaterally.  Villagers incur a 4 per cent 
penalty described as a “tax” if the fish is sold to other than the licensee.  However, 
although the villagers would prefer to sell direct to the licensee, they lack means of 
transport and must therefore sell to middlemen who come to the village to buy the 
available fish.   
Illegal fishing was clearly a major issue and has led to violence not only in this part 
of Battambang, but in other areas as well.50  It also creates significant economic 
pressures on families due to loss of sustenance and income.51  However, the major 
problem for the villagers is not necessarily the loss of access and income but the risk 
they face in attempting to assert their rights, and in attempting to prevent illegal 
activities.  The law is clear on their rights and those of lot owners (whether these are 
fair and equitable is another matter).  Human security is thus affected by the 
management of the resource by those legally responsible – department officials, 
police, the courts and local commune representatives – who determine whether 
villagers’ rights to peaceful and sustainable access to these resources are upheld.  
However, fisheries officials are reluctant to visit the villages; police and fisheries 
officials may be in the service of powerful people; disputes do not get to court and 
commune council involvement in the resolution of problems may be hampered by 
councillors’ political associations with powerful people.  In very large part, the threat 
to livelihood and human security is thus in consequence of responsible government 
agencies failing to intervene and uphold the law.  It becomes an issue of governance, 
not only of the fishing sector, but also of the military, police, justice and other 
responsible departments and the commune councils.  In this situation it falls to the 
NGOs to provide whatever protection and support they can to help villagers to claim 
their rights.52 
                                                 
50  Village interviews 21/4/05.  See also Mak Sithirith, "Fishing Conflict in Battambang,"  
(Phnom Penh: NGO Forum on Cambodia, 2000); Mak Sithirith, "Fishing for Lives: Conflicts 
and Struggles between Communities and Fishing Lots in Kompong Chhnang Province." 
51  Village observation 27/3/05.  American Friends Service Committee, "Crossing Borders, 
Crossing Norms: Vulnerability and Coping in Battambang Province," (Phnom Penh: The 
Socio-Cultural Vulnerability and Coping Strategies (SCVCS) Research Project, 2000), 7. 
52  Village interviews 21/4/05.  A committee had been set up to try to address these issues with 
the authorities with the help of NGOs. 
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NGOs such as KAWP, Village Support Group, Aphivat Strey and the Fisheries 
Action Coalition Team (FACT) were all working to protect the people’s lawful 
access to fishery resources.  They were particular active in promoting and, as the 
need arose, facilitating contact with the relevant government officials and extension 
services.  This was done as far as possible in consultation with the commune 
councils.  I observed several meetings where villagers, commune councillors and 
NGOs discussed issues of concern.  People in the fishing villages were generally 
keen to have training on fisheries protection and to establish agreements with the 
councils on what could and could not be done.53  One group requested KAWP to 
arrange for an official from the Fisheries Department to come to the village.  The 
villagers could not make the request alone as it would be necessary to fund a meeting 
and provide a per diem for the official, since poor pay and a genuine deficit in 
resources for local extension activities is compensated by rent taking.  It is not clear 
to what extent the shortfall in resources and limited active engagement of officers is 
due to higher level mismanagement and their lack of commitment to departmental 
policies and programmes.  Thus, the question of how serious senior provincial 
fisheries and police department heads are about eliminating illegal fishing, or 
whether they are they part of it as rumoured, remains open.  So, too, the question of 
where the commune council loyalties lay and to what extent they may be intimidated 
by other powerful people.  In the final analysis, however, it is unlikely that commune 
councils can manage their responsibilities for law and order and the protection of 
villagers’ fishing rights without line department support and cooperation. 
What is important is that the problem of access to fishing resources and illegal 
fishing has demonstrated that from a human security perspective, villagers must find 
a way to address not only problems of access but, at the same time, the broader 
social issues of rights and how these are to be protected by local and line department 
governance.  
In my discussion with fishing villagers, land matters were not raised as major 
concerns other than as passing references to expropriations by powerful persons and 
the military.54  There was recognition of the existence of landlessness in the villages 
                                                 
53  Village interviews 15/3/05; and 21/4/05.     
54  Village interviews 15/3/05; and 7/4/05.  This is not surprising as land ownership and access 
are sensitive matters impacting directly on peoples’ lives and relations with others.  I did not 
pursue the matter as there are statistics on landholdings in the region and the general 
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and of the livelihood difficulties which resulted from small, inadequate holdings.  
These villages had limited wet season rice land and many had depended formerly on 
harvesting floating rice and, more important for cash income, harvesting jute which, 
in the past, had been important to the local economy as the local jute factory had 
provided both income for suppliers as well as employment for others.55  Although 
some jute is still sold to a Thai businessman (at low prices), the factory closure has 
impacted heavily on those formerly dependent on jute harvesting for a significant 
part of their annual income.56  Access to the jute resource remains, but the markets 
for it has been radically reduced.   
Water shortages and limited market access 
While the extensive flooding of the countryside and the expansion of the Tonle Sap 
in the wet season provided the base for rice production and a generous fish resource, 
the dry season left the countryside parched and barren except for the few crops made 
possible by accessible water supply.  Some in the fishing villages complained that in 
the dry season,  “there is not enough land or water.  The poorest have to follow the 
water [i.e. the receding flood] for fish” while others try alternatives such as cash 
cropping.  However, only small amounts of dry rice, peanuts, maize, green beans, 
watermelon, tomato and other crops could be produced because of water shortage 
and lack of basic techniques.  There were concerns, too, at the low market prices 
offered for these crops (in part due to quality) and competition from both Thai and 
Vietnamese produce.  The local view was that “the government stifles local 
production in favour of imports on which they can collect taxes and import duties.  
Even manure is being trucked in … and Vietnamese take produce to Thailand, put a 
“made in Thailand” stamp on it, and re-import it at a higher price.  The government 
doesn’t care.”57  Nevertheless, considerable effort was being made by many villagers 
                                                                                                                                          
proposition that many households could not survive solely on agricultural activities was 
evident.  Not only land size, but also factors such as skill levels, access to physical and 
capital resources, and household size could all affect survivability on available land.  These 
issues emerge in the rice producing villages. 
55  Village interviews 15/3/05.  I was told the local floating rice variety was no longer available 
having been lost since the Pol Pot period, and that the depth and rapid fluctuations in the 
flood in the area prevented the growing of available floating rice types from other regions. 
56  Village interviews 25/3/05; and 15/3/05.  Discussions with KAWP and VSG.  The 
Battambang jute factory closed amid rumours of scandals and corruption in 1994.  Proposals 
to re-open it since have all failed.  This is due in part  to the lack of demand resulting from 
the use of plastics rather than hessian for rice and other grain bags. 
57  Discussion with NGOs. 
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to create income from gardens.  Despite this, it was a struggle and with very limited 
government agricultural extension services or assistance with market access, and no 
alternative agribusiness approach, there was marginal if any economic benefit.  
Again the people looked to the NGOs either for direct assistance or to invite (and 
pay for) government extension workers to give training in the villages.58     
These same issues were prevalent in the rice-growing villages in communes such as 
Bay Damran, located further up the Sangke River beyond the range of the Tonle Sap 
flood, where wet season rice was the major income source and there was less 
involvement in fishing.59  There, the people were particularly concerned that dry 
season income was curtailed, even for many of those who had land and wanted to 
plant dry season crops, by the lack of water for rice fields and gardens.  One 
complained that there had been no rain in three years and that although he used to 
get 20 sacks per hectare before, now his yield was down to 8-10 sacks.  “Farmers 
need nothing but water,” he said.60  There had been no rain, ponds had dried up 
(partly due to illegal fishing in some areas), and there were not enough pumps to use 
available water.  Low prices for vegetable and fruit produce and lack of capital and 
knowledge of techniques for vegetable production were common complaints.  
Villagers felt they needed more help with techniques and marketing of various crops 
as businessmen came to buy organically grown crops, such as jasmine rice, but they 
could not always supply it.61 
In these parts there was much more concern about the area of land owned by families 
and its future availability.62  People here all knew of cases where small and 
                                                 
58  Village interviews 25/3/05.  My view of a training day was not very positive as it was all 
classroom presentation and not demonstration in the field which would have been more 
appropriate.  Nevertheless critical questions were asked, particularly about marketing which 
was not the real subject of the training (which was about how to pick and prepare vegetables 
for transport to market). 
59  Village discussions 21-22/3/05.  Fish is nevertheless important and is caught by villagers in 
the ricefields and flooded areas (including flooded forest).    
60  Village interviews 21/3/05.  2005 was a serious drought year and the WFP was providing 
emergency food aid, especially in Pursat province.   
61  Village interviews 21/3/05.  The businessmen, I was told, could tell by the taste if chemicals 
had been used.   
62  Village discussions 5/4/05; 7/4/05; and 10/4/05.  See also American Friends Service 
Committee, "Crossing Borders." In some areas land holding patterns vary greatly.  In 
neighbouring villages in Bansay Treng commune in Battambang it was reported that 54 per 
cent of families did not hold land for cultivation in one resource poor village while in a 
neighbouring village only 18 per cent of families lacked land.  In another village, 10 non-
residents owned between 60 and 100 hectares each.  Other land holding was reasonably high 
at up to 3 hectares per family. 
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unprofitable land holdings had meant that loans could not be repaid and villagers had 
sold up to rich landowners and left.  Many still depended on access to the commons 
in the off-season but resources there were increasingly scarce.  Overall, the 
community seemed most concerned about was the lack of long term opportunities 
for dry season crops and for off farm income generation and employment – 
especially for the young who would be unlikely to have access to adequate land in 
their home villages and who, therefore, faced limited prospects of raising their own 
families in the future.   
In both fishing and rice growing villages visited, there was a common concern with 
the human security issues of basic food production and of producing a surplus or 
other income to meet household income requirements.  The non-availability of off-
farm employment was also a major issue.  There was little support, other than from 
Seila and the NGOs, as the people tried the best they could to make off-farm income 
to meet their family needs.  Hence, it was not uncommon to find a girl of school age 
selling soup on the side of a dusty road under a makeshift shelter, another minding a 
neighbour’s cows, or school age boys searching for labouring work—all missing 
important schooling to help their families.  In difficult times, it was common practice 
for children to be taken out of school to help the family, and the children themselves 
considered it their duty to do this while regretting the loss of education and future 
prospects.  Another response to these economic insecurities is labour migration. 
Push migration to access survival income 
Many rural Cambodians are forced to search for supplementary livelihood incomes 
outside their normal village context, migrating to find work as labourers in Thailand 
or at the border, in Battambang or elsewhere in Cambodia, especially during the dry 
season.63  Thailand is a strong lure since labour rates are four times higher than 
Cambodia’s one US dollar per day.  Landlessness and poverty have been identified 
as the reasons for labour migration to work in Thailand, at salt works in Kompot 
(which includes child labour), in fishing industries on the Tonle Sap or in expanding 
industries in the cities.64  In every commune I visited, villagers and officials 
                                                 
63  This issue arose in all village discussions.  Ibid., 7; and Cambodia Development Resource 
Institute (CDRI), "Moving Out of Poverty," 111. 
64  Chan Sophal and So Sovannarith, "Cross-Border Migration Hit by Asian Crisis," Cambodia 
Development Review 3, no. 1 (1999): 1-4; Steve Gourley, "Child Labour, Migration and Salt 
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expressed disquiet at the lack of jobs, especially for young people.  These, they 
complained, went to Thailand where they were vulnerable to exploitation and at high 
risk of returning with drug addictions, sickness (HIV/AIDS), and where girls 
sometimes became sex workers.   
Research has confirmed that the reasons for migrating are “overwhelmingly 
economic.” 65  It was reported that in one Battambang village up to 40 per cent of 
women between 20 and 40 years of age had left at some stage for work on the border 
or in Thailand.66  However, migration is often illegal and migrants can suffer at the 
hands of unscrupulous employers with long hours and relatively poor pay and 
conditions.  They risk being cheated or beset by the police or gangs for payment on 
return.  Many are exposed to drugs and HIV/AIDS.67  The impact can be severe on 
innocent children who lose parents and are left with grandparents.  One young boy 
told me his father had died of AIDS and that his mother had gone to Pailin leaving 
him with his grandparents.  The mother came back each month, if she could, to see 
him.  He wanted to be a doctor, but did not think he would have the chance.  He was 
lonely without his mother.68  The long-term future of such children is particularly 
insecure if they lack support, and the education which will allow them to have 
genuine options for their future livelihoods. 
A survey of migration—both internal and external—identified it as “a survival 
strategy for large sections of the population.”  Desbarats and Sik Boreak’s study 
shows that migration was mainly “for landlessness and poverty reasons.”  Rural-
rural migration was 57 per cent; rural-urban 21 per cent; urban-urban 14 per cent and 
urban-rural migration 8 per cent.  Those who migrate include youth and young adults 
                                                                                                                                          
Production," Cambodia Development Review 5, no. 1 (201): 9-11; Sarthi Acharya, "Poverty 
Reduction in Cambodia – Some Reflections," Cambodia Development Review 5, no. 2 
(2001): 4-7; Chea Huot and Sok Hach, "The Cambodian Garment Industry," Cambodia 
Development Review 5, no. 3 (2001); and Suzanna Stout Banwell, "Vendors' Voices," 
Cambodia Development Review 5, no. 3 (2001): 9-11. 
65  So Sovannarith, "International Migration: Some Issues in Cambodia," Cambodia 
Development Review 5, no. 1 (2001): 5-9.   
66  American Friends Service Committee, "Crossing Borders," 14.  See also  Chan Sophal and 
So Sovannarith who detail “long range” migration to Bangkok and other locations for work 
in the construction industry, manufacturing and food processing, and on fishing boats, while 
“short range” migrants are involved mainly in agricultural activities such as rice harvesting, 
vegetable and fruit picking.  Chan Sophal and So Sovannarith, "Cross-Border Migration Hit 
by Asian Crisis," 14. 
67  So Sovannarith, "International Migration," 5-9; Cambodia Development Resource Institute 
(CDRI), "Moving Out of Poverty," 113. 
68  Village interview 15/3/05. 
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who are “disproportionately represented;” while in terms of gender, girls go to 
Phnom Penh to work in the garment industry; men to “frontier provinces” for land 
and agriculture.  They concluded that “employment creation in the non-farm sector 
appears to be the most promising solution.”69  Cambodia’s is “push” migration rather 
than “pull” to areas of labour shortage.  Some 30 per cent of Cambodia’s internal 
migrants were young (15-24 years), and 13 per cent in the range 25-29 years (= 8 per 
cent of the population).70  Child labour is not uncommon and children may be passed 
to other families to pay “bondage” debts or cover loans; young daughters previously 
“sheltered and groomed” to be future wives are often sent to work outside the 
village, as servants or agricultural labourers, to towns and even as far as Thailand.71  
Other forms of child labour are widespread in Phnom Penh and include begging, 
street hawking (shoe shine, garlands, flowers, books and newspapers) and foraging 
(bottles and cans, plastic, food scraps) as well as domestic labour and portering.72 
There may of course be positives associated with migration for work where moneys 
are remitted to support village households which might otherwise be in dire straits.  
However, as regards the garment industry, only 13 per cent of migrant workers remit 
to their families, but this may not necessarily be to the poorest households.73  
Migration can also lead to the development of new skills and their application.  It 
can also lead to lives of destitution in urban slums and deprive children of education 
and any hope of achieving a better life.  There is little evidence that efforts are being 
made by the central government and provincial authorities to reduce the 
circumstances which produce push migration and to create better access to 
employment and basic services which are critical to national and human 
development, and hence to human security.   
                                                 
69  Jacqueline Desbarats and Sik Boreak, "People and Land in Rural Cambodia," Cambodia 
Development Review 4, no. 3 (2000): 6-10. 
70  Sarthi Acharya, "Labour Migration in the Transitional Economies of South-East Asia," 
Cambodia Development Review 6, no. 1 (2002): 12-15.  See also Lundström and Ronnås, 
"Employment and Growth in Cambodia: An Integrated Economic Analysis," 25, which 
discusses “distress migration” for employment.   
71  American Friends Service Committee, "Crossing Borders," 13. 
72  American Friends Service Committee, "Bins of Gold: Livelihoods of Young People in the 
Tonle Bassac Squatter Area, Phnom Penh,"  (Phnom Penh: The Socio-Cultural Vulnerability 
and Coping Strategies (SCVCS) Research Project, 2000). 
73  Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI), "Moving Out of Poverty," 9. 
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  Access to services 
The village studies have shown how in terms of access to resources, human security 
is influenced by the performance of line departments as well as local commune 
councils and civil society, represented mainly by NGOs.  As well as addressing 
resource issues the people were also concerned by the poor level of health, education 
and justice services being delivered to the countryside.  
Health Services 
There was widespread dissatisfaction with rural health services generally.  The 
people complained in particular that fees and informal costs charged by health 
providers excluded the poor and risked impoverishing others.  This they said was not 
just.  The fact that medical services were often some distance away was not seen as a 
problem so much as that health centres were regularly unattended because health 
workers preferred to take private patients, despite the reforms which had introduced 
‘user pay’ fees from which the income of health workers could be subsidised.  While 
these reforms were said to have brought responsibility and better services in some 
places, it appeared to have had very limited effect in this region.74  Local services 
were limited and a commune health centre in one locality was only staffed by a nurse 
three days a week, but villagers complained she “could only explain.”75  Some said 
the commune health centre was “not serious” and people preferred to consult private 
doctors even if that meant going to other villages.  Costs were considered to be too 
heavy.  People said it cost 10,000 Riel for two days for childbirth and that medicines 
had to be bought on top of this.76  People did not like the regional hospital as the 
staff “used harsh words” and it cost 40,000 Riel for one week.  The service was said 
to be better if the medical people knew there was an NGO helping the sick person, or 
they had a reference from the commune council chief.  While health services were 
supposed to be free for the poor if they had a letter from the commune council chief 
and the hospital director agreed, it was claimed that hospital staff would still try to 
extract money from the patient.77  Nevertheless, health workers were preferred to 
                                                 
74  The reforms are presented in Khmer and English in Health Messenger, "User Fee Schemes," 
Health Messenger (Khmer Edition), no. 18 (2004). 
75  Village discussions 21-22/3/05; and 7/4/05.  The following discussion comes mainly from 
these interviews. 
76  Compared with a daily labour wage of about 4,000 Riel. 
77  KAWP had arranged a visit by commune and community leaders to the hospital to 
familiarise them with the hospital, rules and workings.  
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traditional healers despite the expense.  The fact that people will go into ruinous debt 
for medical treatment highlights the value placed on modern medicine.  Traditional 
midwives were, however, widely consulted.78   
These are widespread attitudes which are representative of the “universal” barriers to 
health services, both public and private, outlined in recent research in Cambodia.79  
The barriers included transport and distance from health care facilities; direct and 
indirect (informal) costs of health care; real and perceived poor quality of services; 
poorly trained staff and poor attitude to patients; staff conflict between public role 
and private practice; weak regulation and poor referral systems; inadequate 
understanding of the health services and consumer rights; poor communications 
between service providers and the communities; and widespread ignorance of health 
issues and diseases.80  The MOPS study found that while health services have 
improved over the years of their study, they are still of poor quality and are still more 
accessible to better off households which can bear transport and other costs.81  In a 
number of provinces and districts, various formal health equity and health insurance 
schemes have been introduced by donor organizations with varying success.  These 
will be looked at further in the next chapter.  Such schemes were not established in 
the areas visited in Battambang, although KAWP and other NGOs did support 
community health associations which I will refer to below under civil society.  What 
was notable during my visits was that safe water supply, sanitation and the general 
condition of the village were not raised by villagers as health issues though, as an 
outsider, they were often the first things I noted.  
Education 
Primary schools were relatively accessible for most, but again, despite a policy of 
free education, there were informal costs imposed on the people which many found 
difficult to meet.  In particular some teachers showed more commitment in their paid 
private tutorial classes than in normal school hours.  Children were often required to 
pay teachers for notes and had a reduced chance of progress if they did not purchase 
private tutorials or notes.  Many reported that schoolteachers were not regular in 
                                                 
78  Village discussions 21/4/05. 
79  Peter Annear, "Study of Financial Access to Health Services for the Poor in Cambodia:  
Phase 1 - Scope, Design, and Data Analysis," (Phnom Penh: For the Ministry of Health, 
WHO, AusAID and RMIT University, 2006). 
80  Ibid., 15-17. 
81  Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI), "Moving Out of Poverty," 62-65. 
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attendance at school.  This had been the case for years and a decade earlier KAWP 
had tried to help parents lobby for improved teaching standards.82   
Despite these problems, villagers considered the education of their children to be 
important and looked for better services from teachers.  They also wanted schools 
nearby and in one case I was told that a community seeking to have a school 
restaffed but did not have the resources for restoration of buildings.  They objected 
to being told that the community was required to provide the facilities.83   
Education in Cambodia is basic to the national future in a world of knowledge 
industries.  It is also increasingly important for ensuring individual human security.  
The current policy is based on a decentralised cluster school approach that is 
intended to engage communities with teaching staff in school management.  But, 
although valuing education, there is little evidence of an active participation by 
villagers in school committees.  Nor did the commune councils see a need for their 
involvement.84  This has been found to be the case in other studies which note the 
poor educational standards, poor pay for teachers, rent taking, and low level of 
community participation in the cluster school arrangement.85 
Justice 
In addition to the major issues of illegal fishing and land seizures, the people cited 
other instances where due process and justice were commonly denied.  These 
included references to thefts, gambling, domestic violence, gangs, police taking 
money, the lack of protection from the law, and abuses of human rights.  These same 
issues are reported by the MOPS study which refers to them as new vulnerabilities.86  
Gangs were seen as a particular problem in some villages.87  These represented a 
threat to property and life, but police action was inadequate, being largely responsive 
to payment in return for leniency or total neglect of duty.  In the absence of real 
                                                 
82  Krom Akphiwat Phum, "Changes in the Villages," 10.  
83  Village discussions 5/4/05.  Communities have normally provided material support but this 
has been decreasing,  See Arnaldo Pellini, "Decentralisation of Education in Cambodia: 
Searching for Spaces of Participation between Traditions and Modernity," Compare 35, no. 2 
(2005): 210. 
84  Village discussions 5/4/05, 7/4/05, and 10/4/08. 
85  Pellini, "Decentralisation of Education in Cambodia," 214; and Charlene Tan, "Education 
Reforms in Cambodia: Issues and Concerns," Educational Research for Policy and Practice 
6, no. 1 (2007): 23-24. 
86  Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI), "Moving Out of Poverty," 117. 
87  Village discussions 7/4/05; and 21/3/05.  Gangs also appear as a major issue in ibid., 20 and 
85-6.  
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opportunities, youth were at risk of being drawn into illegal activities, often led by 
the children of powerful people who benefited from an immunity not granted to their 
followers. 
Villagers also feared the proximity of military camps which often brought gambling, 
drunkenness, prostitution, and even seizure of land and property, which villagers 
were powerless to challenge.  There were regular references to the role of the 
military in illegal activities.  Villagers often talked of those who have association 
with ‘powerful people’ which also enables them to act with impunity (for example to 
conduct illegal fishing or to take land). 
The Cambodian military is a composite of factional armies and, in principle, subject 
to an ongoing government policy of reform and demobilisation.  It suffers, from 
corruption “shamelessly spread in the Cambodian society, especially among the 
high-ranking military officials” and has been involved with Oknha in land 
grabbing—often forcibly removing the poor.88  Other problems identified by Chieam 
Channy in the military include: “corruption, pressures and nepotism in the promotion 
and task distribution” and, despite adequate sub-decrees to deal with such issues, “… 
those who do not belong to the parties or serve the party interest would never be 
promoted and in fact would be removed from their current positions in spite of their 
hard endeavours.”89  In areas controlled by the military, people have suffered many 
injustices, especially where the military have acted against the poor to support 
logging companies.  
The essential message coming from such reports is that the military in Cambodia is 
unprofessional and ill-disciplined – a reflection on its poor leadership.  It is also 
questionable as to what its real role is in national defence and what its civil support 
activities are.  Tea Banh considers part of its function is to “protect our territorial 
integrity, natural environment, human and food security, national security and 
                                                 
88  Chieam Channy, "The Future of Civil-Military Relations in Cambodia: Prospects for Change 
and Improvement," in Civil-Military Relations in Cambodia: Issues Challenges and 
Prospects, ed. Kao Kim Hourn (Phnom Penh: Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and 
Peace, 2002), 34-40.  Chieam Channy, a former soldier, is a member of the National 
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89  Ibid., 37.  
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Cambodian territory.”90  From my fieldwork there is no evidence of any of the 
human security roles being fulfilled by the military. 
As we have seen above, while the commune council chief has some responsibility 
for law and order, access to protection from the law for the ordinary villager is not 
guaranteed since the interests of the powerful are always put first and where money 
is more likely to buy protection.  Villagers were consistently sceptical about the 
prospect of police protection and saw them more or less as agents of the powerful.  
The council chiefs, too, were treated with certain distrust as representing the 
powerful and their own interests first.  The police service and justice system were 
largely out of the reach of the ordinary villager and inaccessible for the poorer 
ones.91 
While the access to services is closely related to governance in terms of state 
agencies (or private sector contractors) providing services in accordance with 
government policies and programmes and protecting people’s rights by application 
of relevant regulations and guidelines, there is another aspect of governance that is 
crucial to human security.  That is the right of all individuals and groups to 
participate in local decision making processes and in commune council deliberations.  
In other words, governance processes must not only protect people’s rights and 
entitlements but also give them a say in what rights and entitlements have priority 
and how they are to be protected or delivered.  Since such participatory governance 
assumes an effective civil society, the next section begins with a description of 
several civil society associations in practice, and proceeds with more specific 
observations relating to the workings of the commune councils. 
Access to resources and governance 
Day-to-day problems have been identified in relation to people’s access to resources 
needed for basic food and economic survival, and to services to protect their rights 
and to develop their capacity through education and good health.92  The main issues 
                                                 
90  Tea Banh, "Civil-Military Relation in Cambodia: Challenges and Prospects," in Civil-
Military Relation in Cambodia: Issues, Challenges and Prospects, ed. Kao Kim Hourn 
(Phnom Penh: Cambodian Institute for Cooperaton and Peace, 2002), 46-54.    
91  See also Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI), "Moving Out of Poverty," 81-
82. 
92  Vulnerability to food insecurity was evident during the drought season of 2005 when the 
WFP introduced emergency food programmes in several provinces. 
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have concerned environmental change, access to commons, dry season water 
shortage, and the need for infrastructure development, markets for dry season crops 
and off-farm income generation opportunities.  Even agricultural diversification into 
new dry season crops has proved to be of mixed benefit due to lack of water, 
insecure access to markets and inadequate returns for the effort of production.  It has 
also been shown that health, education and justice services are severely curtailed by 
informal fees and rent taking by officials.  While this is partly due to government 
salaries being grossly inadequate to support a family, it is also question of the culture 
of governance within the organisations—from the central ministries through to 
provincial and district administrations to the schools, health care clinics, courts and 
extension services.  From a human security perspective, people are vulnerable to 
distress from many causes which, instead of being relieved by government 
programmes, are compounded by the failure of governance institutions to carry out 
their responsibilities equitably.   
Participation in governance 
One of the most important aspects of local NGO activities I encountered during 
fieldwork was their support for village and commune associations of various sorts.  
These are, in a sense, the training grounds for the development of civil society 
organizations which development theory argues are necessary for people’s 
participation in local, regional and national governance and for ensuring the 
accountability of governments and institutions.93  It is a problem of Cambodian civil 
society that national or regional civil society organizations have not formed to date 
from local initiatives in rural Cambodia.  It appears that the creation of social 
movements with political objectives may be restricted by the current authoritarian 
political climate.  Nevertheless, NGOs such as KAWP, Village Support Group 
(VSG) and Aphivat Srey include in their aims the development of civil society which 
they approach through their work with village associations. 
                                                 
93  There is a need for caution here as civil society organizations may also include mafia and 
criminal gangs as interest groups with other than social welfare in mind.  Here I want to 
focus only on those organisations concerned with citizen welfare and development.  
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Associations and civil society 
I observed a number of association meetings and reporting sessions during fieldwork 
in Battambang.  These included fisheries associations, rice banks, rice co-operatives, 
health and funeral associations, farmer associations and human rights, school parents 
and youth associations in various communes.94  The issues raised were not in 
themselves out of the ordinary.  The elected leader of a fishing association had failed 
to attend meetings and was not available to sign an agreement with a department 
concerning a new village well and pump.95  The other members were uncertain how 
to manage the leadership issue and how to reactivate the deal with the department.  
The matters were aired quite forthrightly and the guidance of the NGO 
representatives sought.  There was, it emerged, confusion as to the village head’s 
responsibilities and whether approval was needed from the Fisheries Department.  
The villagers decided to arrange a workshop and wanted KAWP to arrange for a 
Fisheries Department official to come and explain the system and what was required.  
It was also decided to address the failure of the elected leader to attend meetings and, 
if there was no satisfactory explanation, to consider his removal and replacement by 
the vote of members.  Although KAWP was trying to encourage self-help and to 
empower villagers to decide and to take their own actions, the association still 
sought guidance from the NGO on how to manage the leadership issue and 
assistance in reactivating contact with the department officials concerned.   
Similar advice was sought in another village where a rice bank leader was having 
trouble retrieving loans because, it was said, of the drought.  Of 27 households which 
had borrowed rice, only 8 had managed to repay, while several had returned the 
interest only.  Most had promised to repay the following year but the problem 
persisted as some did no honour their promises and were avoiding the rice bank 
leader.  Discussion among the group suggested that if people didn’t honour their 
promises they should be reported to the Village Chief; or the rice bank leader should 
go with a cart to collect the rice, or that people be “named.”  Others thought that 
those who made promises should “sign the paper” or “make a contract.”  One 
member interjected that some borrowers said the rice belonged to the NGO’s and not 
                                                 
94  Association of some sort were observed in all the communes visited.  Since the issues 
reported may be particular to one association and identifiable, I have not provided dates for 
the village visits in this section.  
95  Village observation and discussions. 
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to the rice bank and, he argued, if this attitude was allowed to persist they would 
never repay.  The discussion was lively and the NGO encouraged the leaders to try 
to persuade members to meet their obligations, to hold a meeting with all the 
borrowers to discuss the way out of the impasse, but not to take harsh measures such 
as the suggestion that people be forced to sell a cow or other asset to meet the loan 
repayment.96   
A village rice cooperative was experiencing similar difficulties due to drought with 
some users unable to return the allocated rice and interest.  It was claimed that rice 
yields had dropped from 3 to 2 tonnes per hectare and “…  we cannot improve,” said 
the leader.  “The same people borrow each year but return less.  Some owe three 
sacks but still need to borrow.  Some think ‘why return any’ and treat it as a gift.  I 
do not know how to collect from the poor.”  There was an interjection that most of 
what the cooperative did was “for the businessman” in any case.97 
Participants at the meetings did not really blame those who failed to pay back their 
loans.  It was understood why this would happen, even if not in accordance with the 
association rules.  The scheme was intended in the first place to help those in need, 
so the risk was high.  There was also a strong sense among some villagers that NGOs 
were there to provide handouts.98  The issues that arise are of trust between members 
and the problem of how to sanction those who do not repay when they are already 
needy and must to be treated with compassion.   
In the context of food insecurity caused by drought and declining yields, it is not 
surprising that the rice associations were facing problems.  In fact it is doubtful 
whether they can become self-sustaining when their significant role is welfare in the 
first place.  The attempt to develop trust and caring in relation to food insecurity is in 
a sense challenged by the problem that it involves competition for a scarce resource.  
Trust and caring are far more likely to flourish in situations of relative prosperity and 
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economic security.  Small rural associations designed to meet urgent needs may thus 
be limited in their capacity to develop civil society.   
In another case, a farmer association was providing information about the System of 
Rice Intensification (SRI) methods, and 19 families were active in the association, 
which was helping to supply higher value seed.99  The leader said growers would 
need less of the better quality seed but could return more after harvest—borrow 8 
kilograms and return 15 kilograms.  He was positive about progress and wanted to 
continue with the 19 participating families and improve the programme rather than 
open it to new members.100  It may well be that the trust between the families was 
established and a slow opening to others after consolidation of the success was a 
practical approach, especially as the association appeared to be self-sustaining.  
Two associations, one for the poor and a cow bank, appeared to be less troubled.  
The first, which was largely concerned with welfare, was not very demanding on the 
recipients of assistance.  In the case of the cow bank, all the cows and calves were 
being properly cared for and, except in two cases, money borrowed had been 
returned.  The threat of taking back the cows if the money was not returned was 
roundly rejected by the group and it was agreed that people should be given leeway, 
as there was a need for them to learn to save and to do as they agreed.  However, the 
difficulties faced by associations became evident when a member responsible for 
money indicated there was, in fact, no money in the box as she had used it for family 
purposes and would put it back later.  The NGO person explained that this was poor 
practice and could lead to trouble.  “It must be stopped.”101  Again the emphasis on 
trust and a preparedness to give people the opportunity to meet their obligations were 
the key messages being expressed by the people themselves and promoted by the 
NGO. 
Not surprisingly, health associations seemed to be at considerable risk of tension and 
failure.102  While they could be valuable in training and supporting mothers and 
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infants, lack of financial support has led to problems.  While member’s contributions 
are small and manageable on their low incomes, payments to meet a members urgent 
medical expenses is likely to be high, depleting the association’s financial reserves 
and putting pressure on subsequent claims for assistance.  Apart from the scandal of 
collected money “disappearing”, some members had, it was claimed, received up to 
10,000 Riel for health care but then stopped contributing.103  A few in the meeting 
thought people weren’t sure how the association worked, others scoffed and said 
people knew very well!  The discussion was also about whether these people should 
be allowed to remain members and whether it should it be open to new members.  
There were mixed views but general agreement that people needed to learn how the 
association worked and that they should continue to help the sick.104  It seems likely 
that such a small scheme might be impracticable in the first place as studies of health 
equity funds show that they draw on a larger contribution base and have the benefit 
of both external funding and management support.   
Despite the difficulties within the associations, it was noticeable that there was a 
process of embedding new concepts and processes.  In particular, the idea of 
democracy was mentioned regularly and that people needed to be accountable for 
their actions.  Leaders were expected to be open in what they did as well.  The idea 
of contract was often referred to as a way of holding people to the word and creating 
trust.  Human rights was a familiar concept to the extent that the leader of one human 
rights association believed that the few who did not understand it were better than 
before and he felt the human rights group could disband.  A Village Chief, however, 
opposed this and said they needed a new strategy to explain human rights since 
“people with violence never listen ...  especially if they are drunk and they could 
                                                                                                                                          
providers).  Health Equity Funds are hospital or district based and funded externally or partly 
by individual subscription.  They are considered to best meet the needs f the poor.  See for 
example Annear, "Financial Access to Health Services."; Wim Hardeman et al., "Access to 
Health Care for All?  User Fees Plus a Health Equity Fund in Sotnikum, Cambodia," Health 
Policy and Planning 19, no. 1 (2004); Bart Jacobs and Neil Price, "The Impact of the 
Introduction of Use Fees at District Hospitals in Cambodia," Health Policy and Planning 19, 
no. 5 (2004); Bart Jacobs and Neil Price, "Improving  Access for the Poorest to Public Sector 
Health Services: Insights from Kirivong Operational Health District in Cambodia," Health 
Policy and Planning 21, no. 1 (2006); Bart Jacobs and Neil Price, "Community Participation 
in Externally Funded Health Projects: Lessons from Cambodia," Health Policy and Planning 
18, no. 4 (2003); and Mathieu Noirhomme et al., "Improving Access to Hospital Care for the 
Poor: Comparative Analysis of Four Health Equity Funds in Cambodia," Health Policy and 
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103  Reil is the Cambodian currency.  At the time, 4,000 Riel was equal to US$1. 
104  Village meetings. 
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threaten the one who tries to stop them.  The next day they don’t remember.”  It was 
also said that some villagers complained that human rights was just an excuse for 
wives to abuse their husbands!  As with other groups, it was decided that the 
association should keep on trying to promote the idea of human rights.105   
Most of the associations steered clear of criticism of the commune councils or of 
considering engagement with the councils on matters of concern.  The leader of a 
youth association, however, was more inclined to press for their involvement in 
youth affairs.  He explained that it was difficult to get members because they say to 
him “we don’t listen to our parents, why would we listen to you?”  Some were shy, 
and not “brave” enough to join.  Two years ago he said the youth were “good” but 
now they were “not good.”  He asked KAWP to talk to the commune council to 
convene a meeting with the young two or three times a year.  That might help, he 
said, as otherwise youth are “very hard to talk [to].”  Another interjected that it was 
important and talk was good, but she was “afraid of the ones who don’t talk.”106  
Interestingly, it is with the youth that one begins to see a different view of local 
governance and the need for commune councils to engage with particular groups 
within the society.   
What emerges from the associations is that food security for many in the villages is a 
significant issue and people need access to credit to survive.  There is also the risk 
that village cooperatives and banks are abused by some, probably very needy, 
villagers.  The NGOs here see the solution in increasing the people’s experience of 
associations and their management, developing leadership, empowerment and 
participation while advancing the villagers’ political skills and trust to work together 
to improve their lot.  Rather than promoting civil society in terms of confronting and 
making demands on government, they support cooperation with local authorities 
while also trying to encourage officials to trust and respect the people and to carry 
out their duties openly and accountably.  These grass-roots social development 
activities of the NGOs, embedded as they are in the social reality, highlight the 
absence of a politically active civil society with interest groups and associations able 
to propose policies and press governments on specific issues of concern.   
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106  Village meetings. 
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The significance of these associations is that they represent nascent civil society 
activities at the village level.  They bring people together to discuss wide-ranging 
issues and search for solutions within the existing social and political realities.  What 
is also particularly important is that they are not only organised for the poor.  They 
recognise the critical fact that for the poor to benefit, the broader society must 
recognise its responsibility and use the governance mechanisms and resources 
available to advance the condition of all villagers at the same time as providing for 
the special needs of the less well-off.  The associations engage local commune and 
village officials with local interest groups in an open and structured environment.  
What was particularly interesting, nevertheless, was that there were few demands 
being directed to local commune councils or state departments for the resolution of 
particular problems or for better performance and delivery of services.  Privately, 
though, as we have seen, there was widespread criticism of the health and education 
systems in particular, and people were more prepared to demands better government 
services.   
It is not clear what proportion of commune populations participate in such 
associations, but the MOPS study suggests about 30 per cent in the villages they 
studied.107  The associations are, however, important in that they offer an alternative 
to more traditional forms of patronage networks and provide opportunities for 
building trust, open discussion and cooperative action.  They are formed to deal with 
real issues and provide the possibility for political engagement with commune 
councils.  It is the hope of NGOs such as KAWP that they will develop further 
contact across villages and communes to become broad civil society organisations.108   
From a human security perspective, the associations did not suggest a strong 
engagement of the people with local governance.  This left open the question of what 
role the commune council and government did play and how villagers viewed the 
role of officials and their activities as they impacted on the situation of villagers 
generally and of the poor in particular.  More sense of this emerged in private talks, 
suggesting a lack of trust in open discussion and political processes, as well as a 
                                                 
107  Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI), "Moving Out of Poverty," 76-77; John 
Holloway, Chom Sok, and Researchers from Crossroads Consultancies Group, "Follow Up 
Survey on Governance (CMB/01/R72/RILG),"  (Phnom Penh: For the Cambodian Seila 
Task Force, 2005), 18-19. 
108  I am not aware of any studies of associations and the development of civil society in 
Cambodia. 
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view that council members looked after their own first – “… if the commune council 
has money, they use it to help their own families.  The council does not publicise its 
budget, only the key people get the information, not the simple people.”109  This was 
a theme repeated in a number of discussions.  However, the association leaders also 
expressed the view that when they consulted with the commune council on particular 
issues, the councils were usually helpful.  In part at least this was because they were 
conscious of the NGO backing.110 
Governance 
Commune councils have been given responsibility for security and public order; 
social and economic development; and general wellbeing of the citizens.  Village 
heads are also expected to work with the council to meet these objectives. 
It has been shown that there are many issues of public order in the communes, 
including the vexed problems of illegal fishing, land seizures, domestic violence and 
gangs.  I did not pursue the question of public order in interviews.  It was evident in 
relation to law and order, as in the case of illegal fishing, that councils were 
somewhat powerless to control events due largely to the involvement of officials, 
influential people and, often, the police and military.  In this situation the councils 
had no effective backing from the law and the justice system.  There was, however, 
in these cases and in other public order matters, a close engagement with the NGO 
backed associations which supported villagers’ rights and sought council 
involvement in resolution of the issues.  People remained sceptical of councillors’ 
impartiality in cases involving powerful outside parties, but also recognised that the 
council was limited in what it could do in the face of gangs and domestic violence.  
These are widespread problems in Cambodia and it is reported that up to 60 per cent 
of a commune chief’s time may be spent on mediation of disputes even though the 
village chief was more likely to be consulted first, while elders were also important 
mediators ahead of the police.111  The most prominent personal security concerns 
nominated by the people were gangs, while councillors considered land conflicts to 
                                                 
109  Village interviews. 
110  Discussion with NGOs. 
111  Kim Ninh and Roger Henke, "Commune Councils of Cambodia: A National Survey on their 
Functions and Performance, with a Special Focus on Conflict Resolution," (Phnom Penh: 
The Asia Foundation, 2005), 42-57. 
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be the main problem.112  Although dispute settlements made locally are usually 
honoured, there remains an underlying apprehension about the impartiality of 
council mediators.  
There was also concern that opposition political party representatives were regularly 
intimidated and were unable to conduct their normal political activities or participate 
fully in commune council functions.113  Minor party councillors were simply not 
informed of meetings and kept ignorant of council information to which they should 
have had access. 
People interviewed were widely sceptical of the commune councils, saying they only 
looked after their own, had no power over police and military, and were not 
interested in the villagers – especially the poor.  It was telling too that the people felt 
that without the NGOs and Seila they would be left to their own devices.  Some 
interviewees were sceptical of the political affiliations of councillors and considered 
that they put their party interests, or at least policies, ahead of the commune wishes, 
and that party members got preferential treatment.  Two surveys of commune 
councils suggest that party members are favoured while another found that while the 
villagers claimed there was no preference for party members, 30 per cent of 
councillors themselves believed there was bias.114  This indicates that there is a need 
for civil society associations to be alert to local political activities and to be free to 
openly challenge undue preference to party members. 
These are new challenges in a society with strong traditions.  It is evident that the 
role of elders and village heads in dispute resolution in Cambodian society has 
survived the Pol Pot years and the disruption of the Vietnamese and later UNTAC 
periods.115  The survival of aspects of traditional society are also evident in the 
                                                 
112  Ibid., 42; and Biddulph, "Landlessness: A Growing Problem," 13.    
113  Several minority councillors cited cases of intimidation in private discussions. 
114  Biddulph, "Landlessness: A Growing Problem," 24.  See also Kim Ninh and Henke, 
"Commune Councils of Cambodia," 32. 
115  While some have argued the whole fabric of Cambodian village society has been destroyed 
this has been refuted by others.  Among the former see: Judy L Ledgerwood, "Rural 
Development in Cambodia:  The View from the Village," in Cambodia and the International 
Community: The Quest for Peace, Development, and Democracy, ed. Brown and Timberman 
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Asia Society, 1998); Kim Sedara, 
"Reciprocity: Informal Patterns of Social Interactions in a Cambodian Village near Angkor 
Park" (MA, Northern Illinois University, 2001); J Ovesen et al, When Every Household is an 
Island: Social Organisation and Power Structures in Rural Cambodia (Stochholm: Uppsala 
University, 1996); UNESCO, Between a Tiger and a Crocodile: Management of Local 
Conflict in Cambodia - an Anthropological Approach to Traditional and New Practices 
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cooperation that takes place directly between families, relatives and friends when 
certain forms of assistance are required, in ‘community’ activities which take place 
around ceremonial needs such as weddings and funerals where the village may 
provide general assistance, or when people are organised by village heads, commune 
councils, NGOs or other agencies for local development.116  This illustrates the 
changing roles of commune councils, new legal frameworks and new relationships 
of power arising from modernisation which fall outside the traditional framework 
and influence dispute settlement.117  The implications for the more traditional, less 
educated, or less aware villagers is that they may be increasingly unable to depend 
upon the security of the village traditions and become more vulnerable to conflict 
through failure to understand and adapt to the new power sources, and to establish 
patrons connected to them.  Village associations supported by NGOs can play a 
useful role in urging councillors to respect and to protect the people’s rights and to 
find just solutions to disputes.118  
Patron client relations are important since they are, on the one hand an exercise of 
status and power by the patron, while on the other hand they are a source of support 
and security for the client.  They may have positive benefits in the village 
community.119  However, as it is not always the case that the parties can deliver the 
level of service sought by the other, and so the relationships can be quite flexible in 
Cambodia where the parties involved may simply vary their allegiances to meet 
particular circumstances.  Patrons may be drawn from kin, the rich, monks or 
                                                                                                                                          
(UNESCO, 2002); and Pierre Lizée, Peace, Power and Resistance in Cambodia: Global 
Governance and the Failure of Conflict Resolution (London: Macmillan, 1999). 
116  Timothy Hugh Conway, "Poverty, Participation and Programmes: International Aid and 
Rural Development in Cambodia" (PhD Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1999), 253. 
117  Caroline Hughes, "Conflict Management: A Village-Level Approach," Cambodia 
Development Review 5, no. 2 (2001): 8-11.  Kim makes a similar point that “reciprocal 
norms in the village are being transformed, while the influence of the cash economy is 
changing the nature of reciprocity in the village”, Kim Sedara, "Reciprocity: Informal 
Patterns of Social Interactions in a Cambodian Village," Cambodia Development Review 5, 
no. 4 (2001): 5-8.  Also Bottomly notes that “logging has also placed the governance systems 
of some highland villages under stress.  Villager elders, who in Tampuan and Kreung 
villagers have traditionally played a central role in mediating over village conflicts, appear to 
be feeling their increasing exclusion from decision-making processes concerning the logging.  
Bottomley, "Contested Forests," 587-606. 
118  Robin Biddulph, "Study on the Performance of the SEILA Provincial Investment Fund: 
DFID-SIDA Permanent Advisory Team,"  (SPM Consultants; Oxford Policy Management, 
2004), 13-14. 
119  See especially Meas Nee, "Social Reconstruction in the Post-Conflict Situation"; and Meas 
Nee and Joan Healy, Towards Understanding: Cambodian Villages Beyond War (Sydney: 
Sisters of Saint Joseph, 2003). 
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traditional healers and the educated (who are treated with considerable deference by 
Cambodians).  However, other important patrons are those with positions in the 
administration or those who have access to outside funding through association with 
development assistance agencies such as NGOs.120  Patronage also provides a 
mechanism of protection for illegal fishers and land grabbers as well as gang leaders 
who may often be the children of influential persons.  Thus, rather than institutional 
governance processes promoting democratisation and development in accordance 
with donor strategies, patronage networks appear, to some extent, to have infiltrated  
and appropriated them to serve their own purposes of power and wealth 
accumulation.   
Although the councils have development responsibilities, and the Village 
Development Committees are active in meetings to identify priority projects, there 
seemed to be a certain ambivalence towards the planning process and outcomes.  
Village Development Chiefs I met really had little to say about the process or about 
what sort of schemes were being considered.121  Although it was not possible to form 
a view on whether participation and empowerment were being realised from the 
local planning process, people generally considered they had benefited from the 
council projects in the past, although some attribute it to Seila, NGOs or generous 
people rather than to the councils.122  It will be shown in the next chapter that the 
majority of development plans proposed by councils for funding through provincial 
and line department programmes are ignored, leaving very limited sums of money 
for council run projects (around US$10-15,000 per council).  Councillors pointed out 
they could do little with such small sums.  Surveys support these views with the 
interesting observation that while people appreciated the council activities and 
contribute to them, they were less likely to consider their standard of living had 
improved as a result.123 
                                                 
120  See Judy L Ledgerwood and John Vijghen, "Decision-Making in Rural Khmer Villages," in 
Cambodia Emerges from the Past: Eight Essays, ed. Judy L Ledgerwood (Southeast Asia 
Publications, 2002), 109-11.  
121  Biddulph, "Study on the Performance of the SEILA Provincial Investment Fund," 22, 
suggests VDCs only active if they have support of outside agencies. 
122  See also Kim Ninh on participation – 60 per cent knew about meetings, 40 per cent had 
participated at least once.  Kim Ninh and Henke, "Commune Councils of Cambodia," 27-34. 
123  Biddulph, "Study on the Performance of the SEILA Provincial Investment Fund," 22.  He 
also notes that councillors were aware of “discontent” but were frustrated they could do little 
with their small funds.  
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When I put it to one council member that the councils could not meet the demands of 
the people for development and asked whether some problems might be too big for 
the communes to manage and might therefore be taken to a higher levels of 
governance, he quashed any such suggestion saying that the communes had to be 
self sufficient and to find their own solutions.124  There is a sense of unrealistic 
expectation in this attitude which appeared to have more of a party policy ring than a 
governance imperative.  It is reflected, too, in the view of the agriculture department 
that, despite all the inherent obstacles to agriculture in Cambodia, poverty can be 
reduced through improvements in small-scale agriculture and the corresponding 
focus on agricultural training and techniques, rather than infrastructure development. 
In the villages visited there was a positive relationship between the NGOs and the 
councillors on a quite regular basis.  Councillors and Village Chiefs attended several 
of the association meetings and were open to questions – even though responding 
along strictly formal lines in most cases.  The associations are an important nascent 
civil society which will be essential for effective and democratic local government.  
They will also need to broaden their base across communes and on a province wide 
basis at least to become politically effective advocacy groups.   
While the fieldwork focused on the issues confronting people, it was unable to 
undertake a detailed assessment of the function of the commune councils.  
Governance at the village and commune level is strong on process as defined by the 
decentralisation laws, but not yet working with an open and effective civil society 
which is able to countervail the influence of party, powerful persons and the central 
government influences in the commune councils.  As with local governance 
everywhere, there are questions of participation and representation in the creation of 
local policy and the making of decisions affecting service delivery to the community.  
This will be looked at in the next chapter.  The MOPS study discovered a strong 
negative attitude towards governance issues to the extent that people in seven of the 
nine villages were scared to talk about such issues and were afraid of being 
“disappeared” by powerful interests.125  Similar fears – “they had guns” – influenced 
people’s reluctance to claim their rights.126 
                                                 
124  Village interviews 25/3/05.  
125  Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI), "Moving Out of Poverty," 75. 
126  Ibid., 79. 
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Line departments 
To look at these matters in the context of human security however, we need to be 
aware that governance is not only about the commune councils but involves line 
department functions as well.  Councillors seemed fairly reluctant to be in direct 
touch with line agencies or police on a regular basis to press for adequate services.  
This applied even to education and health departments which had initiated 
procedures for representation on school committees and for monitoring local health 
centres respectively.127   
The obscure relationship between provincial authorities and line departments, and 
provincial responsibility for commune councils are both discussed in the next 
chapter.  However, the people’s comments to me on the poor performance of 
government departments were supported and well summarised in a rare public 
meeting between villagers and Provincial Officials in Battambang in April 2005.128  
Opened by the Deputy Provincial Governor on behalf of the Governor, the meeting 
was based around presentations by provincial officials followed by questions from 
the villagers.  Thus, the meeting also provided opportunity for villagers to ask about 
policies and performance in many areas of concern to them including health and 
education, agricultural needs and employment issues, policing and justice.   
Officials were asked about the inadequate services reaching villages, informal 
payments and exclusion from proper health care.  They were defensive and reiterated 
policy statements, noting that delivery of services was not always perfect and all 
were learning.  While the responses of military, police, health, agriculture and 
education officials all reflected a lack of control over the performance of their 
personnel and shortcomings in service delivery, there were no suggestions of 
solutions other than that villagers should know and expect their rights.  The basis for 
poor performance lies in the institutional cultures as well as the poor pay and, 
perhaps in some cases, limited capacity of officials.  One of the more telling 
statements was that by the health official who highlighted the issue of control over 
                                                 
127  Leonardo G Romeo and Luc Spyckerelle, "Decentralisation Reforms and Commune-Level 
Services Delivery in Cambodia" (paper presented at the Workshop on Local Government 
Pro-Poor Service Delivery, Manila, 2003), 13.  See also Biddulph, "Study on the 
Performance of the SEILA Provincial Investment Fund," 20. 
128  The two day conference on 25-6 April 2005 was organised by KAWP for villagers and 
officials to hear from and to question each other.  There were some 220 participants 
including Provincial department representatives, 14 Commune Council representatives and a 
number of NGOs. 
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quality of health services by noting that only a very small proportion of private 
chemist outlets in Battambang township were registered as required by law.  So, he 
warned, there could be no guarantee of either the qualifications of the dispensers or 
the quality of the products they were selling. 
These sessions highlighted the responsibility recognised by government to provide 
services, while at the same time demonstrated the inability of government to 
implement its own policies.  A major excuse commonly claimed for poor 
performance is that the level of salary for public servants is so low as to discourage 
any real commitment to the job.  This failure of government departments to carry out 
their responsibilities has, as shown above, a direct negative impact for human 
security in rural Cambodia.  This issue will be pursued further in the next chapter. 
Freedom, peace and safety 
Freedom, peace and safety are in the end basic conditions which depend on the 
outcome of access to resources, protection of rights, and governance.  If we take 
Sen’s view of development as freedom, then there is a long way to go before rural 
Cambodians can be said to have freedom based on their capability and opportunity to 
shape their own destinies.129    
If peace is defined as freedom from war, then that has been attained in Cambodia, 
though military confrontation ceased only in 1998 with the final laying down of arms 
by the Khmer Rouge.  If peace means freedom from organised conflict, then that too 
appears to have been achieved for the present by Hun Sen’s seizure of power by 
military means in 1997.  Yet, such peace is at best tenuous while political power 
continues to be supported by military interference in national affairs.  The fact that 
the state police and military are seen as a threat to the people’s safety also suggests 
that the peace is fragile and vulnerable to disruption.130  As noted in chapter 2, 
econometric studies also suggest that there is an ongoing risk of Cambodia’s relapse 
into civil disorder and conflict.   
                                                 
129  Sen, Development as Freedom. 
130  The econometric analyses discussed in chapter 2 consistently report the risk of former 
conflict states falling back into conflict.  
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Individual safety is a more personal issue and open to perceptions.  People may feel 
unsafe or be fearful of gangs and crime when in fact statistics suggest otherwise.131  
To some extent, safety depends on the perception also that the relevant authorities, 
such as commune councils and police, are providing a level of protection that makes 
people feel safe.  However, the feeling of safety is not assured in a society where the 
powerful are able to largely ignore the law with impunity and where the threat of 
violence hangs over those who might seek to assert their rights to fishing grounds, or 
protest against land seizures.  There is also a perception that safety is threatened by a 
rise in the incidence of youth gangs, gambling and alcoholism.  Domestic violence is 
also a continuous threat to the safety of many women.  In one survey, 85 per cent of 
respondents indicated that the government was not doing enough to make all citizens 
feel safe and secure.132 
Although freedom, peace and safety can only be assessed in quite general terms in 
this thesis, it is appropriate to conclude on the basis of the information presented in 
this chapter, that freedom is compromised economically, socially and politically.  
While the country is militarily at peace and free of international or civil war, most 
Cambodians are conscious of the risk that this could be broken at any time as 
challenges to authority in Phnom Penh are regularly met with police intimidation and 
violence.  A lack of trust in political process was evident in the villages visited 
where it was a commonly held view that if the Cambodia People’s Party was voted 
out of power, Hun Sen would refuse to leave and would be prepared to use force to 
retain power.   
Overall therefore, Cambodians do not live in freedom, peace and safety but rather in 
a fragile social environment where freedom is denied and where there is 
considerable threat to personal safety and vulnerability to breaches of the peace.  In 
terms of these criteria, human security is not achieved in rural Cambodia.   
                                                 
131  This is discussed in the Human Security Report for example.  Human Security Centre, 
Human Security Report: War and Peace in the 21st Century, 48-54.    
132  Holloway, Chom Sok, and Researchers from Crossroads Consultancies Group, "Follow Up 
Survey." 7 and 35. 
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Conclusion 
It has been demonstrated that for many people in rural Cambodia the conditions of 
human security are not met.  While people live in basic peace and safety, their 
freedoms are curtailed, as are many of their fundamental rights.  Access to the 
resources necessary for day-to-day existence and to secure future needs also eludes 
many villagers despite their best efforts, and there is limited participation in 
governance.   
The most significant point to emerge from my field research is that, despite the 
considerable individual effort made by rural Cambodians, these are not adequately 
supported by the government.  Thus, to achieve human security, the people need the 
support that comes from improved infrastructure, agricultural extensions services, 
industry and employment policies as well as from the protection of rights and from 
effective justice, health and education facilities.  I have identified the poor 
performance of local government and line-departments as major factors in the 
persistent human insecurity which exists in rural Cambodia.  It is also evident that 
commune councils can make only minimal improvements in human security on their 
own and that they require the commitment and support of line departments. 
A second and related issue that arises from the chapter is that there is no effective 
political process for rural Cambodians to put their demands to the government and 
provincial authorities.  Thus, human security matters are not raised in public political 
debate, nor are they prioritised for policy responses.  In part, this is due to the nature 
of society and its traditions, as well as to politics and the institutions and processes 
of governance.  In the absence of effective civil society organizations, people depend 
largely on international NGOs to raise rural concerns directly with political parties or 
ministries.  
The next chapter will explore issues of politics and governance further.  It will 
question some of the basic assumptions of state building and nation building that lie 
behind the international approach to development and security and their applicability 
within Cambodian society.  Also, it will show that a human security approach 
demands a different emphasis in relation to leadership and institution building, for 
expanding opportunities and improving the delivery of services to rural Cambodians.   
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CHAPTER 5 
GOVERNANCE AND HUMAN SECURITY    
Governance: the action or manner of governing.1 
Governance is the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s 
social and economic resources for development2  
Good governance is effective, participatory, transparent, accountable and equitable and 
promotes the rule of law.  Governance is led by the state, but transcends it by collaborating 
with the private sector and civil society.  All three are critical for sustaining human 
development.  The state creates a conducive political, economic and legal environment.  
The private sector generates jobs and income, and civil society facilitates political and 
social interaction and mobilises groups to participate in economic, social and political 
activities.3 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the governance framework and processes which 
impinge on human security in rural Cambodia.  However, governance has various 
meanings as the quotations above indicate, and may take many possible forms 
depending on a country’s social and political systems and its national development 
objectives.  Therefore, the concept is discussed in the following section to more 
closely define its meaning for analytical purposes and to situate the concept of “good 
governance” within its broader conceptual framework.  This is followed by a section 
which shows how Cambodia is linked into a system of local, national and 
international governance institutions and processes, which influence Cambodia’s 
rural development and, hence, the human security of people in the countryside. 
The development of Cambodia’s governance framework and the manner in which it 
functions cannot be separated from Cambodia’s historical context.  The concepts of 
state building and nation building, the participation of the population and the 
distribution of national resources are used to outline the dynamic processes of 
change in Cambodia’s governance systems as it has responded to outside influences 
and internal tensions.  This highlights social and cultural factors which have in the 
                                                 
1  The Concise Oxford Dictionary, Sixth Edition 1976. 
2  This is a standard definition widely used by major development agencies such as the World 
Bank and Asian Development Bank. 
3  Statement of the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan quoted in Laura Zanotti, 
"Governmentalizing the Post-Cold War International Regime: The UN Debate on 
Democratisation and Good Governance," Alternatives 30, no. 4 (2005): 471-72.  
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past tempered the acceptance and functioning of introduced methods of governing in 
Cambodian society and continue to influence contemporary developments. 
This theme is used to explore the relationship between human security and 
governance at the local level.  In particular, the joint lenses of participation and 
empowerment are used to show that the lack of cohesion between local government 
and line departments in Cambodia is especially detrimental to the achievement of 
human security.  A further analysis of line departments in terms of public sector 
corporate governance highlights the influence of past practices on Cambodian 
governance processes.   
The chapter argues that although state building in Cambodia under international 
influence has put in place a framework of democratic institutions and “good 
governance,” this has not been matched by nation building which requires the 
acceptance and legitimisation of the institutions in terms of society and culture.  I 
argue that political leadership is essential both to reform the culture of governance in 
Cambodian institutions, and to encourage the social and cultural change that is also 
necessary to generate confidence and trust in them.  To support such nation building, 
I contend that international, national and local governance need to work towards a 
common purpose, and that human security provides a sound basis for the 
harmonisation of their policies, programmes and practices.     
Governance 
Governance is a useful term primarily because, although it describes a process of 
governing, it is not necessarily associated with the government of a state, or of its 
institution.  Thus, the way in which global trade is managed or governed by the 
WTO, represents a process of “governance without government.”4   
There are many approaches and theories associated with the processes of 
governance.5  At a national level, governance theory has a strong ideological 
                                                 
4  R.A.W Rhodes, Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and 
Accountability (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997), 18. 
5  Jon Pierre and B Guy Peters, Governance, Politics and the State, ed. B Guy Peters, Jon 
Pierre, and Gerry Stoker, Political Analysis (London: Macmillan Press, 2000), 37-47.  They 
identify approaches to the study of governance through the traditional authority of the state; 
self-organising networks and the decreasing power of government; cybernetics and steering 
in which institutions respond to maintain a stable state; the use of policy instruments such as 
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association with Western forms of liberal democracy and economic rationalism.  In 
this context, it adopts the liberal philosophy of small government and the central role 
of a free market economy.  Hence, it is closely associated with the winding back of 
the welfare state, decentralisation of authority, the expansion of the role of the 
private sector and civil society in public service delivery, and economic 
globalisation—all of which demand new ways of managing state functions.  As well 
as appearing to dilute state power, these governance approaches may also change the 
processes of democratic government itself.  Thus, the concept of governance 
suggests a shift in power from the state downwards to local organizations; outwards 
to non-state actors; and upwards to international organizations.6   
A shift in power upwards occurs when states accept binding regulatory and 
compliance regimes through membership of global governance organisations.  There 
are many such international organisations governing matters such as international 
security, the regulation of trade and corporate behaviour, and a host of international 
and regional arrangements for the management of issues such as post and 
telecommunications, environmental protection and preventing the spread of disease.  
These organisations are considered to represent forms of global governance and, for 
some commentators, represent a weakening of state power.7  The shift of power 
                                                                                                                                          
tax as tools to govern by steering society; institutional analysis an how they establish norms 
and promote or resist change; rational choice institutional analysis; networks and policy 
communities (new governance) which function in relation with government or 
independently.   
 Rhodes, for example, identifies approaches to governance as Minimal State which 
“embodies the ideological and political call for downsising the state”; as Corporate 
Governance which “focuses our attention on the policy making, goal setting role of 
government and sets the requirements for transparency and public accountability”; as New 
Public Management (NPM) it projects the “…notion of government directing or ‘steering’ 
action by structuring the market, which takes over the actual service provision or the 
‘rowing’ function of government”; as Good Governance it is “… advanced by the World 
Bank [which] marries new public management to the advocacy of liberal democracy”; as a 
Socio-cybernetic System based on “… interactions among government, social, political and 
economic actors wherein no one actor has a monopoly over information or experience”; and 
finally  as Self-organising Networks “… in which private, non-profit, and public individuals 
and organizations interact to provide public services.”  R.A.W Rhodes, "The New 
Governance:  Governing without Government," Political Studies 44, no. 4 (1996): 652-67; 
and Rhodes, Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and 
Accountability, 47-52. 
6  Pierre and Peters, Governance, Politics and the State, 83-87; Craig and Porter, Development 
Beyond Neoliberalism? Governance, Poverty Reduction and Political Economy, 17; and 
Rhodes, Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and 
Accountability, 17. 
7  Power here being the authority and control over certain domestic matters which is 
voluntarily passed to international non-state institutions.  Membership of the European 
Union involves a particularly significant form of such power transfer.  
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downwards is represented by domestic policies of decentralisation of state powers to 
regional and local bodies and, in particular, to communities through their 
relationship with state institutions and public service delivery.  The third aspect of 
the power shift is outwards to the private sector and non-governmental organisation, 
which are increasingly engaged in the delivery of public sector services on behalf of 
governments.  Although these are represented as shifts in power, national 
governments still play a central role in deciding whether to participate in the 
arrangements and in setting or “steering” the political and economic environment to 
facilitate the adoption of the new governance approaches.  To the extent that 
governance implies a greater political engagement with non-state actors and the 
public, the role for governments in reconciling demands and determining policy 
responses which are accepted as legitimate by society (democratic or authoritarian) 
becomes more significant.  In particular, different societies may arrive at different 
governance solutions depending on societal and cultural factors.8   
The World Bank has focused its attention on “good governance” as part of its neo-
liberal reform agenda, emphasising the need for “… efficiency in public service, rule 
of law with regard to contracts, an effective judiciary sector, respect for human 
rights, a free press, and pluralistic institutional structure.”9  These outcomes are to be 
achieved by classic economic rationalist reforms including “marketisation of public 
services, reduction of public sector overstaffing, budgetary discipline, administrative 
decentralisation, and NGO participation.”10  The early UN approach to governance 
was similar to that of the World Bank but, to avoid being seen to promote 
democratisation and normative approaches, it promoted “good governance” as a “… 
series of techniques for optimising institutional arrangements.”11   
The late 1990s brought greater freedom for the UN and the World Bank to engage 
openly in the promotion of democracy, and by 2000 the UN Millennium Declaration 
proclaimed that the UN would “spare no effort to promote democracy.”12 The 
following year the UN encouraged the “the expansion of political space in order to 
                                                 
8  Pierre and Peters, Governance, Politics and the State, 163-92.  Pierre and Peters discuss 
different models of governance in several developed countries. 
9  Zanotti, "Governmentalizing the Post-Cold War International Regime," 468. 
10  Ibid. 
11  Ibid.: 469-70.  Zanotti traces the UN debate from the early 1990s on good governance  and 
its relations to its expanding involvement in democratisation and state building.    
12  UN General Assembly, "United Nations Millennium Declaration," (A/RES/55/2, 18 
September 2000). 
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guarantee the full exercise of the political, economic, social and cultural rights.” and 
noted that there was “no single prescribed form” of democracy.  Instead, it argued, 
democracy must reflect the “culture, history, and political experience of its 
citizens.”13  The Secretary General’s plan for implementation of the UN Millennium 
Declaration was essentially a restatement and consolidation of existing goals and 
strategies, but introduced a set of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to focus 
national attention.  It expressed the need for political will and asserted that 
democratisation demanded “good governance, which in turn depended on inclusive 
participation, accountability and the promotion of the rule of law.”14  Although the 
Secretary General’s reports and goals referred to the role of politics and culture in 
development, these aspects were not pursued further in subsequent documents.15  
Instead, the focus of attention shifted to administrative institutions and, in particular, 
“democratic governance” (or “good governance”) which it considered was essential 
for achieving the MDGs.16 Thus, the Secretary General warned that while 
governance was important to achieving peace and security, it went beyond political 
processes to include economic and administrative systems.17   
These are all important, but in fact it has been the political governance – or 
government itself – which has been neglected in Cambodia, as elsewhere, especially 
in the decentralization process.  During his brief period as head of the World Bank, 
Paul Wolfowitz appeared to recognise the importance of politics and government for 
governance when he argued that corruption “… undermines the ability of the 
government to function properly,” and that people wanted governments that 
delivered on promises.  He added that in the development community, “good 
                                                 
13  UN General Assembly, "Support by the United Nations System of the Efforts of 
Governments to Promote and Consolidate New or Restored Democracies: Report of the 
Secretary-General," (A/56/499, 23 October 2001), para. 7, 26; and Zanotti, 
"Governmentalizing the Post-Cold War International Regime," 474.  The Millennium 
Development Goals also make a specific association between security and development.  
Violent conflict is identified as arising from “social injustice and the failure of governance 
institutions and public administration systems.”    
14  UN General Assembly, "Road Map towards the Implementation of the United Nations 
Millennium Declaration: Report of the Secretary General," (A/56/326, 8 September 2001), 
para. 7, 218. 
15  Zanotti, "Governmentalizing the Post-Cold War International Regime," 476-77. 
16  UN General Assembly, "The Role of Public Administration in the Implementation of the 
United Nations Millennium Declaration: Report of the Secretary General," (A/57/262, 16 
August 2002); and UN General Assembly, "Public Administration and Development: Report 
of the Secretary General,"  (A/60/114, 12 July 2005). 
17  UN General Assembly, "The Role of Public Administration in the Implementation of the 
United Nations Millennium Declaration: Report of the Secretary General," para. 5. 
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governance” is the name given to “what helps governments function effectively and 
achieve economic progress.”  Here, at least, the central and essential role of 
government is recognised even as the liberal agenda is assumed to reduce the role of 
government by adopting a standard “good governance” approach.   
There are many studies of the processes of governance in developed countries where 
individuals, civil society groups, local governments and the private sector all become 
significant actors in decisions concerning the devolution of responsibilities to non-
state actors for the delivery of services on behalf of the state.  An early outstanding 
example is Barbara Cruikshank’s study of empowerment and participation as applied 
in the US Government Community Action Programmes (CAPs) in the 1960s to 
address poverty and to reduce the cost of large bureaucratically run government 
welfare programmes.18  Not only does it provide an a example of a governance 
approach, but also an analysis of that approach in terms of Foucault’s concept of 
power based on the idea of the state knowing and identifying groups, such as the 
poor, engaging them through individual participation and empowerment activities so 
as to enable them to choose gainful employment and escape from poverty.  A similar 
approach is basic to the contemporary development wisdom, which promotes 
participation and empowerment as the means of changing individual behaviour to 
realise poverty reduction objectives.    
The CAP programmes were introduced in the US also because of liberal concerns 
that welfare was leading to dependency on the state and creating a ‘culture of 
poverty’ among certain defined groups.  It represented a new approach designed to 
break the individual dependency on welfare and to assist the individual to find a way 
out of the so-called culture of poverty.  As such, participation by the poor was 
intended to guide the government in designing and providing programmes which the 
poor themselves wanted and in which they would freely take part.  It was anticipated 
the participatory process would empower individuals by offering training and 
follow-up opportunities to access employment (or income support) which would 
help them to break out of a cycle of poverty and to become fully active citizens in 
the economy and society.   
                                                 
18  Barbara Cruikshank, "The Will to Empower: Technologies of Citizenship and the War on 
Poverty," Socialist Review 23, no. 4 (1994): 29-55. 
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More recent manifestations of the liberal governance approach based on individual 
freedom include the Thatcher reforms in the UK.  These also sought to downsize 
government bureaucracies by replacing their welfare programmes with a range of 
optional services provided by the private sector under government contracts.  
Individuals were then free to exercise (rational) choice to select from the market 
place the assistance options which most suited their needs.  This was considered to 
involve the participation and empowerment of the individual.  The challenge to the 
individual was characterised by the view that “if you require guidance and training in 
the practice of freedom you must first practice your freedom as a consumer of 
employment [or other services] to gain access to such guidance and training.”19   
Studies of governance and “democratic spaces” in public administration reveal how 
participation and empowerment are significant elements in the processes of 
decentralised governance in developed countries.  Nevertheless, questions still 
emerge, as in the USA case 40 years before, as to who is really exercising power and 
whether key civil society leaders engaged in local activities are genuine 
representatives of a constituency or merely representing themselves.20  The art of 
governance is thus an intensely political process in modern democracies.  To 
maintain legitimacy, public cooperation and acceptance of their objectives, 
governments must respect and balance not only individual freedoms but also the 
demands of communities, organised groups and the population as a whole.   
A number of studies in developing countries also identify tensions which emerge 
around issues of leadership and representation, and the nature of engagement with 
governance institutions.21  Similar problems emerge in local government in 
Cambodia where the same principles of decentralisation, empowerment and 
participatory governance are promoted by international development agencies and 
the government itself.  The commune councils have been given responsibilities in 
relation to law and order, preparing and approving village and commune 
development plans; preparing council budgets; establishing commune rules and 
                                                 
19  Mitchell Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society (London: Sage 
Publications, 1999), 161. 
20  Andrea Cornwall, "Introduction: New Democratic Spaces? The Politics and Dynamics of 
Institutionalised Participation," IDS Bulletin 35, no. 2 (2004): 3-6. 
21  See for example ibid.  This paper summarises studies from seven countries, developed and 
developing.  
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regulations; and imposing local taxes and service charges.22  To the extent these 
responsibilities and, in particular, the processes involved are designed by 
international development actors, they are intended to use processes of governance 
to infuse new social and economic norms and to incorporate people within a global 
neo-liberal governance orthodoxy.23   
The political and social aspects of the way governance operates at the commune 
council level in Cambodia have been largely overlooked.  Attention has instead 
focused more directly on “good governance” as a technical means for promoting 
democracy and setting in place the processes and regulations considered by donors 
to be necessary for economic development and poverty alleviation.  Politics and its 
role in local as well as national government decision-making continues to be de-
linked from governance (or at least government is reduced to a minor technical role 
of regulatory agent).  Issues, such as market regulation, land law and local 
government policies, which might otherwise be part of open political debate, are 
instead determined largely according to internationally defined (and universalising) 
policies and practices.  These policies and practices are supported by international 
NGOs which, while emphasising humanitarian concerns, are committed to the same 
development orthodoxies and principles of participation and empowerment as those 
promoted by the World Bank, UNDP and other agencies.24  However, their 
prescriptions ignore the actual culture of governance in Cambodia, which is heavily 
politicised, incorporates networks of patronage, and sees rent taking as a right.  In 
Cambodia, this means the government can appear to accept the donor inspired 
principles and practices of “good governance” by moving, however slowly, to enact 
laws and regulations which, in the end, it has neither the intention nor the political 
will to implement.  
Governance, however, endures whether good or not and continues to impact on the 
lives of ordinary people.  The next section examines the governance framework in 
practice in Cambodia as it relates to the rural people and their human security.  The 
                                                 
22  Royal Government of Cambodia, "The Law on Khum/Sangkat Administrative 
Management."  Note that I have taken out reference to the municipal elements and sangkat 
as I am dealing with rural Cambodia in this thesis. 
23  Andrea Cornwall and Karen Brock, "What do Buzzwords do for Development Policy? A 
Critical Look at "Participation", "Empowerment" and "Poverty Reduction"," Third World 
Quarterly 26, no. 7 (2005): 1043-60. 
24  Craig and Porter, Development Beyond Neoliberalism? Governance, Poverty Reduction and 
Political Economy, 64-89; and Cornwall and Brock, "What do Buzzwords do," 1045-48. 
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commune councils are of particular interest in the framework as it is largely through 
them that international donors hope that, somewhere in the future, decentralization, 
the promotion of civil society through participation and empowerment and the 
principles of “good governance” will result in a free and open political system and 
effective democracy in Cambodia.   
Cambodia in an international – national – local governance 
framework 
The governance framework depicted in Figure 5-1 below can be considered in terms 
of three interlocking processes.  First, local governance is based on the commune 
councils which, subject to their place within the Ministry of Interior, have 
decentralised responsibilities to engage with their rural constituency in the 
democratic formulation of policies for the welfare, or human security, of their 
constituents.  Commune councils are also empowered to establish local bodies with 
paid workers or officials to deliver certain services to the commune or to particular 
groups within it.25  In addition, they are entitled to establish local revenue collection 
systems, subject to specific conditions.  Local governance is also closely associated 
with the people and civil society and private sector organizations.   
Participatory approaches to council affairs and “good governance” principles are 
built into the legislative and regulatory frameworks in the form of mandatory 
processes which must be followed in matters such as development planning, private 
sector contracting and financial management.26  This assumes that participation and 
“good governance” can be achieved through tightly defined administrative 
processes.  However, this is somewhat contrary to the experience in developed 
countries, such as Australia, where public sector governance reforms reduced 
reliance on mandated procedures.  Instead, greater attention was given to the culture 
of organisations and the responsibility of officers to make appropriate management 
decisions rather than simply follow procedures.  This will be discussed below. 
                                                 
25  Description of some services which have been developed such as sanitation and road 
maintenance are referred to in Cristina Mansfield and Kurt MacLeod, "Commune Councils 
and Civil Society: Promoting Decentralisation through Partnerships," (Phnom Penh: Pact 
Cambodia, 2004). 
26  Royal Government of Cambodia, "The Law on Khum/Sangkat Administrative 
Management."; Royal Government of Cambodia, "Inter-Ministerial Prakas on 
Commune/Sangkat Development Planning." 
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The second governance process has its origins in the international sphere.  In this 
context, international development organisations with global agendas conduct their 
activities in direct contact with what may be called their constituents (or clients).  
While these organizations are grouped together in Figure 5-1 under “donors”, they 
represent a mix of types including the WTO, World Bank, UNDP and other UN 
agencies, official bilateral donor countries and international NGOs.  All have 
governing arrangements whereby their primary policy objectives, such as a common 
commitment to promoting human rights, “good governance” and poverty reduction, 
as well as neo-liberal economic reforms, are formulated in consultation with their 
own constituencies outside Cambodia.27  They each promote, with varying degrees 
of forcefulness, their own programmes within Cambodia – directly with the 
government, within state institutions and with civil society and the private sector.  
These agencies comprise forms of international governance and are able to have 
their policies and programmes adopted by the Cambodian governments.  They also 
have the capacity to project policies and programmes directly to the population of 
Cambodia through their support for decentralisation and for the many local NGOs 
which promote international development approaches and undertake advocacy, as 
they see it, on behalf of the people.  While this would appear to support the 
commonly held view that international governance reduces the power of the state, it 
must be recognised that while the Cambodian government largely accepts 
international development approaches, it retains a firm political control over the 
country and its decentralised administration.  
Interlocking with the international and local governance processes are the 
institutions of national governance.  The key national institutions in this third 
process are the government, which makes policy decisions for the nation, the 
ministries which manage and implement government policies and programmes, other 
institutions of state, such as the commune councils and, finally the private sector and 
civil society.  Here, a very different picture of governance emerges from that 
promoted internationally as “good governance.”   
                                                 
27  The major critique of global governance institutions is that they are undemocratic and 
represent the interests of already wealthy and powerful states when they assert an 
international consensus on matters such as good governance, democracy, participation, 
human rights and development.   
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Figure 5-1 Governance framework: international – national – local 
Democracy is tenuous, human rights not respected, law and order compromised, 
corruption and nepotism abound and the government’s commitment to “good 
governance” is illusory.  While the blame is regularly attributed to the Cambodians 
and internal factors, the nature of international development assistance must not 
escape attention.  Development assistance has led to “capacity destruction” within 
state institutions as a result of aid projects delivering services rather than working 
within and improving the capacity of national institutions to do so.28   
That approach is prominent in Cambodia, where donors have supported discrete 
projects within ministries but managed separately from the mainstream ministry 
bureaucratic processes to shield them from perceived poor governance and 
corruption.  This highlights the complexity of governance within Cambodia where 
the combined international and domestic approaches—the latter with its roots firmly 
in Cambodia’s society and past history—produce uncertain outcomes in service 
delivery to rural Cambodia.  Thus, the international donors also attempt to use a 
decentralisation approach to reach the rural population and to engineer social change 
                                                 
28  Francis Fukuyama, State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First 
Century (London: Profile Books, 2005), 55. 
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by engaging the people in specific regulated processes associated with democracy 
and “good governance.”  There is an expectation that these processes and associated 
training will lead to the embedding of new concepts and values as well as 
empowering people to participate, not only in local commune council governance, 
but also in national democratic governance.29   
That the political processes in Cambodia are not democratic is due in part to the 
nature of Cambodian government, but also in part to the dominant policy role played 
by the major international institutions.  Using their vast capacity for defining and 
“knowing” the populations of developing countries in statistical terms, the donors 
are able to determine what they perceive as a country’s development needs, 
influence government policy and pressure countries to adopt “universal” solutions 
without reference to domestic political debate.  While attempting to “embed” norms, 
however, the process simply bypasses the Cambodian population politically since 
they have no opportunity to access the information and analysis, or to debate the 
policy proposals and their social impact.30  This becomes even more evident in 
considering the operation of Cambodian government line departments, and the level 
of centralised control over their provincial functions. 
The line departments do not operate unencumbered to the local level.  Instead there 
is a small Provincial administration in the form of Executive Committees and 
Provincial Rural Development Committees (PRDC) which are intended to 
coordinate the line department functions within the provinces.  The line departments 
are formally structured within the central ministries, although funding is transferred 
to the provincial line department offices through the provincial finance department.  
Most line departments also have district offices within the provinces.  Overall, the 
linkage between the different levels is not straight forward, a fact that is highlighted 
by national and donor discussions on proposed deconcentration reforms.  These 
propose to devolve line department responsibility to the provincial authorities and to 
give the provincial governors greater autonomy (as well as subjecting them, in 
theory at least, to greater public scrutiny).31  
                                                 
29  Zanotti, "Governmentalizing the Post-Cold War International Regime," 471.   
30  This reflects the process of the “anti-politics machine” discussed by Ferguson.  See James 
Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development," Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic 
Power in Lesotho (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994). 
31  See for example UNDP Cambodia, "US$34.8 Million to Support Cambodian 
Decentralisation and Deconcentration Reforms," Newsletter, no. 15 (2007).  The Konrad 
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Provincial governors are currently appointed by the Prime Minister and, attesting the 
mutual suspicions and potential political and material benefits to be had, a deputy 
from an alternative political party is also appointed by the Prime Minister.32  The 
governor’s position is organisationally located under the Ministry of Interior—as too 
are the commune councils.  The provincial governor also has direct responsibility for 
the police and military within the province, adding to the complex relations of 
power.  Currently there is no open and effective mechanism for the people and civil 
society to put policy proposals, political concerns and social and economic demands 
to provincial governing authorities. 
Despite significant international involvement, government plans to produce new 
organic law for deconcentration have been put off until after the 2008 national 
election.  The deconcentration debate has, however, raised significant issues 
concerning the nature of the governorship and whether it should be an appointed or 
elected position, the extent of political freedom to be given to the provinces and their 
role in policy and strategic control over provincial development, the processes for 
civil society inputs, and provincial budgetary allocations and controls.  Much of the 
debate concerns the future levels of power (particularly budgetary control) to be 
exercised by politicians and senior civil servants at central and provincial levels.  It 
also concerns the basis for determining priorities and allocating resources to national 
versus provincial programmes and projects. 
Currently, the confused state of governance inherent in the administrative 
arrangements, as well as the lack of resources and financial control at provincial 
level, severely limit the ability of provincial governors to develop and implement 
policies and programmes designed specifically to address infrastructure needs and to 
promote agricultural development, create new industries and trade and tourism 
opportunities.  In the case of Battambang, for example, the province has been unable 
to develop significant long-term plans and projections for employment creation, 
especially to meet the needs of the young educated and computer literate who flock 
                                                                                                                                          
Adenauer Foundation organised a major seminar for the Inter-Ministerial Committee for the 
Drafting of the Organic Laws.  See Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, "Decentralisation and 
Deconcentration in Cambodia," Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Cambodia Office, 
www.kas.de/proj/home/events/2/year-2006/month-6/veranstaltung_id20950/index.html 
accessed on 7 November 2007. 
32  This may change now that the CPP has a clear government majority following the 2008 
national election. 
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to the towns for employment.33  The Battambang Plans are not documents to guide 
investment and the development of the province and its people into the future.  Nor 
has a decade of international aid and development assistance focused on regional 
economic development and local needs.  At the same time, the international 
emphasis on “good governance” principles and practices has achieved little for the 
human security of Cambodia’s rural population. 
Governance and its links to Cambodian culture and history 
To understand governance and the ability of a country to achieve “good governance” 
in the delivery of services to rural people, it is necessary to consider the nature of 
domestic governance and how it came into being.  In the process of political and 
social change, many social and cultural values and processes existing under one 
regime may carry over into the new system.  Thus, family ties, patronage and the old 
school tie; religious or ethnic affiliation; locality or other sources of bonding, may 
survive in new forms.  This means that culture and history are important factors in 
state development in terms of its structure, political institutions and organisation; in 
the process of nation building and the development of popular identification with the 
state and its legitimisation by the people; how the population can participate in 
government; and how resources are distributed among the population.34  
The following sections consider, in turn, the processes of state building in Cambodia 
and the institutions directly engaging the population; nation building in terms of 
culture and legitimisation of the state processes; and, finally, participation and 
distribution in relation to the institutional processes. 
State building 
In principle, the state of Cambodia and its institutions achieved their current form as 
a result of the adoption of the constitution following the UNTAC supervised 
elections in 1993.  Apart from its introduction of representative democracy, the 
separation of powers and a free market economy, the constitution and new 
                                                 
33  Kingdom of Cambodia, "Battambang Provincial Development Plan 1999-2000," 
(Battambang: Provincial Department of Planning, 1998). 
34  See for example Gabriel A Almond and G Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics:  A 
Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), 34-41. 
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government left in place the administrative arrangements from the previous regime.  
These included a system of local government, provincial governors and line-
department structure, largely consistent with previous regimes.  The detailed form 
and functioning of these institutions were, however, subject to ongoing change as 
reforms were introduced to meet international demands and to improve their 
effectiveness.  Appendix C illustrates the administrative arrangements for local 
government in the different periods of Cambodian state building.  
Records suggest that from about the seventh century, a form of bureaucratic control 
was developed, replacing or absorbing the roles of hereditary princes.35  By the 
eleventh century, it has been claimed, that bureaucratic power “… rivalled or even 
surpassed the power of the king.”36  This state development was accompanied by an 
urbanization of the population in the region of Angkor involving the “herding” of 
people into administered areas and the “destruction” of the traditional Cambodian 
village.37  The granting of titles by king and dedication of religious foundations to 
central control were, as described in Appendix A, important factors in reorganising 
and consolidating state control.  This bureaucratic form of state in Cambodia reached 
its peak in the Angkor period with the comprehensive organization of rice 
production and release of wealth and human resources for the construction of cities, 
hydraulic systems and religious monuments.   
Little is known of local institutions other than references to district heads and a range 
of inspectors and village officials under the district head, some of whom represented 
the king’s interest in the territory.38  Districts had their own courts of justice which, 
                                                 
35  Michael Vickery, Society, Economics, and Politics in Pre-Angkor Cambodia (Tokyo: The 
Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies for UNESCO, the Toyo Bunko, 1998), 367-68 and 
390-91.  The 8th century was also a period of architectural and artistic development which 
suggests growth and consolidation of central power.  On titles see Vickery, Society, 
Economics, and Politics in Pre-Angkor Cambodia, 300-4.  See also Sachchidanand Sahai, 
"Les Institutions Politiques et L'Organisation Administrative du Cambodge Ancien (VI-XIII 
Siècles)," Publications de Lécole Française d'Extrême-Orient LXXV (1970): 72-3. 
36  David Chandler, A History of Cambodia, Second ed. (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1993), 
43. 
37  Ibid.; Sahai, "Les Institutions Politiques," 28; George Coedès, The Making of South East 
Asia, trans. H M Wright (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), 100; and Vickery, 
Society, Economics, and Politics in Pre-Angkor Cambodia, 312. 
38  The administrative units referred to in the pre-Angkor period were roughly “city”, “district” 
and “village”, though the last could apparently be similar to the first.  Vickery, Society, 
ßEconomics, and Politics in Pre-Angkor Cambodia, 327-28.  
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as well as administering regulations, controlled land transactions and boundaries.39  
There is mention of village chiefs but it is not clear whether they were popular 
representatives or simply government agents.  The role of respected elders in the 
villages was also considered to be important.40    
Although, following the move from Angkor, the institutions for producing an 
agricultural surplus for religious and public works so important to Angkor had in 
large part become redundant, the king continued to be at the centre of a an extensive 
entourage of princes and appointed ministers and major officials.41  The 
“administrative puzzle,” as Forest called the pre-colonial governance arrangement, 
had two main lines of authority.  One was through a number of ministers such as the 
prime minister and ministers of the palace, justice, navy and war.  These in turn 
appointed support staff and officials to whom they delegated responsibilities.   
A second line of authority was based on partition of the country administratively into 
“apanages”, domains, and provinces.42  The king, his mother, the crown prince and 
other high royal persons held domains and, in turn, nominated provincial governors 
for appointment by the king.43  
Governors were perhaps the main administrators in terms of ensuring peasant 
compliance with royal decrees.  They appointed deputies as well as judges and other 
officials responsible for districts delineated by the governor (as many as he chose) 
                                                 
39  Sahai, "Les Institutions Politiques," 80.  The ‘justice’ system was apparently comprehensive 
and had system of procedures, specified crimes and corresponding penalties, but relied on 
trial by ordeal.  For details of justice see ibid., 88-110. 
40  Ibid., 83-4. 
41  Alain Forest, Le Cambodge et la Colonisation Française: Histoire d'une Colonisation sans 
Heurts (1897-1920) (Paris: Éditions L'Harmattan, 1980), 17-33.  The king, he says, was 
surrounded by up to 7,000 persons including functionaries, princes, slaves and women (with 
the abolition of slavery under the French, some 3-4,000 were still employed by the king in 
Phnom Penh).   
42  Ibid.  An “apanage” is literally a “privilege.”  It is a vague term and is suggestive of a titled 
position with no direct responsibilities (though probably authority to extract some benefit).  
Tully refers to the apanages as “fiefs” presided over by high ranking members of the royal 
family who levied taxes on such things as crops, livestock, fruit trees, implements of farming 
and fishing.  John Tully, France on the Mekong: A History of the Protectorate in Cambodia 
(Lanham: University Press of America, 2002), 36-8.  Sahai also refers to the Angkorian 
administration being divided in four categories but says there is no basis for equating them 
with the apanages.  Sahai, "Les Institutions Politiques," 47. 
43  Forest, Le Cambodge et la Colonisation, 18-9; and Sahai, "Les Institutions Politiques."  The 
king administered 49 provinces grouped in 6 domains, while the obbareach (the prince 
nominated to succeed the king) held in “apanage” a domain of 5 provinces and the queen 
mother a domain of 3 provinces.  The king allocated some of his provinces to his ministers – 
9 each to the prime minister and minister of the Palace; and 6 each to the ministers for justice 
and war.  Their provinces were not necessarily contiguous. 
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and for which he sold the title to the highest bidder.  The governor also appointed 
village heads who in turn appointed two assistants.  Governors were required to act 
as judges; supervise tax collection; organise corvée and arrange transport as required 
by the king.  They were independent, so long as they submitted to the king and 
forwarded adequate finances.  At the same time, it seems, ministers also appointed 
officials to the provinces to look after their separate functional interests.44   
The sale of titles and positions and rent taking at all levels of the administrative 
pyramid were the norm.  Unsalaried officials drew sustenance from a vast network 
of lesser officials who collected taxes from the villagers, administered corvée, 
recruited for military and other service, and maintained some form of local justice 
and security.  The relationships between the various functionaries seems to have 
depended on power and association rather than any allocation of responsibilities and 
hierarchy within a bureaucratic structure and, with a certain resonance in more recent 
bureaucratic practices, the more positions that could be generated, the more wealth 
could be accumulated at the top.45  This system was dominated by the “rapacious 
self-interest of the rulers,” which “stunted private enterprise” and in contrast to the 
Angkor period, produced virtually no public works.46  Governance was little more 
than a means for the extraction of wealth from the peasants, whose extreme poverty 
and oppression was noted by travellers and colonial officials alike.  Figure 5-2 shows 
the general steps in the extraction of taxes which roughly accords with the 
administrative system outlined above.  
   
                                                 
44  Forest, Le Cambodge et la Colonisation, 24.  For example, the minister for justice appointed 
representatives to each province to extract 1/3 of the proceeds from the justice process.  
Forest also refers to a high functionary responsible for agriculture who similarly extracted 
1/3 in relation to property cases.  The king also placed officials who extracted 1/3 of all 
fines.  Similarly, the kings men determined the taxes for each village and advised the 
governor the the amount of total tax to be collected from each village in his charge.  This 
was collected as the governor determined 
45  When the King Ang Duong tried to simplify the organization, one super-governor was 
involved in organising an insurrection.  Ibid., 19.  
46  Tully, France on the Mekong, 35, 59-60, 67.  The Vietnamese had similar perceptions: 
“Cambodian officials only know how to bribe and be bribed. … offices are sold; nobody 
carries out orders; everyone works for his own account” was general Giang’s exasperated 
conclusion!  Quoted in Chandler, A History of Cambodia, 126. 
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Figure 5-2 Patronage and the administration of taxes and fines before 1891 
It would appear that patronage was an “organisation parallel to the official 
organisation” under which each free person could choose a patron from among the 
functionaries and princes or their officials.47  A villager might choose a local official 
such as the village head who, in turn, could select a patron from the host of petty 
officials connected to the various administrative arms.  Each patron in turn selecting 
a patron from a higher rank.  It was a hierarchical network of associations between 
village and the high level patron, and would have been riddled with conflicting 
interests of official and patronage duties. 
Patrons assisted their clients, in theory at least, in matters of justice and paid taxes 
for those otherwise in default.  As well as functioning as an intermediary and 
                                                 
47  The following outline is from Forest, Le Cambodge et la Colonisation, 31-3. 
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protecting their clients, patrons also carried complaints to the king.  It is through the 
patron that the king would have become aware of what was happening in the 
provinces.  For his services to clients, the patron collected a head tax payable to the 
sovereign (and for himself no doubt), and organised men for the army or corvée for 
the king as required.  What is important is that, overall, the system of administration 
was essentially predatory and designed to extract various forms of formal and 
informal taxes and corvée from the people.  It was not a royal administration 
designed to ensure the safety, welfare and prosperity of the population.   
State building during the French colonial period 
The French protectors, like the Vietnamese before then, initially sought to rule 
through the king and existing institutions but soon concluded that more direct 
methods would be needed to meet their colonial objectives.  French Résidents were 
put in place to supervise the Cambodian governors, in large part to oversee the 
collection of revenue and its transfer to the central budget from which allocations 
were made for the colonial administration and the implementation of provincial 
public works.  The purpose was both to assert control as well as to divert allegiance 
and revenue from the king and the existing patrimonial system.  The French moved 
to reduce the number of Cambodian officials and to introduce colonial 
administrators, using Vietnamese and French personnel.48    
More direct rule by the French initiated a new phase of state building through the 
introduction of Western governance institutions.49  These new institutions of state 
building include departments and bureaucratic methods with their rules and 
regulations, salaried positions and concept of civil service.  The French presence in 
the province expanded to include Résident schools, medical and veterinary services, 
police, post and telegraph, public works, and customs, all with a need to engage local 
people.  Eventually, the training of local administrators was initiated in Phnom 
Penh.50 
                                                 
48  The French were particularly concerned to abolish the “apanage” officials and the Oknya 
(titled officials) who they considered to be grossly incompetent.  
49  The Cambodian kings had sought French protection at the same time that King Rama V in 
Thailand was introducing modern reforms to prevent colonisation by the British or French. 
50  Forest, Le Cambodge et la Colonisation, 89-116.  Although rules requiring examinations for 
those being nominated to public functions were proclaimed from 1901, little was done in this 
regard until 1914 when the first administration school was set up to train kromokau (a middle 
level functionary between the governor and village chief).  In 1917 further schools for
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Initially, the French tried to formalize the role of the village heads which, under the 
new rules, were: to receive royal envoys charged with census and collection of taxes, 
to publicise royal ordinances, recruit men for war, and judge disputes; and act as 
local policeman in return for which they received a proportion of fines levied, and 
tax relief.51  Dissatisfied with the regular involvement of village heads with bandits, 
pirates, and various schemes to defraud the tax collectors, the French moved to 
establish elected village councils in Cambodia in 1901 and again in 1908.  An 
underlying assumption seems to have been that the democratically elected council 
would provide some transparency and eliminate fraud.   
This meant that the French, who were of the view that the idea of village 
“community” as a social and political entity simply did not exist in Cambodian 
society, considered it possible nevertheless to create administrative communities.52  
To break with the past, they introduced a new entity called khum (or commune) and 
a commune head (mekhum).  Trying to accommodate the dispersed and irregular 
nature of habitation, the new law recognized the less structured group of residents in 
hamlets or villages (phum) which became the basic entities forming a commune.  
Councillors were to be elected, representing each hamlet or village.  Those elected 
appointed a commune head from either within or outside their ranks (the list of 
candidates had to be approved by the Résident).  The commune head then chose 
assistants and appointed a leader for each hamlet or village.  The commune councils 
were to meet every three months and an independent budget was to be provided for 
each.  While elections were held, it seems that councils rarely, if ever, met.53 
Increasingly, however, the commune head became the agent of the French whose 
rule was highly centralised.  Commune heads were kept busy maintaining records of 
villagers for tax purposes, as well as overseeing justice and implementing colonial 
directives.54   
                                                                                                                                          
justice, teachers and administration were established with a view to putting the 
administration on Western lines.  
51  Ibid.  However, as Forest says, “In brief, he lives above all on his role as policeman” 
52  The general consensus among historians, anthropologists and commentators is that 
Cambodia was typified by “weak” or “loose” social structures and that the household was 
the basic unit.  Vickery, Kampuchea, 52; Conway, "Poverty, Participation and Programmes", 
249; and Delvert, Le Paysan Cambodgien, 201-4.    
53  The reforms in 1911 also changed the role of the Résident Superieure and the structure of the 
Council of the Protectorate (replaced in 1913 by an Indigenous Consultative Assembly).  
Tully, France on the Mekong, 142-3. 
54  Forest, Le Cambodge et la Colonisation, 117-31. 
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The final step in this phase of state building was to come with the formation of the 
independent state of Cambodia when the French granted Independence in 1953.  
However, despite its democratic parliamentary system, political parties and general 
elections, Cambodia lacked the democratic political traditions and a bureaucracy 
capable of meeting the demands of Independence.55  Sihanouk’s abdication and 
move into political leadership symbolising, in a way, an attempted transfer from a 
patrimonial to a democratic role.  Nevertheless, the patrimonial tradition was 
preserved as Sihanouk introduced “Buddhist socialism” and created what was, in 
effect, a one party state centred on himself as ruler.   
Sihanouk’s system failed to control factionalism and corruption, and state building in 
Cambodia received a harsh setback with the Pol Pot interlude which attempted to 
abolish all previous institutions and to replace them with a new extreme form of state 
organised on a military structure.  At its centre was the secretive Angkar—“the 
organization.”  The 1979 occupation by Vietnam heralded a return to state building 
which basically revived the institutions of the previous Sihanouk and Lon Nol 
regimes, but under a socialist state formation.  The new state was established as a 
triumvirate of the Front, the Party and state institutions – government and 
bureaucracy (See Figure 3-2).  The ministries and departments of state were re-
activated as were the provincial, district and commune level institutions.  The 
communes were further divided into village and group level (krom samaki) 
organizations to take into account the socialist agenda of communal production.  
The local government structure, initiated by the French and retained at 
Independence, was effectively in place again as the State of Cambodia prepared for 
the signing of the peace agreement and UNTAC supervised elections.  It was 
maintained then by the new democratically elected state which restored the 
institutions of parliamentary democracy and the king.  As outlined in chapter 3, the 
Seila programme also brought the ongoing state building process directly to the 
people with its democratic and administrative reforms of the existing commune 
institutions.  While the specified functions of the commune councils vary little from 
the previous arrangements, they replaced the socialising agenda with training in 
democratic principles and open and accountable local government.  This reflects the 
importance placed on local governance by powers wishing to transform societies.   
                                                 
55  Osborne, Politics and Power, 114. 
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Nation building 
Given the background of state building in Cambodia, an important issue for 
consideration is whether the various state structures and organisations were accepted 
and legitimised by the population at large.  Here we look to nation building and the 
legitimacy of the state and its institutions and political system in terms of people’s 
loyalty and commitment to them.  While little can be gleaned from the earliest 
periods, those living within the urban bureaucratic system based on religious 
foundations might have given legitimacy to the sovereign in return for the 
performance of rituals deemed necessary to ensure security, good seasons and 
agricultural success.  In return, the functions of the king—who embodied the state—
were “to protect the people against external aggression and internal disorder”; to 
please the people [probably festivals, ceremony etc]; and “to create conditions 
favourable for a prosperous economy and permitting the subjects to gain their 
subsistence.”56  For those outside the urban system, local forest spirits were the more 
immediate concern along with avoidance of the sovereign’s officials and military.   
With the depopulation of the Angkor area, people dispersed and were no longer 
bound to the urban bureaucracy.  Buddhism also became a more widespread and 
popular religion, teaching the people moral responsibility to the king and those in 
authority.57  Thus the king retained his symbolic and ritual status and his legitimacy 
in the eyes of the people, despite the oppressive demands for taxes, corvee and 
military service.  It was his officials who bore the brunt of peoples’ displeasure, 
being referred to by the people in all manner of derogatory terms as “tigers”, 
“spotted snakes” and “demons, or as “crocodiles” and “venomous snakes” who “ate” 
and consumed the domains and provinces allocated to them.58   
As a patrimonial system, there was allegiance to the king but there was no concept of 
nation in pre-colonial Cambodia.  What continued to hold it together was not 
protection from the king or his officials through public services, but comfort in ritual 
and, specifically, ritual that needed to be performed by the king to guarantee the 
harvest and the very viability of the peasant subsistence.  Patronage also provided 
                                                 
56  Sahai, "Les Institutions Politiques," 24-5.   
57  Tully, France on the Mekong, 39.  Tully reflects on harsh climate and difficulties despite 
which he says peasants were “relatively content because they could envisage no other life 
and their fatalism was reinforced by the ubiquitous Buddhist teachings.”   
58  Ibid., 35; and Chandler, A History of Cambodia, 105. 
  176 
some protection from harsh officials.  However, loyalty to the state was problematic.  
There was widespread banditry, and revolts which became even more prominent 
with the French presence as anti-colonial sentiment developed into active opposition.  
The sense of national identity emerging among sections of a growing educated élite, 
however, did not penetrate the countryside.  
This suggests that to the extent there was a “social contract,” it was the responsibility 
of the population to sustain the king through taxes, corvée and so on.  Thus, the 
exploitation and poverty of the people was more likely to be explained in terms of 
the excessive demands of officials and not attributable to the king.  At the same time, 
the host of lesser functionaries played little or no role in the “harmonisation” of 
relations between the king and his people.  Nor did the introduced forms of local 
administration through supposedly elected commune councils encourage new bonds 
of loyalty to the state institutions.  On the one hand, commune and village heads 
lived to some extent from exploiting villagers financially while on the other 
protecting them for excessive exploitation by higher officials.  The welfare of 
villagers was protected within the immediate ties of family and kin and, to some 
extent, their association with “place” and common spirit worship.59  Outside the 
family or kinship networks, trust in institutions and their legitimation were perhaps 
limited to the patronage system that created a network of relationships reaching to 
the ultimate patron—the king.  The bureaucracy established under French rule did 
not reduce peasant oppression, nor did it bring widespread benefits to the 
countryside.  It was staffed by French and Vietnamese officials and there was thus, 
from a Cambodian perspective, little reason to trust or value it.   
Independence, in 1953, brought a resurgence of loyalty to the person of the king 
(Sihanouk), who was revered especially in the countryside.  The countryside 
benefited from an expansion of rural education and road networks, but performance 
in other sectors, such as health and industry, as well as protection of rights, was poor.  
What little nation building had been achieved was quickly shattered by the coup, 
war, the victory of Pol Pot, and his draconian form of state.  After 1979, too, there 
was little achievement in terms of nation building.  Rather than legitimising the new 
regime, people were reluctant to adhere to socialist objectives and were suspicious of 
                                                 
59  Peasants often resided in scattered hamlets and village affiliation and loyalty as such was 
questionable.  The French and later governments tried to consolidate villages for security 
reasons. 
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the government and of officials who cheated and harassed them.  Popular loyalty and 
trust again eluded the state as commune organizations were infiltrated and abused by 
self-seeking officials.  A lack of faith was also evident within the krom samaki where 
people ignored the instructions and guidance of officials and maintained their private 
economic activities—the so-called family economy.  At the same time, as shown in 
chapter 3, patronage networks were reconstructed throughout the new governance 
system established after 1979 and remain largely in place today. 
It could be argued that nation building and the legitimisation of the state in the eyes 
of the people were, along with state building, primary objectives of the UNTAC 
intervention in Cambodia.  The widespread assumption was that an acceptable 
electoral process would lead to the popular acceptance of an elected government.  A 
further assumption was that an elected government would act on behalf of the people 
and create loyalty and commitment to the democratic state.  Voter turn-out under 
difficult conditions exceeded expectations and was construed as evidence that people 
across the country wanted to be involved in the political process.  Popular elections, 
political parties and factions were of course not new to Cambodia and many would 
have recalled the elections and party politics of the 1950s and 1960s.  They would 
also have recalled the turmoil of factional politics in Phnom Penh, the fall of 
Sihanouk and the collapse of the country under Lon Nol, and the impact of events on 
conditions across the country.  People, it seems, placed great hope in the electoral 
process and hoped that with UNTAC and donor support, this time would be 
different.   
Nevertheless, once the vote was counted Cambodia’s political élite, many of whom 
had been opponents in armed conflicts since the 1970s, took over and the people 
were no longer consulted as a coalition government was formed and a constitution 
ratified.  Despite the belief of donors that they could engineer social and cultural 
change, nation building in terms of creating social and cultural acceptance of 
democratic institutions, trust in government and respect for the constitution, was 
abandoned from the start by the political élite.  The institutions of state—the 
ministries in particular—became captive to political parties and the personal gain of 
the leadership rather than becoming managers of government policies and 
programmes on behalf of the people.  These were political processes outside donor 
control. 
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Hence, nation building in terms of public good or social contract has lagged badly 
behind state building.  For the villagers, the principal concern remains survival 
within the particular institutional and political power structures existing at any time.  
The traditional patronage and family loyalties appear to offer more security than 
loyalty and commitment to the nation, which is discouraged by a lack of trust in 
political leadership and the ability of élites to capture resources for their own 
purposes.  The political élite which ignores democratic principles today comprises 
the same people and families who in the 1980s ignored socialist nation building 
tenets and used the Communist party, patronage networks and their official positions 
for their own ends.  Unfortunately, some legitimacy is given to such patterns of 
behaviour by the Buddhist concept of karma—good actions create merit and 
happiness, while bad actions bring suffering in this life or in rebirth.  A person of 
official status has good karma and has, people say, earned the right to use that status 
for his/her own ends even at the expense of others.  These factors also influence the 
distribution of national resources which are, in turn, determined by participation in 
the political decision making processes of governments.   
Participation and distribution 
Participation in the context of “good governance” has been shown to be concerned 
primarily with peoples’ engagement in development projects and programmes 
designed mainly by international donors.  These have largely ignored popular 
political and community processes.  However, in the context of state and nation 
building, participation is concerned with how people are engaged in the overall 
process of government decision-making.  Popular participation in the early forms of 
the Cambodian state, embodied by the king, was limited to audiences with the people 
who came, often against the wishes of officials, to lodge petitions or to register 
complaints.  Feedback from officials would also have been significant, but may have 
been somewhat tempered by the officials’ own ambitions and hence of dubious 
benefit to the peasants.  Decisions would have been reserved to the king and his 
court.  Local rebellions and banditry also conveyed messages to the rulers.  Aspects 
of these former processes are retained in current practice in the form of 
demonstrations, especially where groups, often travelling from rural areas, converge 
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on the parliamentary offices or ministerial residences to convey their demands direct 
to the government and leadership.   
Political parties under Sikanouk and Lon Nol were elitist and had little if any popular 
input into the formulation of their policies and programmes.  The local commune 
councils then were arms of central administration and control rather than local 
consultative and policy forming bodies.  The communes developed under communist 
Heng Samrin and Hun Sen governments were part self-help organisation and part 
agents of the central administration, and intended to engineer socialist change and 
development.  While mass organisations, commune councils and the party 
committees may have provided some political feedback, they were intended to train 
the people and embed socialism.  A similar self-help theme runs through current 
arrangements while the ideological objective has changed to the development of 
democracy at the local level on the assumption that embedding democratic processes 
at the local level of society will influence its upward progress into higher levels of 
political and administrative institutions.   
Gottesman provides ample evidence that the governments under Heng Samrin and 
Hun Sen were well informed as to what was going on in the administration across 
the country, whether through feedback from mass organizations, the party or the 
bureaucracy.60  Apart from local level contacts, the rural population had no way of 
providing direct input into debate about political issues.  Participation in politics at 
the local level may have been as much about the avoidance of officials and their 
demands and ignoring government directives as about activating the family and 
patronage networks necessary for survival.  In extreme cases, local politics led to 
banditry and revolt.  Since 1993, other factors, such as political intimidation, absence 
of media freedoms and a lack of trust in government institutions and officials arising 
from years of conflict, have limited popular participation in government decision 
making.  In rural Cambodia, the emphasis on “good governance” processes has also 
overshadowed political processes, both local and national, which means that the 
problem of how to develop participation in government decision making remains an 
ongoing nation building issue.  
                                                 
60  Gottesman, Cambodia after the Khmer Rouge. 
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Since Independence, and certainly under Sihanouk, distribution to the countryside 
became a demonstration of personal largesse by the ruler rather than presented as 
government programmes responding to government policies and priorities.  
However, from 1979 to the early 1990s there were few resources to share as external 
aid from Eastern bloc countries was minimal and domestic accumulation was also 
low—being largely ambushed by provincial authorities which managed their own 
economies independent of Phnom Penh.  Since 1993 there has been a massive 
injection of international aid, but it has come tied to donor priorities and 
conditionalities which have influenced government policies and programmes and, to 
some extent, hampered the development of public policy debate.  The current Prime 
Minister and other political party leaders continue to practice largesse and 
personalise rural projects.  This often ignores or interferes with ministry programmes 
and budgets, making a mockery of government priorities and plans.  Such political 
processes have stifled participation and discouraged the development of trust in 
government processes and the legitimisation of state institutions.   
Commune council line department interface –  ‘participation’ and 
‘empowerment’? 
In the current system, participation and empowerment take on a very contemporary 
meaning in the context of human capacity building and democratisation.  While 
important in this sense, it is also vital to see them in the wider context of state and 
nation building and participation in government decision-making.  This level of 
participation is also critical to human security for rural Cambodians.  In the 
following sections I will outline the issues impinging on participation mainly in 
relation to governance structure and the state defined processes for rural 
development planning, which involves both commune and line department 
governance.   
Commune councils 
Figure 5.3 outlines the eleven steps in the commune development planning process 
according to official guidelines.  Commune and Village Development Committees 
are established to determine development needs in consultation with villagers.  
These needs are prioritised by the commune councils and incorporated into a set of 
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project proposals which are processed through District Integration Workshops 
(DIWs).  The DIWs are intended to harmonise commune proposals with provincial 
and line department development policies and strategies and to form an integrated 
programme of projects at commune, district and provincial levels.  The projects 
agreed for commune council implementation, called Temporary Agreements (TAs), 
are incorporated into Commune Development Plans (a 3-year plan) and Commune 
Investment Programmes (a 5-year programme).  Other projects and programmes 
with broader impacts are set aside for provincial/line department and donor action.  
 
Commune Development Plan (CDP) Preparation 
 
Figure 5-3 Commune Development Plan (CDP) preparation61 
Two aspects of the process are particularly important in relation to peoples’ 
participation in governance and to their human security.  Consultation with villagers 
in the early stages of development planning is the first, and the second is the role and 
outcome of the DIW process. 
I found that there was a very tentative attitude to the village development planning 
process and some reluctance among village development chiefs to discuss the sort of 
plans being developed other than in the most general terms.  There was a sense that 
the process was not as open and participatory as intended by the law, despite the 
                                                 
61  The figure is adapted from unpublished presentations provide by the Seila Programme. 
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extensive training by Seila and its step-by-step guidelines.  Holloway’s 2005 audit of 
commune/sagkat funded projects in four provinces concluded, similarly, that few 
projects had arisen from genuinely participatory processes and that few of the 
commune council chiefs, most of whom had been engaged in civil service activities 
since the 1980s, had much empathy with participatory practices.62  This was also 
evident in complaints to me that leaders tended to look after themselves and their 
families first.63  Holloway found, too, that there were generally diverse views on 
who identified and funded projects and their objectives.  Yet, while only half the 
beneficiaries and 20 per cent of non-beneficiaries knew about the project planning 
and about commune development funding, most were satisfied with the choice of 
project, even if the quality of implementation was often lacking due to both poor 
design and poor monitoring of contractor performance.  The general agreement that 
projects were, on the whole, useful and beneficial to the village was also found in 
other studies and in my own observations.64   
While participation in decision-making is promoted as a key concept in effective 
governance, the power of officials is often unchallengeable in Cambodia, meaning 
that participation in open forums may not be a practical choice for many villagers.  It 
requires trust in each other and in the institution if people are to participate.  Trust is 
however a difficult issue in view of Cambodia’s recent history and the likelihood 
that there may be former Khmer Rouge people, officials who held positions under 
the former socialist regimes, as well as former victims of oppression, living side-by-
side in the communes.  The political affiliation and business associations of many 
leaders also makes villagers reluctant to participate in local governance activities.  A 
great deal of NGO work in the villages I visited has been to restore trust and to break 
down barriers between officials and the people.65   
Another impediment to participation in the newly created institutions is that villagers 
may feel they lack the necessary skills to engage productively in the processes of 
deliberation.  Thus the opportunity for group participation is important since it is 
potentially more comfortable for some people, including those with limited literacy 
                                                 
62  Holloway, Chom Sok, and et. al., "Process Audit of Commune/Sangkat Fund Projects 
(CMB/01/272/RILG)." 
63  Village interviews, see chapter 4. 
64  Kim Ninh and Henke, "Commune Councils of Cambodia."  Village interviews and 
discussions. 
65  See for example Meas Nee, Towards Restoring Life: Cambodian Villages. 
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skills, to contribute and be empowered as a part of a group with common interests 
than it is to participate in more open fora as an individual.  It is in this regard that 
NGO have come to play a critical and essential role in local governance.   
While the associations we discussed briefly in the previous chapter are important 
empowering agencies, without NGO involvement it is unlikely they would have 
been formed and resourced in the first place.  There are concerns that such 
associations are only viable because they have the protection of international donors 
or parent NGOs, or that they promote their own agendas rather than those of the 
villagers.  There is the problem, too, that the NGOs become part of the patronage 
system and that, similarly, the associations may become the tools of an élite, or that 
the NGOs themselves are an élite.  These issues of representation are not dissimilar 
from those raised in studies of local governance in developed countries.  What it 
highlights is that governance must be recognised not simply as a narrow 
administrative process but also as a deeply political process as well. 
Thus, the commune councils (despite their promise) are not the ideal democratic or 
“good governance” environments in which trust, participation and empowerment are 
operative.  Dominance of the CPP and its strong rural presence, as well as possible 
local association with the military, police, officials and the private sector, are all 
matters which make many villagers reluctant to participate in local affairs.  The fact 
that legislation excludes independent members being elected to commune councils 
also enhances the prospect of centralised party control over local policies.  
Nevertheless, there is some evidence that commune council members are learning to 
work together and to cooperate across party lines.  The authoritarianism of commune 
council chiefs is also being tempered where there is an active NGO presence.  The 
ongoing role of the NGOs in encouraging interaction between associations and 
councils is important.  NGOs are also playing a significant role in broadening the 
experience of local associations through networking with similar bodies in other 
communes.  They are also helping to open dialogue between villagers and officials at 
various levels as was seen in the provincial meeting in Battambang.  Local 
governance does show signs that it can become participatory if leaders are prepared 
to be open and accountable.  
Holloway’s survey of governance in rural Cambodia concluded that of seven 
objectives identified for commune councils, the only one partially met was to 
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provide the opportunity for people to participate in commune governance.  The 
failed objectives included economic growth, poverty reduction, provision of 
services, security, accountability and combating corruption.66  Thus, improvement in 
governance at the commune level will depend on the continued involvement of 
NGOs in supporting associations and dialogue with commune councils and officials.  
There is no doubt that, as was said by an official at the Battambang meeting, “we are 
all learning.”  What is required is a change in institutional and political cultures, but 
this cannot occur at the commune level without a similar change in central and 
provincial governance institutions.  
If human security is to be served, participation in governance needs to be encouraged 
also in relation to line departments.  In the previous chapter, I identified the 
significant shortcomings of line departments in carrying out their responsibilities in 
rural Cambodia.  The DIW process reveals the structural problems of line 
department governance which also works against the objectives of participation and 
empowerment and, hence, human security. 
District Integration Workshop 
The DIW process is shown in detail in Figure 5.4.  It represents a critical element in 
the commune development planning process outlined earlier.  In particular it 
illustrates how line department and provincial projects and programmes, along with 
NGO and other donor proposals, are included in the process.  It also shows that not 
only are commune project proposals assessed in the Workshops, but also certain 
provincial and international donor projects and programmes.   
What emerges from the process in practice is that commune council priority project 
proposals are largely overlooked in favour of line department and donor (mainly 
NGO) projects nominated from ‘outside’ the commune council priority lists.  In 
2004, just 30 per cent of commune development projects (TAs) agreed through the 
DIW process corresponded directly to priority requests proposed by commune 
councils.  The same data shows that more than 65 per cent of line department and 
nearly 80 per cent of NGO projects included in commune council programmes as 
                                                 
66  John Holloway, Chom Sok, and Researchers from Crossroads Consultancies Group, "Follow 
Up Survey on Governance (CMB/01/R72/RILG),"  (Phnom Penh: For the Cambodian Seila 
Task Force, 2005).  
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TAs were based on the NGO and line department’s own perceptions of need rather 
than as a direct response to priorities established, in principle at least, through village 
participation and empowerment approaches.  Thus, responsibility for village and 
commune development is re-centralised and is not consistent with the objective of 
promoting the participation and empowerment of villagers.  Instead, central and 
provincial governance oversight and control is asserted over rural development.67   
District Integration Workshop process 
 
Figure 5-4 District Integration Workshop process68 
At a sectoral level also, line-departments and NGOs shun commune requests for 
agriculture (irrigation) and transport infrastructure projects while incorporating their 
own preferred agricultural training projects.69  The same occurs in the social 
category where, for example, the number of health projects is more than double the 
priority requests, but do not correspond to commune priority issues.  Line 
                                                 
67  “Guided democracy” has been built into the system by the international donors and experts 
who set up the Seila experiment and oversaw the development of the governance process 
incorporated into legislation and guidelines.   
68  Copied from unpublished official presentations provided by the Seila Programme. 
69  Seila Program, "Commune Development Planning Database 2004 Analysis: Report on 
Commune Priority Requests and Agency/Donor Support Commitments at the District 
Integration Workshops in 2004,"  (Phnom Penh: Ministry of Planning and Partnership for 
Local Governance, 2005); and Biddulph, "Study on the Performance of the SEILA 
Provincial Investment Fund." 
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departments and NGOs also neglect administration and physical security priority 
requests.70 
Thus, there are two issues which warrant new approaches.  First, it is evident that in 
relation to development, the extensive legislated governance framework of 
participation and empowerment does not translate into local control over commune 
councils, or over local development.  Instead, line departments and donors have 
maintained control over the direction of development and the use of development 
resources.  While it is important that the key departments, such as health and 
agriculture, do implement national and provincial strategies it is unclear why these 
need to be enacted through a supposedly participatory process designed to respond to 
locally determined needs.  It would make more sense for line departments to identify 
their priority programmes, including funded projects, for national, provincial and 
regional strategies which they intended to implement.  Such programmes might be 
for AIDS, bird flu, malaria or dengue control, for employment creation or to promote 
particular crops and marketing in certain regions.  If necessary, commune 
participation in these programmes, but not funding, might be mandatory.   
Secondly, line departments might then offer a further set of optional development 
projects and programmes at a provincial level which councils could select from 
according to their locally determined needs.71  Allowing communes to choose and 
fund projects from the line department list would be far more consistent with 
participation and empowerment objectives.  The DIW could then become more of a 
political space for harmonising commune needs and a forum for identifying district 
and provincial projects and policy initiatives which might emerge from commune 
proposals. 
The outcome of the current situation is that commune councils expend a great deal of 
nugatory effort on procedures to identify priorities which are most likely to be 
ignored.  A 30 per cent success rate is not good and indicates that even if there is 
effective participation, the empowerment of people to take responsibility for their 
own futures is denied under current governance arrangements.  Instead, powerful 
                                                 
70  Seila Program, "Commune Development Planning Database 2004 Analysis."; and Biddulph, 
"Study on the Performance of the SEILA Provincial Investment Fund." 
71  The fact that the line department TAs are basically in the form of training and services and 
not infrastructure would make it a simple exercise to the programmes which may be 
available to communes on request.   
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departments and donors are able to impose projects on the communes.  It is even 
doubtful whether departments act paternalistically on the assumption they know 
better what is good for the communes and rural people generally.  Rather, it seems, 
under-funded line departments may approach the DIW as a source of provincial 
funding for their own operations.  
However, while communes, donors and line departments negotiate small-scale 
development projects, the villagers I spoke to were far more concerned about their 
need for wider employment and income generation opportunities and to be able to 
reap the benefits of equal access to health services, education for their children and a 
fair system of justice.  Yet, these and other development related issues such as 
irrigation, rural transport, markets and electrification, could not be addressed through 
the development planning process.  The village development chiefs I spoke to were 
rather vague about village development plans and what could be included.  This 
same uncertainty emerged in Holloway’s surveys.72   
While the opportunity for villagers to participate in village and commune planning is 
improving, and capacity building through line department designated training 
projects is no doubt important, the overall process leaves unattended the people’s 
real concerns for opportunities to become more economically secure and, thus, avoid 
the need to resort to migration and land sales to meet basic needs.  These are the 
broader development issues which require national attention and political debate and 
decision-making.   
Political 
Local governance in Cambodia falls under the responsibilities of the Minister of 
Interior.73  While it has been decreed by the Government that all official links 
between communes and other ministries and institutions of the Royal Government 
must pass through the Ministry of the Interior, this “power” has been delegated to 
provincial governors, who, although chosen by the Prime Minister, also report 
directly to the Minster of Interior.74  With the completion of the Seila programme in 
                                                 
72  Holloway, "Follow Up Survey." 
73  Royal Government of Cambodia, "The Law on Khum/Sangkat Administrative 
Management." 
74  Royal Government of Cambodia, "Sub-Decree on Decentralisation of Powers, Roles and 
Duties to Commune/Sangkat Councils," (Royal Government of Cambodia, No. 22 ANK/BK, 
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December 2006, its functions were also transferred to the National Committee for 
Management of the Decentralization and Deconcentration Reform (NCDD) in the 
Ministry of Interior.  This, as well as an administrative assistant placed with each 
commune, imposes a tight control over the commune councils by the Ministry of 
Interior.  The Interior Ministry is headed by a member of the ruling CPP which, as 
we have seen, also dominates leadership of the commune councils.   
There was considerable scepticism among interviewees regarding the commitment of 
commune councils to democratic principles and “good governance.”  Non-CPP 
candidates felt intimidated and were often left out of council deliberations.  The 
dominance of the CPP and its strong rural presence, as well as its possible 
association with the military, police, officials and the private sector, were matters for 
concern among many villagers and made people cautious in how they participated in 
local affairs.   
Despite these issues, commune council members are learning to work together and 
cooperate across party lines and the authoritarianism of commune council chiefs is 
being tempered by the presence of NGOs and local associations.  It seems though, 
that in this latter regard, the ongoing role of the NGOs in encouraging interaction 
between associations and councils has been important.  They have also played an 
important role in broadening the experience of local associations through networking 
with similar bodies in other communes.  The NGOs have also helped to open 
dialogue between villagers and officials at various levels as was seen in the 
provincial meeting in Battambang. 
Improved governance at the commune level will continue to depend a great deal on 
the continued involvement of NGOs in supporting villagers’ political dialogue with 
commune councils and officials.  It will also depend on how the concept of civil 
society is unpacked and realized in Cambodian society.  This entails a process of 
social and cultural change requiring the development and acceptance of the roles and 
functions of institutions and of the protection they purport to offer.  But trust and 
acceptance cannot be created at the commune level without also being generated in 
relation to the governance of central and provincial institutions. 
                                                                                                                                          
2002); and Royal Government of Cambodia, "Inter-Ministerial Prakas on Commune/Sangkat 
Development Planning." 
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Line departments and governance 
I have demonstrated in chapter 4 that shortcomings in justice, health, education and 
rural development can be in large part attributed to the poor governance processes of 
line departments.  The international donor community and the government all 
promote “good governance” and anti-corruption measures and neo-liberal regulatory 
reforms in their policy pronouncements.  However, the emphasis on openness and 
accountability, and attempts to achieve these through technical means such as 
streamlining regulatory controls of the private sector, freeing up the market and 
developing computerised financial systems and public contract processes, are 
important but only part of the solution for poor line department outcomes.   
Focusing more directly on the internal operation of ministries highlights their 
corporate governance—that is, how departments carry out their responsibilities.  
Experience in introducing neo-liberal governance reforms has highlighted the 
importance of the culture of public sector organisations as well as their management 
structures, regulatory frameworks and how they deal with stakeholders.75  The 
cultural change needed to introduce governance reforms was also found to be 
critically dependent on leadership which “sets the tone at the top.”76 What was also 
important was that the delivery of services needed to conform, not only with the law 
and regulations, but also with community expectations of probity, accountability and 
openness.77   
 Line departments in Cambodia are far from achieving such reforms.  A public sector 
culture of openness, accountability, sound decision making and fearless policy 
advice is not easily achieved in a public sector where the purchase of positions is 
common, and where party membership and patronage is a determinant of work 
placement, promotion and involvement in departmental business.  Rent taking is 
prevalent at all levels and inappropriate relations with business interests common.78  
                                                 
75  The extensive public sector governance reforms in Australia in the 1990s were based on the 
same principles of “good governance” promoted by the international agencies but went 
beyond the principles into the practical issues to be confronted in implementing neo-liberal 
reforms.  Australian National Audit Office (ANAO), "Public Sector Governance; Volume 
1,"  (Canberra: ANAO, 2003), 6. 
76  Ibid., 8. 
77  Ibid., 6. 
78  I also spoke to several young civil servants who told me that on entry to the service there 
was an expectation that they would affiliate with a dominant party within the department.  If 
not, they were sidelined, not given work and excluded from the normal operations.  They 
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In other words, those practices which were identified as problems in the civil service 
in the 1980s remain in place.79  In the absence of realistic living salaries in the civil 
service and strong leadership, it is not surprising that such activities persist even 
though they are increasingly disapproved of by Cambodians.80  Keeping the salaries 
low may also perpetuate the system of patronage and political domination. 
International donors have attempted to isolate the management of development 
assistance from the perceived corruption of mainstream ministries and departments.  
To do so they design and fund projects which, although established within the 
ministries, have separate management control and accountability with donor 
oversight.  Such an approach, in Cambodia as in other developing countries, limits 
capacity development by removing responsibility and accountability from the 
mainstream, creates privileged enclaves and puts at risk the effective integration of 
processes into the line department operations.81  The project approach also leads to 
the flight of more capable officers to the higher paid donor projects, and to NGOs 
and the private sector when the projects are completed.  Many young educated 
people also leave the country, disillusioned by the poor salaries and politicisation of 
the civil service and the systems of patronage operating within ministries and 
departments.  The project approach also prevents the development of an institutional 
culture of governance as a public service.   
At the provincial level, this is reflected in the failure of departments to relate to the 
public and civil society organizations and draw them into consultation on the 
formulation of local and provincial policy making.  It is reflected, too, in their 
avoidance of responsibility for poor performance and the persistence of a governance 
culture that owes little to a sense of public service.  While people express their 
dissatisfaction with departments, they have little hope of influencing a political 
leadership which remains uncommitted to change.  The poor governance culture and 
                                                                                                                                          
could not contribute and had no futures within the service.  Lucrative positions within 
departments  could also be purchased through party and patronage networks.   
79  See Christine J Nissen, Living Under the Rule of Corruption: An Analysis of Everyday 
Forms of Corrupt Practice in Cambodia (Phnom Penh: Centre for Social Development, 
2005); and Centre for Social Development, Corruption and Cambodian Households: 
Household Survey on Perceptions, Attitudes and Impact of Everyday Forms of Corrupt 
Practices in Cambodia, ed. Christine J Nissen (Phnom Penh: Centre for Social Development, 
2005). 
80  Centre for Social Development, Corruption and Cambodian Households, 41-42. 
81  See Fukuyama, State Building, 55, who refers to “capacity destruction” by this approach.   
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failure to deliver effective services means that there is a lack of belief in the 
departments and their legitimacy is not embraced by the society.   
Conclusion 
The long process of state building in Cambodia has been marked by sharp 
discontinuities as the country lurched from the bureaucratisation of the Angkor 
period, through the uncertain years leading to colonisation, Independence, 
revolution, occupation and a return to internationally supported independence.  
Nation building in terms of creating popular legitimacy of the various forms of state 
has not, however, automatically followed state building in Cambodia.  Societal 
norms, and cultural beliefs and practices, survive and carry over into the successive 
state arrangements, often with the effect of hindering and slowing the full 
incorporation of new ideas and values which underlie the different state structures.  
Thus, the process of state building has not been matched by nation building.  
The Cambodian state since 1993 has been founded, in principle at least, on a 
democratic constitution and adoption of a free market economy.  State building has 
been strongly influenced by the international donor community, particularly in 
relation to decentralisation and the promotion of “good governance” principles.  
However, despite appearing to have all the right structures in place according to 
donor plans, this chapter has shown that international, national and local governance 
processes are all closely associated with the failure of Cambodia to achieve the 
nation building, public participation and the just distribution of resources required to 
promote human security. 
One reason for this is that international, national and local governance are not 
harmonised to achieve common objectives.  While international governance 
institutions focus attention on influencing government policies at the top and on 
changing the processes of local governance in the countryside with a view to 
democratisation and economic development, Cambodia’s political leaders are more 
concerned to use the governance of national institutions to consolidate power and 
wealth.  These conflicting aims create tensions in decentralised governance between 
commune councils and line departments and prevent the emergence of people’s 
confidence and trust in the institutions and their management.  Thus, the 
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harmonisation of governance and its aims becomes an important pre-condition for 
future nation building and human security.  
Therefore, there are critical changes that need to be made to governance at all three 
levels.  First, international governance institutions need to “democratise” in-country 
development programmes and facilitate public debate.  While they are currently able 
to pressure the Cambodian government to adopt “universal” development policies 
and priorities, this is currently done at a parliamentary and ministerial level with 
little regard for due political process and national debate.  NGOs, though claiming to 
represent the people, also participate more in the international governance context 
than in a national debate.   
But the “anti-politics” approach of international governance, in fact, has the reverse 
effect of entrenching local, largely undemocratic, political power.82  Political power 
also invades state institutions despite attempts by the international governance 
institutions to isolate projects from direct bureaucratic management.  This is an 
approach that removes government responsibility and accountability and also 
prevents public political scrutiny of development activities.  It also sidesteps the 
major problem of the entrenchment of a governance culture of political interference, 
patronage and rent taking which impairs institutional outcomes, creates mistrust and 
prevents the advancement of human security. 
Secondly, therefore, international governance institutions and the national 
government need to address issues of political will and national leadership and how 
these can contribute to the institutional and social changes necessary to engender 
trust in and give legitimacy to political and institutional systems.  Leadership and 
open debate is important to nation building in terms of generating confidence in 
institutions and their governance and in legitimising them within the Cambodian 
social system.  In this process the culture of Cambodian governance must be 
addressed and changed to achieve government development objectives and human 
security outcomes.  Also, it highlights the need to encourage the development of 
Cambodian institutions in a Cambodian way rather than by donors trying to implant 
a mythical Western model of “good governance.”  The focus for all parties should be 
on outcomes and not primarily on policies and processes. 
                                                 
82  Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine. 
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Finally, international, national and local governance institutions together need to 
ensure that there is genuine opportunity for participation and empowerment of the 
people.  While a start has been made at the local level with the reform of commune 
councils, the potential benefits are stifled by a superstructure of political domination 
and institutions which inhibit the trust which is necessary for full participation in 
governance processes and the empowerment of the people.  It is a superstructure that 
promotes its own priorities and largely ignore the people’s expressed needs, as well 
as failing to create an environment which provides rural people with genuine 
opportunities for economic, social and political participation.  International and 
national processes need to provide opportunities for the people to participate 
democratically in their policy development, programme implementation and 
accountability mechanisms. 
Governance plays a key role in nation building, resource distribution, participation 
and empowerment.  In Cambodia, the achievement of human security in all its 
dimensions will depend on the culture of governance in national institutions, on 
leadership which demands that institutions deliver the services they are responsible 
for, which creates trust in the institutions and most importantly, in the political 
processes, including the involvement of international organisations, which determine 
national policies and priorities. 
 
 
  194 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
In contrast, [to realist practice] critical perspectives argue that, confronted as we are by a 
frighteningly dangerous world political future, human society urgently needs a security 
studies that goes beyond problem-solving within the status quo and instead seeks to help 
engage with the problems of the status quo.1 (emphasis in original) 
 
 
I began this thesis by asking in the broadest terms what a human security approach 
could contribute to the way in which international relations, international security 
and international development are conducted.  The reason for choosing to explore 
this issue arose from my strong belief that security is as much about people as it is 
about states.  I was also puzzled by the ease with which such notions as food 
security, heath security, environmental security, resources security and energy 
security were accepted in academic and public debate, while the idea of human 
security was hotly disputed.   
Two of the major problems within the status quo of international security referred to 
by Booth are the large number of people living in poverty and deprivation, and the 
persistent high level of domestic and interstate conflict.  This thesis has taken up 
Booth’s challenge by looking at the problems of security perceived through the lens 
of human security.   
The research question addressed by this thesis is how a human security approach can 
contribute to human welfare by providing a framework for conceptualising the 
problems and a foundation for realistic, effective response to them.  To answer this 
question, using Cambodia as a case study, I established that several supplementary 
questions needed to be addressed.  First, is a broad definition of human security 
practicable; secondly, how has international security and development practice 
influenced human security in Cambodia; and thirdly, in view of the findings of the 
Cambodia case study, what new approaches to international security practice—
                                                 
1  Booth, "Critical Explorations," 10.   
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including international development assistance—are needed to improve the human 
security situation of people generally? 
In this conclusion, I address these questions and highlight the contributions the thesis 
makes to encourage the rethinking of human security and its place in global security. 
Is a broad definition of human security practicable? 
In terms of human security, there is a strong tendency among commentators to 
identify situations of conflict or post-conflict reconstruction and development and to 
equate them to problems of freedom from fear on the one hand, and freedom from 
want on the other.  The Cambodian case has shown, however, that human security 
cannot be divided in this way.  Human insecurity is not represented only by the 
existence of a situation of war and related violence, but also by the particular forms 
of insecurities which impact on the people in a given situation.  Many insecurities 
which are present in times of conflict also exist in post-conflict situations.  These 
include such matters as the denial of human dignity, food insecurity and the lack of 
opportunities for economic and human development. 
Application of the narrow approach to human security finds its niche mainly in 
short-term conflict resolution and peacebuilding and in promoting international 
treaties to “humanise” war by banning indiscriminate weapons such as land mines 
and cluster bombs, the use of child soldiers and of rape as a weapon of war.  While 
these are important humanitarian initiatives, I have demonstrated that only by 
adopting the broad definition can the full potential of the analytical concept of 
human security be realised in practice. 
In support of the broad definition, this thesis has shown that human insecurities of 
different sorts whether related to violence, livelihood, welfare or human dignity, 
coexist in each of the pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict situations in Cambodia.  
War brought not only violence and death but also loss of property and livelihood as 
well as food insecurity, loss of freedoms and other deprivations.  Refugees and those 
held in factional camps, as well as people living inside Cambodia, all experienced 
forms of human insecurity—some common and others peculiar to their particular 
circumstances.  However, despite the cessation of war and general improvements in 
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livelihood and welfare, the thesis has shown that human insecurity continues to 
affect many people in rural Cambodia.   
By approaching human security from the local perspective of individuals and groups 
in rural Cambodia, I have been able to demonstrate that wide-ranging human 
insecurities such as food security, environment security, personal security, and 
political security are inextricably interrelated and should not be treated in isolation 
from each other as sectoral issues.  This is particularly significant in relation to 
governance where, for example, it was found that the failure of line department 
officials to uphold villagers’ legal right can resulted in economic and personal 
insecurity.  It emphasises, too, the mutually supporting roles that state departments 
need to play in relation to local government and individual human security.   
One of the strengths of the broad approach is that it does leave open the prospect for 
“anything” to be labelled a human security issue.  This does not render the concept 
unmanageable as some have argued but places human security very much on the 
same footing as wider security analysis and practice.  Also, it reduces the risk that 
potentially serious human security threats and vulnerabilities might be overlooked.  
At the same time this approach ensures that context can be taken into account to 
reflect the fact that critical problems for some may be less significant for others.  It 
also provides the possibility for political determination of what constitutes a threat to 
human security and how it is to be managed, rather than total dependence on 
quantitative measure such as poverty indices, incidences of disease or violence, or 
other criteria. 
How have international security and development practices 
influenced human security in Cambodia 
Cold War politics and military adventure in the region caused a period of intense 
human insecurity for Cambodians as their country lurched from domestic unrest and 
factionalism into war, and endured four years of the brutal Pol Pot regime followed 
by over a decade of civil war after the Vietnamese intervention and removal of Pol 
Pot.  Policy decisions made by major powers and their allies in pursuit if their own 
perceived security interests, as well as political choices made by Cambodian 
governments and factions, all contributed to the human insecurity of Cambodians.  
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The involvement of three permanent members of the UN Security Council, the US, 
USSR and China, which were key Cold War protagonists as well as having interests 
in the region meant that the UN Security Council was sidelined.  There were two 
main reasons for this.  First, the power of veto held by the US, USSR, and China and 
their conflicting positions on Cambodia, meant that the Security Council’s collective 
security mandate could not be applied either to the Vietnam War or events in 
Cambodia.  Thus, the power of veto, acting as a balance of power mechanism, 
prioritised state security over the rights and human security of individuals.   
This power carries over into the second reason for Security Council inaction which is 
that it only has an indirect interest in humanitarian issues (apart from genocide) to 
the extent they impact on state (and hence global) peace and security.  Thus, despite 
the state of war and the gross human insecurities being suffered by the people of 
Cambodia, there was no obligation on the Council to consider the humanitarian 
situation.  Instead, state rights and the veto overshadowed the situation and the 
people were denied any protection which might otherwise have been forthcoming 
through the Security Council.   
Even as the Security Council was sidelined and unable to prevent war and human 
insecurity in Cambodia, the UN’s humanitarian agencies were engaged in efforts to 
provide protection to refugees and humanitarian assistance to other victims of war.  
However, the US, USSR, China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand and other ASEAN 
states, along with their factional clients, obstructed the UN humanitarian agencies, 
such as UNHCR and UNICEF, and NGOs who were trying to protect refugees and 
provide assistance to others facing severe human insecurities.  Thus, the Cambodian 
case shows how the UN’s mandate to protect individuals and groups was thwarted 
by its own member states on national security grounds.  Membership of the UN, in 
the end, demands few obligations and many UN treaties remain unratified by 
governments, of developed and underdeveloped states alike.2  Hence, humanitarian 
treaties and conventions do not protect people unless they are implemented by states 
themselves.  
                                                 
2  The US, China and Russia have, for example, refused to sign or ratify the treaty banning land 
mines on national security grounds.  The UK, France and nearly all other developed 
countries have ratified the treaty. 
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From the human security perspective, therefore, the case of Cambodia highlights the 
need for change, particularly in the Security Council, if the UN is to be able to 
provide protection to individuals and groups in dire circumstances.  It also shows 
how, with a shift in the balance of power and consensus among the permanent 
members, a peace settlement could be agreed by the otherwise reluctant Cambodian 
factions with the support of interested countries and strong pressure from China, the 
US and USSR.  In the post-Cold War context, the peace was also negotiated 
independently of the UN Security Council which merely endorsed the final 
agreement. 
The Cambodian peace agreement was a form of victory for democracy and the free 
market.  It specified that Cambodia was to become a democratic state governed by 
the rule of law and respect for human rights, and that it would adopt a free market 
economy.  Assuming that democratisation and development would contribute to 
stability and security, the agreement also committed international donors to the 
reconstruction and redevelopment of the country.  The international security 
involvement in Cambodia thus shifted from the application of military power to that 
of economic and political power in the form of economic and social development.   
This new role engaged new players such as the World Bank, the WTO and UN 
agencies such as the UNDP, and many international NGOs.  Together, these global 
governance institutions control huge sums of development assistance funds, as well 
as a vast network of researchers, development experts and officials who formulate 
standardised development policies and prescriptions and control the disbursement of 
the development funds.  They are able, therefore, to exert a powerful influence over 
the development policies and priorities of developing countries.  In Cambodia, their 
vision has been incorporated into five-year development plans, poverty reduction 
strategies and the “home-grown” Rectangular Strategy.   
On the ground, however, the thesis has shown that the application of such donor 
power has failed to address a number of critical human security problems in rural 
Cambodia.  In particular, there are many persistent human insecurities which are 
perpetuated by the poor governance of line-departments and commune councils 
which, at the local level, do not function in accordance with the universal 
prescriptions of democratisation and “good governance”  
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The difficulties confronting donor power are evident when examining Cambodia’s 
recent record of nation building.  It shows that the international prescriptions are not 
consistent with the local social, political and cultural realities, and that donors cannot 
produces the changes that they consider to be necessary for “good governance.”  
Instead, the culture of governance is dominated by politically inspired 
authoritarianism and patronage, to the detriment of service delivery and of public 
trust.  No matter how well intentioned it may be, the application of donor power is 
not achieving its security or development objectives.  One reason is that patrimonial 
political power has been consolidated under recent international development 
approaches.  Applying a human security approach to Cambodia has shown that 
development policies and practices need to focus more attention on facilitating rather 
than attempting to engineer social and cultural change.  This requires that national 
leaders become the main motivators of social change and of nation building.   
They must also be encouraged to address the lack of economic and employment 
opportunities, the shortcomings of service delivery in health and education and the 
failure of officials to uphold people’s legal rights.  In the process, donors must be 
prepared to accept the way Cambodian nation building, participation and 
empowerment emerge.  
What new approaches to international security practice – including 
international development assistance – need to be implemented to 
improve human security 
Global security and global governance 
The diagram at Figure 6-1 identifies two parallel structures which together make up 
a total global security framework.  On the left is what I have called “global security.”  
This represents an approach to security based on military power rather than a form of 
global governance, and is separated into two main parts—the anarchic balance of 
power mechanism and the UN Security Council as the collective security 
organisation.  The latter is further broadly divided into conflict resolution and 
conflict prevention components.  Global security in this framework is, under current 
conditions, a governance arrangement only on an ad hoc basis when the UN Security 
Council agrees to act in relation to specific security issues.   
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On the right of the diagram is “global governance.”  In addition to the more familiar 
balance of power and collective security mechanisms, global governance institutions 
perform a security function which is outlined below.  Thus, the two streams, global 
security and global governance have a common security objective but no formal 
institutional relationship.  This open relationship is depicted at “A” on the diagram.   
Global governance includes institutions such as the WTO, IMF, World Bank, the UN 
General Assembly and its humanitarian agencies, supported also by international 
NGOs.  These promote democracy, human rights, human development, “good 
governance" and free market economies, which are also considered to contribute to 
state and global stability and security.  Donor countries all consider it to be in their 
national security interest to invest large sums of their taxpayers’ money in overseas 
development assistance programmes through these organisations or independently.  
Also, econometric research supports the security outlook of global governance by 
arguing that countries with low income and low growth are, on statistical evidence, 
prone to unrest and civil war.  
In addition, through their development programmes, these global governance 
organisations operate through state and local governance processes in recipient 
countries.  Thus, they have direct influence on human security which, I argue, is the 
base upon which state and global security must be built. 
Cambodia’s peace agreement placed it firmly within this global governance 
framework, instituting a democratic and free market constitution while also setting 
out a framework for reconstruction and development which engaged the major 
global development institutions.  Development assistance became the major stability 
and security mechanism for Cambodia.   
Three other relationships are identified in the diagram at “B”, “C” and “D.”  These 
represent the three areas where changes are needed to ensure that human security 
becomes a basis for development and security governance.  Each of these points is 
discussed below. 
 
 
 
  201 
Global security, global governance and human security 
 
Figure 6-1 Relationship between global security, global governance and 
human security 
Global security and human security 
The framework of global security shows its major flaw at “B” on the diagram.  First, 
despite the various treaties and conventions governing the ‘proper’ conduct of war 
and treatment of civilians, the balance of power system does not recognise or 
commit to human security.  The nature of the system and of war itself suggest that 
human security cannot be a major consideration of parties to conflict.  Secondly, 
however, a second collective security mechanism, the UN Security Council was 
created in large part with the aim of preventing armed conflict between states.  It, 
too, has no undisputed mandate for the protection of individuals and groups and does 
not, to date, recognise an explicit responsibility for human security either through 
conflict resolution or prevention processes.  
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From the 1960s until the finalisation of the peace agreement, the conflict that 
eventually engulfed Cambodia was managed by balance of power relations—which 
meant confrontation and military intervention.  The UN Security Council was simply 
sidelined and the people suffered.  Two important issues with contemporary 
significance arise from the Cambodian experience.  First, it highlights, the need for 
the global security framework to adopt human security as a major consideration, and 
to close the gap which prioritises the state to the near exclusion of the welfare of 
populations.  Secondly, the Cambodian experience illustrates the way in which 
states, acting in their own perceived security interests, are able to ignore their 
humanitarian responsibilities under UN treaties, conventions and other agreements, 
and actively prevent UN agencies from performing their humanitarian functions.  In 
the process, UN member states exacerbated the conditions of human insecurity. 
A new approach is needed which bridges the gap between global and human 
security.  This would involve the UN Security Council adopting human security as a 
concept to guide its deliberations and involvement in situations of conflict and major 
human insecurity.  It also means insisting that, even in balance of power situations 
such as Cambodia experienced, UN member states respect UN agreements designed 
to protect the individual.  Obviously, these represent major areas of reform but, as 
discussed below, a human security approach could strengthen the purpose of 
Security Council reforms currently under discussion in the UN.  
Such an approach would, however, require a significant change in the approach of 
the permanent members of the Security Council, who would undoubtedly be 
reluctant to adopt a human security approach which might be seen to interfere with 
their special status and flexibility.  However, under present criteria, serious human 
security issues such as genocide, conflict related deprivation or other humanitarian 
crisis such as occurred in Cambodia, are too easily neglected by the Security 
Council.  Major obstacles to its intervention arise too easily from appeals by member 
states to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in a country’s domestic 
affairs.  Nevertheless, there are indications that issue of individual and group rights, 
and hence human security, are increasingly viewed as matters of international 
security concern.3  The ICISS report made a series of recommendations, the 
                                                 
3  See the case of Myanmar in Andy Newman and Seth Mydans, "UN Aid Official Criticises 
Junta," The New York Times, 9 May 2008. 
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Secretary General’s High Level Panel and the Secretary General himself have also 
addressed the issue and proposed guidelines for the Security Council in considering 
intervention in humanitarian crises.4  
Development and human security 
Shifting the focus to global governance at “C”, the Cambodian experience provides 
significant lessons for the way in which development assistance programmes are 
formulated and implemented.  After more than a decade of large-scale international 
development assistance in Cambodia, many rural people continue to suffer avoidable 
human insecurities.  The basic problem is that international development institutions 
have attempted to apply universal solutions which are not readily consistent with the 
social and political realities.  People in rural Cambodia do not live in a free and open 
democracy, participation and empowerment is severely hampered by local politics 
and a society that retains authoritarian traits and systems of patronage.  People are, 
however, generally keen to take advantage of whatever opportunities arise and ask 
for better education and health services, a justice system that can be trusted and for 
greater economic and employment opportunities.    
In Cambodia the governance of state institutions is politicised and ineffective.  Also, 
there is no effective political opposition or public scrutiny of the dominant political 
party and its authoritarian government.  Using a human security approach the thesis 
has shown, too, that creating opportunities to alleviate human insecurities is not just 
a matter of bureaucratic processes and of  “good governance”, but of the attitudes, 
values and commitment of civil servants to the achievement of policy outcomes, and 
of a relationship of trust and genuine participation with the public.  Instead of 
confronting these issues, international development agencies have tried to bypass 
them by supporting independently accountable project activities within state 
institutions.  This has done little more than leave the departmental cultures intact and 
corruption rife.  The problem, of course, is that there can be little improvement in the 
civil service without a radical change in the attitude and political will of the nation’s 
leadership.  Without such change, the effort made by rural people to improve their 
lot will continue to be curtailed. 
                                                 
4  See United Nations, "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility," 67. 
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In the case of Cambodia, the human security approach has identified the need for 
international development institutions to focus greater attention on the political 
performance of recipient governments and how they create national policy and 
manage the governance of state institutions.  Too often, the methods promoted by the 
development agencies are not consistent with local society values and culture, but 
assume that these will change to align with western democratic principles and 
processes.  Participation and empowerment are slow to take root in societies 
governed by hierarchy and patronage – especially when the traditional customs and 
values dominate state institutions.  Principles of sovereignty and non-interference 
aside, a human security approach highlights the need to confront these political and 
social issues openly in association with the Cambodian government in the overall 
context of its responsibility to the welfare of its population.  A government which is 
urged to listens to the people, establish trust in state institutions and attempts to 
address human insecurity may achieve more than a government driven from outside 
to implement internationally declared goals. 
Human security – the link between global security and development 
Point “D” in Figure 6.1 represents a vital link in a human security approach to 
security and development.  It is the area in which the Security Council, taking more 
interest in intra-state conflict resolution and prevention, is increasingly dependent 
upon humanitarian and development organisations to protect refugees and displaced 
people, and to provide other humanitarian assistance.  These programmes are 
directly concerned with human security. 
  During the time of Cambodian peace making and peace building efforts, the 
Security Council had little if any direct involvement with global development 
institutions.  Most international development agencies were very limited in what 
development assistance they could bring to Cambodia because of US-led sanctions 
and wider political opposition to the regime in Phnom Penh.  Nevertheless, it is clear 
that once peace was made, global governance institutions quickly assumed their 
stabilising and security role through aid and development programmes.  What the 
Cambodian experience demonstrates is that there was no explicit or formal 
recognition of the interdependence of the two security mechanisms.  Having largely 
failed in its own security role, the Security Council in a sense handed over the 
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security responsibility to global governance.  This pointed to the need for a far closer 
and more explicit recognition of the interdependence between the two approaches to 
security, and for them to build on human security.   
Indeed, the increased involvement of the Security Council with UN and other 
agencies in intra-state conflict resolution in the years since the Cambodian settlement 
has also demanded closer ties between global security and global governance.  This 
relationship is now developing and tentative steps are being taken towards its 
formalisation.  In particular, the two security arms are brought together by the 
formation of a Peacebuilding Commission within the UN to harness resources and 
provide strategic advice on peacebuilding, to focus on post-conflict development 
strategies and to coordinate the activities of agencies associated with post-conflict 
recovery.  The Commission’s membership includes Security Council representatives, 
key donors of financial and military assistance as well as representatives from 
specific UN organizations, with the WB, IMF and other institutional donors invited 
as appropriate.  The Security Council has also recently begun to meet with NGOs, 
which brings the Council into touch regularly with concerns for human security.5  
While these are initial steps opening the Security Council to new approaches, the 
Cambodian case demonstrates the importance of a human security approach to both 
security and development.  The research shows that the common ground between 
global security and global governance lies not only in the security of states but in 
human security as well.  
Achieving security 
Achieving human security depends upon two fundamental changes.  The first 
priority for an international security framework based on human security is that the 
concept be adopted by the UN Security Council as a valid part of its overall 
responsibility for maintaining peace and security in the world.  This closes the 
                                                 
5  Working Group on Women, Peace and Security organised roundtable with the Security 
Council entitled “Towards International Peace and Human Security: Advancing Prevention, 
Participation and Protection in the Work of the Security Council”, 27 January 2004;  See 
also for example the Human Security Network addresses to the Security Council debates on 
children and armed conflict and on the Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace 
and security.  Also  the “Arrias” formula which encourages the Council to consult NGOs in 
conflict resolution processes.  See for example UN Security Council, "Security Council 
Stresses Need for Broad Conflict Prevention Strategy - Underlines Potential Contribution of 
Civil Society in Process: Presidential Statement,"  (SC/8500, 20 September 2005). 
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existing gap between the related imperatives of global and human security.  In the 
short term this is unlikely as key countries such as the US reject the concept of 
human security and focus attention on homeland security.6  It is also unlikely while 
permanent members of the Security Council wish to preserve their privileged 
balance of power rights and are resisting fundamental reforms such as increased 
permanent membership and regional representation.  Nevertheless, there is some 
hope in the longer term that, through UN contact with international civil society 
organisations, attitudes in the Security Council will change and the concept of 
human security might be adopted.7 
Secondly, global development institutions should also adopt human security as their 
primary goal.  The Cambodian case shows that despite the many benefits of the 
development effort, large numbers of people still live in poverty and deprivation, and 
are subject to wide ranging insecurities.  This is largely because development 
policies and practices pursued by donors have been top down rather than based on 
existing social, political and economic conditions.  A human security approach to 
development would place greater emphasis on individual circumstances, leadership 
and the governance of state institutions.  It would also harness human rights and 
human development approaches to a common objective. 
These two basic changes would see human security become a unifying concept to 
focus the activities of global security and global governance on a shared goal.  They 
would also enhance the prospects of peace, security and development in the world. 
Contribution of the thesis 
The thesis has demonstrated the important contribution that can be made by a human 
security analysis based on a broad concept of human security.  It has highlighted the 
critical role of governance in providing the opportunities which are necessary for 
people to be able to achieve human security by their own efforts.  In addition, it 
highlights the need for development approaches to pay greater attention to the 
                                                 
6  It could be argued that homeland security has a strong commitment to human security but 
only within the narrow confines of state boundaries.   
7  See for example United Nations, "Effective Partnerships for Human Security, Sustainable 
Development Theme, as Annual DPI/NGO Conference Opens at Headquarters,"  (UN 
Information Service, NGO/602/PI/1734, 6 September 2006); and UN General Assembly, 
"The Thematic Debate on Human Security," 
www.un.org/ga/president/62/statements/humansecurity/220508.shtml, accessed 2 June 2008. 
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cultures of governance, and to how societal values and customs are reflected in them.  
Only when public sector reforms are understood and accepted as legitimate by the 
people will they be trusted and effective.  To achieve this, donors must work to 
foster a far more committed political leadership which is accountable, not only to 
them, but to the people. 
This thesis has also drawn attention to the link between human security, state and 
global security and development.  The failure of the UN Security Council in the case 
of Cambodia emphasises the importance of including human security as a working 
concept in Council deliberations.  Its main contribution is to show that adoption of 
the broad concept of human security could make a major difference to the way the 
Security Council operates both in relation to its direct responsibility for peace and 
security, and in the increasing involvement of development institutions in 
peacebuilding operations.  Also, it emphasises the need to reform the Security 
Council which, Evatt complained, was “designed to suppress wars or incipient wars 
by organized force, rather than designed to prevent wars by improving those 
economic and social injustices which are likely to cause wars.”8  A human security 
approach offers an important way to address social and economic injustices and to 
prevent war and violence. 
The thesis has demonstrated throughout that human security means refocusing 
security and development on local conditions and people’s needs.  This calls for 
political leaders of all countries, including the permanent members of the Security 
Council, to govern for the human security of their own people and of people 
everywhere. 
 
 
                                                 
8  Herbert Vere Evatt, The United Nations (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1948), 3-6.  
Evatt was Australian Foreign Minister when he participated in and took a leading role in 
negotiating the final UN Charter at the San Francisco Conference, April-June 1945.  
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Cambodian State Formation – Angkor; French Protection; and 
Independence  
Angkor - The Indianised State 
State formation is an ongoing process which involves the development of institutions 
and administrative arrangements to govern the population and to extract resources 
from it for state purposes.  The use of the terms “state”, “king” and “kingdom” in 
relation to the early political entities in Cambodia can be misleading and Funan, an 
entity identified in Chinese records, appears to have embraced a number of 
chiefdoms or local principalities.1  Cambodia’s  processes of state formation were 
based on the gradual consolidation of power by sovereigns over a number of such 
“indianised” principalities and the formation of a centralized Khmer state whose 
influence spread, in its heyday, across Southeast Asia.2  The process of state 
formation and consolidation of centralized rule was gradual and based on the balance 
of economic, political and, no doubt to some extent, military power and conquest, 
the control and allocation of royal and religious titles, and the assertion of political 
authority by a dominant monarch.3  The Khmer empire which developed eventually 
became a major influence across the region between the 9th and 14th centuries.  Its 
wealth and power attested by the vast complex of temples at Angkor (which means 
                                                 
1  These processes are discussed in Michael Vickery, Society, Economics, and Politics in Pre-
Angkor Cambodia (Tokyo: The Centre for East Asian Cultural Studies for UNESCO, the 
Toyo Bunko, 1998); David Chandler, A History of Cambodia, Second ed. (St Leonards: 
Allen & Unwin, 1993), 11-19; and Sachchidanand Sahai, "Les Institutions Politiques et 
L'Organisation Administrative du Cambodge Ancien (VI-XIII Siècles)," Publications de 
Lécole Française d'Extrême-Orient LXXV (1970): 56. 
2  The seminal study of Cambodia is George Coedès, Les États Hinduisés d'Indochine et 
d'Indonésie, Nouvelle édition revue et mise à jour ed. (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1948).  These 
kingdoms were ‘indianised’ in the sense that their religion, courts and administration 
exhibited, to some extent, the adaptation of aspects of Hindu and Brahman customs, 
particularly the association of ‘kings’ and their local cults with Indian divinities.  They were 
not ‘colonised’.  See also Chandler, A History of Cambodia, 12; Sahai, "Les Institutions 
Politiques."; Vickery, Society, Economics, and Politics in Pre-Angkor Cambodia; and 
George Coedès, The Making of South East Asia, trans. H M Wright (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1966). 
3  Claude Jacques, Angkor, English ed. (Cologne: Konemann, 1999), 41-43; Vickery, Society, 
Economics, and Politics in Pre-Angkor Cambodia, 367-78; Sahai, "Les Institutions 
Politiques," 148; and Coedès, The Making of South East Asia, 88-108.  Coedès offers a more 
formal process of one kingdom overtaken by another. 
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“city”) north of Siem Reap and across present day Cambodia and into Western 
Thailand.4   
Historical sources are primarily concerned with the deeds of kings and their 
monuments and reflect an institutional bias from which only limited information 
about the lives of the common people and villagers has been gleaned.  The building 
of monuments and the vast hydraulic network at Angkor required an economic base 
to provide the surplus wealth not only for construction, but also to support the vast 
army of workers, the royal court and officials and the persons attached to the many 
temples.  In part this seems to have been achieved by bringing religious or temple 
foundations, which already existed within the principalities, under central 
administrative control and by endowing new foundations with land concessions.5  
These were used to “colonise” and “urbanise” the region around Angkor and for 
“herding people into conglomerates from less tightly administered rural areas.”6  
They were production units providing the surplus for the king’s construction works 
and to support the population.  It is not clear what villages existed outside the formal 
organization of  foundations and temples, and what their condition may have been.  
Vickery observes that there is no record of natural villages in pre-Angkor 
inscriptions and that in the Angkor period the references are to “natural communities 
being reorganized into state establishments …”, from which “if we wish to speculate 
further, we might suggest that the Cambodian village was destroyed by state 
intervention in the economy during the 7th to 12th centuries.”7  Groslier even suggests 
that life at Angkor was “more or less” communalised.8  What does seem clear is that 
the economy of Angkor depended upon irrigated rice production and a sophisticated 
bureaucratic administration necessary to achieve this.9   
                                                 
4  Angkorian monuments extend across present day Cambodia into Thailand.  See Damian 
Evans et al., "A Comprehensive Archaeological Map of the World's Largest Pre-industrial 
Settlement Complex at Angkor," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104, no. 
36 (2007): 14277-82, for the latest  research on the extent of Angkor.  
5  Coedès, The Making of South East Asia, 100. 
6  Chandler, A History of Cambodia, 43; and Sahai, "Les Institutions Politiques," 28.    
7  Vickery, Society, Economics, and Politics in Pre-Angkor Cambodia, 312. 
8  Bernard P Groslier, Angkor et le Cambodge au XVIe Siècle d'après les Sources Portugaises 
et Espagnoles (Presses Universitaires de France, 1958), 121. 
9  It is still debated whether the hydraulic complex at Angkor was designed specifically for 
irrigation of other urban/religious purpose.  Vickery, Society, Economics, and Politics in 
Pre-Angkor Cambodia, 300; Chandler, A History of Cambodia, 54; and Evans et al., "A 
Comprehensive Archaeological Map of the World's Largest Pre-industrial Settlement 
Complex at Angkor."    
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During the 13th century there was a trend in the Cambodian economic base away 
from irrigated agriculture at Angkor towards trade, mainly in forest products.  Other 
significant changes were a weakening of control over areas in Thailand, which were 
coming under the influence of a rising Ayudhya, and an increasing adoption of 
Theravada Buddhism.  Eventually, whether due to harassment by neighbouring 
states, the adoption of Buddhism, the silting of the extensive irrigation works at 
Angkor or simply the change to a trading economy, the capital was moved to 
Oudong, on the Mekong with direct trade access to the sea.10  The fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries saw an almost continuous state of conflict with the Thai and, in 
1473, the provinces of Chantaburi, Korat and Angkor were taken by Thailand.11  
Regional conflict continued through the 16th century but Cambodia, though 
territorially reduced, remained a force in the region.12 
With the move of the Cambodian court to Oudong (and later to Lovek), instead of an 
emphasis on foundations producing an agricultural surplus for religious and public 
works, there were now trading villages (kompong) established along the banks of 
navigable rivers.  Behind these were the rice growing hamlets and the forests with 
their isolated minority villages.  The rice growing villages or hamlets as an entity 
must have been reconstituted as the state abandoned its foundation production 
units.13  It is unlikely to have been an easy transition for villagers, especially as it 
presents a vastly different picture from the urbanization of the Angkor period and its 
particular form of peasant organization.  This meant that not only the village 
structure but also the central administration would need to have changed to meet the 
new economic realities.  It is also possible that the disruptions to peasant society 
meant that the village and family were only weakly re-organised and did not create 
discrete cohesive units—a description of Cambodian village society that has become 
                                                 
10  Chandler, A History of Cambodia, 77-79.  Chandler takes the view that the increased interest 
in trading made Oudong, with its access to the sea, a more attractive site.   
11  Coedès, The Making of South East Asia, 196.   
12  There were Cambodian forays into Thailand after it was weakened by Burmese attacks and 
the sacking of Ayudhya in 1569.  Angkor was re-occupied briefly in the late 1570s and, in 
1594, it was the new capital Lovek itself that was captured by the Thais.  
13  Forest makes the point that there were radical administrative changes from the Angkor 
period.  Alain Forest, Le Cambodge et la Colonisation Française: Histoire d'une 
Colonisation sans Heurts (1897-1920) (Paris: Éditions L'Harmattan, 1980), 31-32.  Vickery 
however argues that the structure of society did not change from Angkor times.  See Michael 
Vickery, Kampuchea: Politics, Economics and Society (London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 
1986), 51.   
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the norm in recent studies.14  The villagers’ existence, however, remained precarious 
in terms of the demands that could be made by the king and his officials.  In return 
the role of the king appears to have been primarily ceremonial in the performance of 
ritual for ensuring good harvests.  He offered little if any protection from rapacious 
officials who continued to collect a surplus from the peasants and make payment to 
the king and religious establishments (keeping some for themselves in lieu of pay).15 
The following centuries were punctuated by fratricidal internal divisions and the  
increasing  involvement of neighbours and, eventually western countries in 
Cambodian affairs.16  There was a period of Vietnamese rule in the nineteenth 
century but unrest and rebellions forced their withdrawal in 1840.17  The continued 
threat and territorial inroads being made by its neighbours prompted the king in 1854 
to seek French protection which was finally granted in July 1863.18 
French Protection – rebellion and state development 
Opposition to the French presence and administrative reforms, together with anti-
monarchical sentiments and demands on the peasants, prompted sporadic organized 
rebellion.  This, along with piracy and banditry, was fairly common throughout the 
first 50 or so years of the French presence.19   
                                                 
14  Vickery, Kampuchea, 52; and Chandler, A History of Cambodia, 87-8.  For analysis of 
peasant life see Jean Delvert, Le Paysan Cambodgien (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1961; reprint, 
1994). 
15  Vickery, Kampuchea, 51. 
16  From the 16th century Portuguese, Spanish and other western influences, as well as Malay 
and Javanese were established in the region as adventurers and traders, the Spaniards in 
particular becoming involved, along with the Thai and Vietnamese in Cambodia’s dynastic 
and territorial claims.  See Groslier, Angkor et le Cambodge; Chandler, A History of 
Cambodia, 86-7.  During the 18th century, Vietnam occupied much of the Mekong delta 
while the western provinces of Battambang and Siem Reap were transferred to Thailand 
which installed a Cambodian official, supported by a Thai army, as governor.  Coedès, The 
Making of South East Asia, 199.  
17  As with the French later, the Vietnamese rationalised their presence in terms of a civilising 
mission and providing material development.  The Emperor saw the Cambodians as his 
“children” and wished to “Vietnamise” them and “… teach them to use oxen, teach them to 
grow more rice, teach them to raise mulberry trees, pigs and ducks …”  The attempt to 
“Vietnamise” Cambodia included bringing Vietnamese officials and clerks in to replace what 
it saw as incompetent Cambodians.  Quoted in Chandler, A History of Cambodia, 126. 
18  Academics generally agree that without French intervention, Cambodia would have been 
divided into Vietnamese and Thai spheres of influence.  Ian Mabbett and David Chandler, 
The Khmers (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 228. 
19  Ben Kiernan and Chanthou Boua, eds., Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea 1942-1981 
(London: Zed Press, 1982), 2; Forest, Le Cambodge et la Colonisation, 454-55; and John 
Tully, France on the Mekong: A History of the Protectorate in Cambodia (Lanham: 
University Press of America, 2002), 73-6.  In1866, Pou Kombo led an anti-French and anti-
monarchical rebellion which involved up to 5,000 troops (including 7-800 Vietnamese).  
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The banditry involved groups of up to 100 or more men, much of it around border 
areas and with the connivance of local authorities.20  In some cases notices were 
placed in villages urging people to violence against the political order.  As well as 
being anti-French, these movements had particular issues relating to taxes, as well as 
the introduction of regulations limiting access to fishing areas and to forests which 
provided important resources to supplement rice production and, in many cases, 
made subsistence possible.  The French presence added to the grievances which for 
centuries had been associated with the demands of officials of a predatory state 
against whom there were no formal checks and balances other than an arbitrary 
process of appeal to higher authority or, as a last resort, the king himself.  The only 
protection perhaps came from a patron or and appeal to local religious leaders, and 
magic.   
The rebellions against the French regularly involved bonzes, respected leaders and 
village officials who gave them some prestige and support among the people, who 
often provided the rebels with food, hid them and gave misleading information to the 
authorities.  In 1916, large numbers of peasants descended on Phnom  Penh to 
complain directly to the king about the level of taxes imposed by the French and 
collected by Cambodian officials.  While this appeared threatening to the French, the 
crowds quietly dispersed when asked by the King to return to their villages.21  
Nevertheless, banditry and revolt continued in the countryside to the extent that in 
1933 a French military officer noted his reluctance to visit Angkor.22  There were 
suggestions, too, that as well as the ongoing banditry, there was also considerable 
Issarak and communist activity from the 1930s as they attempted to form opposition 
activist groups.23  
The French introduced an administration based on the role of Résidents and local 
communes, but did not radically alter the entrenched patronage structure of the king 
                                                                                                                                          
This lasted 18 months and “turned the tiny Khmer kingdom upside down.”  One of Pou 
Kombo’s lieutenants rebelled again in 1872 with 400 men.  In 1876-7, Prince Si Votha led a 
rebellion and was again involved in a major rebellions in 1885-6.  
20  This account comes mainly from Forest’s Chapter XV “Piraterie et Contestation Populaires” 
in Forest, Le Cambodge et la Colonisation, 373-432.  
21  Milton E Osborne, Politics and Power in Cambodia, Studies in Contemporary Southeast 
Asia (Camberwell: Longman, 1973), 22; Chandler, A History of Cambodia, 154; and Forest, 
Le Cambodge et la Colonisation, 412-13. 
22  Tully, France on the Mekong, 161-63, 167.  Tully discusses this as “social banditry” which 
thrives against oppression.   
23  Kiernan and Chanthou Boua, eds., Peasants and Politics, 14. 
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and his officials.  The outcome was a form of entanglement of traditional and 
modern administration which to some extent has survived to the present.24  These 
administrative issues will be taken up in more detail in chapter 5.  There was little 
development of education and health under the French, though transport 
infrastructure and agriculture, including agricultural infrastructure, did expand 
markedly.25   
At the same time, an educated urban élite developed and became involved in 
activities such as the formation of a student association and a Buddhist institute, as 
well as the publication of the first Cambodian newspaper.  This provided a basis for 
discussion among Cambodians and foreign scholars, ultimately leading to a sense of 
political identity and nationalistic aspiration at least among the urban élite.  
Independence and political unrest 
Cambodia’s experience with electoral democracy began soon after the Japanese 
defeat and the return of the French when three parties (Democratic, Liberal and 
Progressive Democrat Parties) were formed to contest the first National Assembly 
elections in 1948, some six years before independence.26  The Democrats used their 
electoral success to push for full independence and were, it seems,  prepared to 
consider violent means through alliance with Issarak guerrillas and, possibly, the 
Communist Viet Minh.27  Sihanouk, who had come to the throne in 1941, distrusted 
the Democrats and pursued his own approach to win independence from the French 
in 1953.  In the process he assumed emergency powers and launched a military 
offensive against the Issarak guerrillas and the communist Khmer People’s 
Revolutionary Front (KPRP) whose forces together controlled 50-60 per cent of the 
countryside in 1952.28  
Independence came to Cambodia at a time when revolutionary independence 
movements were a common feature of decolonisation, and at a time when US 
concern to halt the spread of Communism had already involved it in the Korean war.  
                                                 
24  Osborne, Politics and Power, 25. 
25  Tully, France on the Mekong, 217-29 and 256-85.    
26  All were led by princes.  Prince Sisowath Yuthevong led the Democratic Party (Krom 
Pracheathipodei); Prince Norodom Norindeth the Liberal Party (Kanaq Sereipheap; literally 
Freedom Group); and Prince Norodom Mantana the Progressive Democrats.  
27  Chandler, A History of Cambodia, 175.  The Liberals (funded by the French) were for the 
status quo while the third party had little support and soon disbanded.   
28  Vickery, Kampuchea.  pp. 10-12.   
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The Vietnamese communist victory over the French at Dien Ben Phu led to the 
Geneva Conference in 1954, which set out territorial claims for the Vietnamese and 
Lao communists, but did not grant a territorial base for the Cambodia Communist 
Party (CCP).29  Despite this, some CCP members retained their links with the Viet 
Minh (later the Viet Cong), received training and at times took refuge in Vietnam 
from the Cambodian government forces or from their communist rivals inside 
Cambodia.30   
Continued political factionalism following independence prompted Sihanouk to 
abdicated and yet maintain political power by forming the Sangkum Reastr Niyum 
(People’s Socialist Community), a mass movement to which politicians of all parties 
were required to belong and to express loyalty to the throne (effectively himself).31  
This did little, however, to resolve political differences nor in the long run to secure 
Sihanouk in power.  The performance of political leaders reflected the strong tension 
or, it would seem, almost an incompatibility between parliamentary democracy and 
traditional politics.32   
The 1960s were turbulent years for Cambodia which was plagued by a divided 
political leadership, extensive corruption, revolutionary opposition in the 
countryside, war in Vietnam with increasing Viet Cong incursions into Cambodia 
along the Ho Chi Minh trail, US secret bombing inside Cambodia, and a Cold War 
demanding alignments.  It was a period dominated domestically by Cambodia by the 
larger than life Sihanouk who tried to embrace all political factions within the 
Sangkum Reastr under his own authoritarian rule, whose family and supporters were 
                                                 
29  The Indochina Communist Party under Vietnamese sponsorship had already been divided 
into national parties and the Cambodia Communist Party formed in 1951.  For discussion of 
foundation dates see Michael Vickery, Cambodia: 1975-1982 (Boston: South End Press, 
1984), Chs. 1 and 4.   
 The Conference produced agreement to the cessation of fighting and the withdrawal of 
troops behind specified lines pending elections in 1956.  There were extensive breaches of 
the agreement on all sides leading to the Vietnam war.  Parties at the Conference included 
Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the State of Vietnam, Laos, France, China, 
the USSR, the UK and the US.  
30  Ibid; Michael Vickery, "The Cambodian People's Party: Where has it Come From, Where is 
it Going?," Southeast Asian Affairs 21 (1994): 102-17; Margaret Slocomb, The People's 
Republic of Kampuchea 1979-1989: The Revolution after Pol Pot (Chiang Mai: Silkworm 
Books, 2003), 1-18; and Chandler, A History of Cambodia, 181, 187.  Several thousand 
Cambodian communists and sympathisers went to Vietnam with the Viet Minh.  Some 
returned after 1975 and were largely purged by Pol Pot.  Others return with the Vietnamese 
in 1978-9.  
31  Osborne, Politics and Power, 55-69. 
32  Ibid., 114. 
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deeply involved in corruption and who tried to play off the US and Soviet Union to 
achieve neutrality for Cambodia while turning a blind eye to Viet Cong incursions.  
Despite significant advances in education and with great rural appeal (his semi-
divine kingly status never really denied), he still managed to alienate nearly all 
sections of the élite before being deposed,  It was in the end the inability to manage 
this factionalism and to provide political space for the left as well as the right, which 
led to Sihanouk being overthrown in a right-wing coup in 1970. 
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FIELDWORK ITINERARY 
Fieldwork was undertaken in Cambodia from  24 November— 14 December 2004 to 
make arrangements with local NGOs for later fieldwork and to undertake initial 
documentary research in Battambang and Phnom Penh. 
Further fieldwork was undertaken in Phnom Penh and Battambang Province between 
2 March—30 May 2005. 
Documentation centres and/or staff were accessed at the following institutions: 
Cambodia Development Resource Institute 
Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (CCC) Resource Centre 
University of Pnom Penh - Library 
United Nations Development Programme 
World Bank 
Partnership for Local Governance (Seila) – Battambang  
NGOs: Krom Akphiwat Phum (KAWP) 
Village Support Group (VSG) 
Aphiwat Srey 
Buddhists for Development (BFD) 
Cambodia Mine Action Centre (CMAC) 
Catholic Relief Services (CRS) 
Fisheries Action Coalition Team (FACT) 
Field visits to villages were made as follows: 
 Date NGO rep or organisation Commune 
1 15/3/05 KAWP Prek Norin 
2 17/3/05 VSG  
3 19/3/05  Samrong Khnomg 
5 21-2/3/05 KAWP Bay Damran 
6 25/3/05 VSG Prek Kpop 
7 27/3/05 VSG Prek Kpop 
8 29/3/05 Aphiwat Srey  
9 5/4/05 KAWP Kouk Khmum 
10 7/4/05 KAWP Phnom Sampeou 
11 9/4/05 VSG Prek Kpop 
12 10/4/05 KAWP Phnom Sampeou 
13 21/4/05 Aphiwat Srey Peam Ek 
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1  The following charts are adapted from Eric Putzig and Dave Davenport, "Cambodian Law 
on Commune Elections,"  (Community Legal Education Centre, University of San Francisco 
School of Law, Cambodia Law and Democracy Project, 2001). 
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